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Abstract
This  thesis analyses the commercial relations between Scotland and the geo-
political area known as the Iberian world in the early modern period. Despite being 
geographically one of the largest areas of Europe, as  well as  arguably the politically 
most weighty, there has, until this thesis, been no scholarly research on Scottish 
trade relations with this area. Though the archives suggest regular and sustained 
contact, very little is known about Scottish-Iberian connections beyond the overtly 
political. When compared to northern Europe the region of Iberia and its dominions 
differed significantly, not only due to a different branch of Christianity being practised 
there but also due to the influence of the Habsburg empire and the power it was 
perceived to give the Spanish Habsburgs. Looking predominantly at Scottish 
commercial contacts with Spain, the Spanish Netherlands and Portugal, this project 
considers a number of angles such as England’s impact on Scottish commercial 
relations with Iberia. For example, very little would be known about Scottish 
commercial relations with Iberia in the late-sixteenth century if it were not for the 
Anglo-Spanish war of that period. The central role of conflict in Scottish-Iberian 
relations continues into the seventeenth century, with the Cromwellian/Stuart 
struggles with the Dutch Republic and later disputes between the new state of Great 
Britain and Habsburg Spain all affecting trade. This thesis  demonstrates  the 
important role of triangular and entrepôt trade, which was popular with Scottish 
merchants who wished to obtain Iberian goods without the risks of sailing into North 
African corsair territory. Scots did not merely pick up Iberian goods from the entrepôt 
markets  of London and the Dutch Republic they also organised trade to Iberia and 
its dominions via other Scots, providing evidence of a complex trade network. 
Further, this thesis  has sought to ascertain that, despite the lack of a large Scottish 
community such as those seen in Poland-Lithuania and Scandinavia, Scottish 
commercial relations with Iberia were valuable both to the Scottish economy and its 
merchants. This  thesis which continues the work of the Scotland and the Wider 
World Project, addresses a lack of scholarly work regarding Scottish commercial 
connections with this key geo-political area. 
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Introduction          
‘It certain that since 1581 Scots merchants have begun to make voyages to, and 
have factors in, Spain and other countries where they were not previously 
accustomed to have such intercourse’.1
In 1722 a merchant of Inverness, John Steuart, made an agreement with George 
Ouchterlony, a Scottish merchant living in London. This business  arrangement involved 
Steuart organising a cargo of cod to be sent to Barcelona.2  On 12 December Steuart 
sent a letter on the ship the Ann of London to Messrs. Windar and Ferrand of 
Barcelona, instructing them to sell the cargo of fish as swiftly as possible and, once the 
master of the ship was paid, to remit the proceeds to Ouchterlony. 
  Several questions  can be posed from this incident. Firstly, how did Steuart know 
who to write to; who informed him of these gentlemen based in Barcelona? Secondly, 
how was a merchant from Inverness, a town not recognised as a center of trade in 
Scotland, involved in commercial activities  with Iberia? Finally, and most importantly, 
how indicative from a national perspective is Steuart’s trade with a region in which 
Scottish commercial connections have, until now, remained unexamined? 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine Scottish mercantile connections with 
Iberia and the Spanish Netherlands in the period from 1580-1730.  This project not only 
examines the extent of commodity exchange but also explores  the possibility that 
mercantile networks existed involving Scots  in Iberian trade. Further, this  study has 
sought to establish the relative importance of this trade in comparison to Scottish 
mercantile connections with other areas in Europe and provide evidence of Scottish 
involvement in a jurisdiction that, in the early modern period, spanned the globe. 
 The Iberian Peninsula itself consists of mainland Spain and Portugal, which until 
1581 were separate kingdoms with individual monarchies. However, following the death 
of Cardinal Henrique of Portugal in 1581 the Portuguese throne was inherited by Philip 
II of Spain, a member of the Habsburg family.3  Portugal remained a territory of 
Habsburg Spain until the Portuguese revolt of 1640 when, following internal struggles  in 
Catalonian Spain, the Portuguese, who had been discontented with Spanish rule for 
some time, took the chance to declare independence.4 The extent of the dominions that 
were directly and indirectly under the control of Portugal and Spain in the early modern 
10
1 CSPS, XI,  481. November 1594.
2 William Mackay, ed, The Letter-Book of Baillie John Steuart of Inverness, 1715-1752, Scottish History 
Society, 2nd Series, IX (Edinburgh, 1915), 195. 3 November 1722. 
3 Malyn Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668 (Abingdon, 2005), 169.
4 John Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598-1700 (Oxford 1992), 150-154. 
period is staggering. Obviously, this  included the Spanish Netherlands and the major 
cities of Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels and Ostend. Due to the on-going conflict between 
Habsburg Spain and the new Dutch Republic following the revolt of 1566 these borders 
were liable to change.5 For the purposes of this thesis the search for Scottish mercantile 
connections with the Spanish Netherlands will cease after 1700. The death of the 
Spanish king Carlos II in November 1700 led to a succession crisis and subsequent 
conflict as European powers battled to install their favoured individual as the new king 
of Spain. As a result the jurisdiction of the Spanish Netherlands became increasingly 
changeable, with military successes  leading to Dutch and English (post-1707 British) 
control of the area, before the eventual seceding of the territory to the Austrian 
Habsburgs after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.6   
 Furthermore, Habsburg Spain also controlled much of the Italian Peninsula, 
either directly or indirectly, from the 1560s until the Treaty of Utrecht.7  This  included 
direct control over the kingdoms of Naples, Sardinia, Sicily and the Duchy of Milan, as 
well as  an indirect influence over Genoa and the Papal States.8  These regions in 
Europe were supplemented, and by the end of the seventeenth century surpassed, in 
economic importance, by commercial expansion in the New World. During the period in 
which Spain and Portugal shared a single ruler the Habsburgs controlled the vast 
continent of South America. This territory made itself useful not only in terms of bullion 
but also in long-term commercial enterprise, albeit enterprise which was successful for 
the colonies rather than the Spanish monarchy.9 Finally, we must consider the activities 
of the Portuguese Crown in the East Indies. Scholars  are already aware that William 
Carmichael, a Scot who was in the service of the Portuguese Crown for over thirty 
years during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, traded to China while 
living in Goa, India.10  The fall of Malacca in 1641 to the Verenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie [Dutch East India Company or VOC] marked the end of Portuguese Crown 
involvement in the East following sixty years of decline with only an unofficial empire 
11
5 C. Bruneel, ‘The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands’, translated by James C. Kennedy in J. C. H. Blom & 
E. Lamberts, eds., History of the Low Countries (Oxford, 1999), 242. 
6 Ibid, 238-42. 
7 Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of Italy (Cambridge, 1994), 75.
8 Thomas James Dandelet and John A. Marino, ‘Introduction’, in Thomas James Dandelet and John A. 
Marino, eds., Spain in Italy: Politics, Society and Religion, 1570-1700 (Leiden, 2007), 1-18; Thomas 
James Dandelet, Spanish Rome: 1500-1700 (Harrisonburg, 2001), 215-18. 
9 Lynch, The Hispanic World, 286. 
10 Victor Enthoven, Steve Murdoch and Eila Williamson, eds., The Navigator: The Log of John Anderson 
VOC Pilot-Major, 1640-43 (Leiden, 2010), 88-89; Steve Murdoch, ‘The Good, The Bad and the 
Anonymous: A Preliminary Survey of Scots in The Dutch East Indies, 1612-1707’, Northern Scotland 22 
(Aberdeen, 2002), 63; Steve Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713 
(Leiden, 2010), 106. 
remaining.11  Thus Iberia and the Iberian world offer an opportunity for a detailed 
inspection of Scots and their activities in this  region. This  is a project with clear 
opportunities for research, which, as yet, remains untapped in any meaningful way. In 
this  current work any Scot found trading with or residing in an area which, at that time, 
was under the control of the Spanish or Portuguese Crown has been included either 
directly in the thesis or in the online database Scots in Iberia.12  However, the research 
primarily focuses on those Scots in the Peninsula itself and in the Spanish Netherlands. 
Those who served in the army, navy or worked in the Catholic colleges are better 
documented, and only feature where a commercial connection has been established.
 During the last fifteen years, diaspora studies and, in particular, the extent of 
Scottish interaction with the rest of the world has received serious scholarly attention. 
These studies have surveyed the diplomatic, military and commercial activities of Scots 
in various kingdoms, regions and cities in the early modern period. Prior to this upsurge 
of interest there had been some study of Scots abroad. However, it was  not until the 
work of Douglas Catterall, Alexia Grosjean, Waldemar Kowalski, Steve Murdoch and 
David Worthington in the late 1990s and early 2000s that Scottish diaspora studies 
came to be established as  a subject in its own right, at least for the early modern period. 
By challenging previously understood orthodoxies, these scholars set out to establish 
Scottish links  with early modern Europe rather than merely assume their existence. 
Basing their arguments on solid evidence gained from European archives (as well as 
Scottish repositories) Scottish relations with Europe are now known to be vastly 
removed from what was previously understood. This has, in some cases, lead to a 
prosopographical approach which has succeeded in providing not only direct 
information regarding individuals but also links to others and networks of families. 
 Two regions which had received scholarly attention prior to the recent interest in 
the early modern Scottish Diaspora are the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of Poland-
Lithuania. Scottish mercantile connections with the Dutch Republic were explored in the 
early twentieth century by John Davidson, Alexander Gray and Matthijs  P. Rooseboom, 
all of whom primarily researched the Scottish Staple at Veere. More recently, however, 
Douglas Catterall has investigated Scottish connections with other parts of the region. 
Due to the influence of the Scottish Staple it is only because of Catterall’s work that 
12
11 Newitt, Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 203, 237.
12 See appendix 4.
other areas  of the Dutch Republic have received serious  scholarly investigation.13  In 
particular, Catterall has investigated the effects of Scottish migration upon the city of 
Rotterdam and has shown that, unlike other diaspora communities, the Scottish 
community in Rotterdam was centred around the Scottish Kirk. This was founded in 
1643 and funded by a grant from the city authorities.14 In contrast to similar institutions 
in the city the Scottish Kirk had, along with the responsibility of dispensing poor relief to 
needy Scots, the right to fine and punish their parishioners.15 In this work Catterall has 
shown the frequency with which the Dutch Republic was a general destination of choice 
for migrating Scots. In conjunction he has pointed out that while the presence of the 
Scottish Staple was important, other areas, especially Rotterdam, were just as, if not 
even more, crucial by the mid to late seventeenth century.
 Similarly scholars have been aware of Scotland’s connections with the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth since the beginning of the twentieth century; however, it has 
only been in recent years that scholarly work regarding this  subject has been pursued in 
earnest.16 Waldemar Kowalski and Peter Paul Bajer have done the most to advance this 
study, not only in attempting to quantify how many Scots were in the area but also 
highlighting their commercial impact within local communities.17 In 2005 Kowalski stated 
that there was ‘for the time being’ no reason to ‘refute the estimate of 30,000 or maybe 
even the 50,000 Scots in seventeenth century Poland-Lithuania’.18  This  figure, often 
quoted by scholars, is taken from the contemporary account of the area by William 
Lithgow, who in his travel memoirs noted that there were as many as 30,000 Scottish 
families  in Poland-Lithuania, thus leading to estimates of 50,000 individuals.19 However, 
13
13 For example, investigations of the Scottish Staple can be found in historical literature since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. See John Davidson and Alexander Gray, The Scottish Staple at Veere 
(London, 1909); Theodora Pagan, The Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland (Glasgow, 1926); Matthijs 
P. Rooseboom, The Scottish Staple in the Netherlands (The Hague, 1910).
14 Douglas Catterall, Community without Borders: Scots Migrants and the Changing Face of Power in the 
Dutch Republic, c. 1600-1700 (Leiden, 2002), 194-232.
15 Douglas Catterall, ‘Scots along the Maas, c. 1570-1750’ in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., 
Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period (Leiden, 2005), 178-181. 
16 The recent publication by Peter Paul Bajer provides an impressive and full evaluation of secondary 
sources which examines the Scots in Poland, with both Polish and English language sources scrutinised, 
see Peter Paul Bajer, Scots in the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth 16th to 18th Centuries: The 
Formation and Disappearance of an Ethnic Group (Leiden 2012), 11-26. 
17 See Bajer, Scots in the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth; Waldemar Kowalski, ‘The Placement of 
Urbanised Scots in the Polish Crown during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in Alexia Grosjean 
and Steve Murdoch, eds., Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period (Leiden, 2005), 
53-103;  Waldemar Kowalski, ‘Krakow Citizenship and the Local Scots, 1509-1655’, in Richard Unger, ed, 
Britain and Poland-Lithuania: Contact and Comparison from the Middle Ages to 1795 (Leiden, 2008), 
263-285; Waldemar Kowalski, ‘Scoti, Cives Cracovienses: Their Ethnic and Social Identity, 1570-1660’, in 
David Worthington, ed, British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603-1688 (Leiden, 2010) 67-85.
18 Kowalski, ‘The Placement of Urbanised Scots’, 64. 
19 William Lithgow, The totall discourse of the rare adventures and painefull peregrinations of long 
nineteene years travayles from Scotland to the most famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia and Affrica 
(Glasgow, 1906),244 .
a recent publication by Peter Paul Bajer has refuted this  estimation. While admitting 
that, due to missing records and the unknown numbers of hidden migrants, an exact 
figure is impossible to calculate, Bajer has provided evidence for a much smaller 
community.20  By utilising church records as well as the more traditionally recognised 
burgess registers he has estimated that there were somewhere between 5,000 to 7,000 
individuals in Poland-Lithuania in the 1640s, a significantly lower estimate than 
previously understood by Kowalski.21 As Steve Murdoch and Esther Mijers have argued, 
the problem in this case is an inability to distinguish between Scottish-born individuals 
who migrated to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and individuals  of Scottish 
descent, who, while identified with the Scottish community, were actually born abroad.22 
While these foreign-born individuals may well have identified themselves as, and 
considered themselves to be Scottish, for the purposes of population history they 
cannot be included in discussions regarding Scottish demography.23  This discourse on 
the region, despite quantitative disagreements, has given rise to an understanding of its 
importance in Scottish diaspora studies.  
 As a result of their doctoral studies Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch 
pioneered The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database 
[SSNE], an online research facility with information on British and Irish individuals in 
Scandinavia and Northern Europe from 1580 to 1707.24 The database provides  service 
records for individuals (including commercial, military and political) religious affiliations 
and, where evidence has been provided, information about future generations, allowing 
the historian to discover links and patterns using a simple search engine.25  This has 
been supplemented with publications which set out to examine Scottish relations with 
specific areas of Scandinavia and provide historical context surrounding the individuals 
involved. 
 Alexia Grosjean’s work researching Scottish connections with Sweden from 1569 
to 1654 includes mercantile connections in conjunction with a full evaluation of the 
military relationship between the two countries. It concludes that despite the 
‘Britishness’ of the Stuart monarchy, Scots in Sweden believed themselves to be 
14
20 Bajer, Scots in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 114. 
21 Ibid.
22 Steve Murdoch and Esther Mijers, ‘Migrant Destinations, 1500-1700’ in T. M. Devine and Jenny 
Wormald, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History (Oxford, 2012), 327. 
23 Ibid.
24 Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical 
Database, online at: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/index.php
25 For information as to how the database was constructed and its parameters see Steve Murdoch, ‘The 
Database in Early Modern Scottish History: Scandinavia and Northern Europe, 1580-1707’, Northern 
Studies 32 (1997), 83-103. 
Scottish, as did the Swedish administration.26 Furthermore, while there was no alliance 
on paper between the two kingdoms, Sweden assisted Scotland in the Bishops’ Wars, 
providing military aid to what was  essentially a ‘rebel’ cause.27  Finally, Grosjean 
concludes that it was only with attempts to make a documented alliance during the 
1650s when Scotland was under Cromwellian control and with the death of Axel 
Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, that this unofficial relationship came to an end.28  
 Steve Murdoch’s analysis of Great Britain’s official relations with Denmark-
Norway from 1603 has  laid out the political framework of Scottish interaction with 
Denmark-Norway from the Union of the Crowns to 1660.29  This has been further 
developed in a commercial context by Nina Østby Pederson’s investigation of Scottish 
merchants and burgesses in Bergen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.30 
Grosjean and Murdoch have also examined the Scottish community in Gothenburg, 
where Scots were enticed to the town by the 15-year tax break awarded to foreigners 
who became burgesses.31  More recently, Murdoch has analysed the Scottish 
community in Stockholm, concluding that although Scots did not receive official 
recognition as they did in Gothenburg, this  did not hinder Scottish activities and was 
actually advantageous.32 
 David Worthington’s work differs  slightly from his contemporaries in the sense 
that, rather than investigating Scots in a particular area, he has researched the activities 
of Scots connected with a royal dynasty, the Habsburgs.33  In particular, Worthington 
scrutinises Scots involved in political and military dealings of these predominantly 
Catholic regions during the Thirty Years’ War. In this research he has provided evidence 
of Scots heavily associated with the court of Madrid and the imperial court of Vienna, 
indeed, one of these individuals, William Semple, was connected with Scottish trade to 
Iberia as shall be discussed in chapter two.34  Worthington shows that far from being 
15
26 Alexia Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654 (Leiden, 2003).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Steve Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660 (East Linton, 2001). 
30 See Nina Østby Pederson, ‘Scottish immigration to Bergen in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries’, in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early 
Modern Period (Leiden, 2005).
31 Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in Seventeenth Century Gothenburg’, in 
Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period 
(Leiden, 2005), 192, 196. 
32 Steve Murdoch, ‘Community, Commodity and Commerce: The Stockholm-Scots in the Seventeenth 
Century’, in David Worthington, ed., British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603-1688 (Leiden, 
2010), 47-50. 
33 David Worthington, Scots in Habsburg Service, 1618-1648 (Leiden, 2004).
34 Ibid, 1-104. 
uninterested in the conflict regarding the Palatinate, which previous orthodox histories 
have assumed, Scots in Habsburg areas were eager to involve themselves.
 The Scotland and the Wider World project based at the University of St Andrews 
has also contributed to the field of Scottish diaspora history with individuals involved in 
the project completing theses and publishing their results. Kathrin Zickermann’s study of 
the Elbe-Weser region of Germany is not confined to a single kingdom and 
concentrates on the geographical area as a whole, rather than a political enclave. 
Zickermann focused on Scottish networks in this area and in doing so discovered that 
the region was of significant commercial importance to Scottish merchants despite the 
lack of a structured Scottish community.35 Siobhan Talbott’s thesis focuses on trade with 
France between 1560 and 1713. She has determined that relying on ‘official’ records is 
not always indicative of actual trade relations, and in relation to France is inaccurate, as 
trade continued despite the lack of ‘official’ evidence.36  These studies, exploring 
previously un-researched territories, add to the knowledge not only of migration history, 
but also to Scottish economic and commercial history. 
 Furthermore, Steve Murdoch has investigated the links between Scots in a 
specific region as well as connections between Scots throughout Europe in his 
publication, Network  North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in 
Northern Europe, 1603-1746. This monograph explores  the connections that Scots 
made with each other on the basis of a common denominators including, but not 
exclusive to, familial, confessional and geographical networks.37 For example, Murdoch 
examines the activities  of the Spalding family, in which members of the same family 
were based in Scotland, Sweden and Northern Germany. The Spaldings, upon further 
scrutiny, were engaged in trade with destinations including most of Northern Europe, as 
well as Spain and Portugal.38 Through this research, Murdoch has shown that far from 
being confined to geographical areas, networks of Scots were involved in various 
activities and were spread out over large areas that could involve dozens  of individuals 
in numerous political regions. 
 The importance of diaspora studies and its contribution to Scottish history has 
been a topic of debate for scholars since the late 1990s. Keith M. Brown has criticised 
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the attention given to this subject area, remarking that the study has inflated Scottish 
emigration, where scholars have emphasised Scotland’s links with Europe in order to 
avoid ‘dealing with England’ and the importance of English influence on Scotland.39 
Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch have parried this view in their edited collection, 
Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period. Far from detracting from the 
relationship that Scotland had with England, Grosjean and Murdoch counter that the 
examination of Scottish communities abroad has lead to the discovery of the economic 
and military impact that such communities had on Scotland and, indeed, Britain.40 
Furthermore, Murdoch has argued that until Scottish migration to England is fully 
surveyed in a similar way to Scottish emigration overseas, it is impossible to ascertain 
the significance of England as a destination for emigrating Scots or of England to the 
Scottish economy.41  In addition, Murdoch expresses astonishment that scholars are 
more knowledgable regarding the Scottish diaspora in Poland-Lithuania than that of her 
closest neighbour.42  Limited studies of Scots in England do exist, but most skirt the 
issue of quantification or do not focus  on this aspect and merely give a cursory nod to 
Scots in England. John H. McCulloch’s 1935 publication is an entertaining ramble 
through Scottish historical ties with England from early times but does not provide any 
attempts to quantify the number of Scots in England.43  William Ferguson’s Scottish 
Relations with England: A survey to 1707 attempted to redefine the commonly-held 
belief that the Scottish economy needed the Treaty of Union of 1707 in order to survive 
and concluded that political management, personal greed and bribery were far more 
obvious reasons for the acceptance of the union by the Scottish Parliament.44 
Ferguson’s publication focuses on political interaction with England rather than Scots 
actually based in that kingdom. 
 In 2003 Justine Taylor completed a history of the Royal Scottish Corporation, a 
London charity from 1603 to 2003. In her introduction Taylor points out that the 
corporation ‘became a focal point for Scots in London, not just for Scots poor but as  a 
rallying point for the Scottish nobility and merchants’.45  Prior to 1680, however, the 
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analysis of this charity is frustratingly brief, merely mentioning the most well-known 
London Scots (such as David Ramsay and George Ramsay) and not providing any 
investigation into the possibility of a larger community. Most recently, an edited 
collection by Stana Nenadic attempts to examine the Scots in London in the eighteenth 
century.46  However, in the editor’s introduction it is  clear that a lack of scholarship on 
Scottish activities  in early modern England has limited the work completed, and no 
comparison is made with this  period prior to the Parliamentary Union of 1707.47 A new 
project that started in January 2011 under the guidance Keith M Brown at the University 
of Manchester hopes to rectify this gap in our knowledge, investigating Scottish links 
with England pre-1707. What many of the above publications show is that detailed 
scrutiny of a geo-political region can tell us  much about migration patterns, community 
development, networks  and also the economic links with Scotland. Some of these 
studies also hint at Scottish connections to the Iberian world.  
 Publications regarding Scottish relations with Iberia do exist but these 
concentrate on military and political matters, not mercantile relations. For example, 
David Worthington’s  work detailing Scots in the service of the Habsburg dynasty is 
informative from both a religious and political perspective, but his work does not feature 
trading relations.48  Several authors have also discussed the political relationship 
between Scotland and Spain. Concepción Saenz-Cambra’s 2003 thesis on the links 
between Scotland and Philip II of Spain in the prelude to the Union of Crowns in 1603 is 
of particular note.49  Keith M. Brown, Ruth Grant and Thomas M. McCoog have all 
mentioned Scotland’s political links with Spain, or more particularly the links between
the Scottish Catholic Earls  and their Spanish supporters.50  So while there is an 
understanding of political and crypto-political intrigue, commercial aspects of the Scoto-
Iberian relationship remain enigmatic. The purpose of this  thesis, therefore, is  to redress 
this gap and discuss the mercantile relationship between Iberia and Scotland. 
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References to Scots trading with Iberia do appear in secondary literature, but 
always as part of a wider study on a different topic, rather than as comprehensive 
analysis of Scottish activities in this geo-political area. One of the earliest examples of 
such a study is  T.C Smout’s  monograph, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union: 
1660-1707.51  This publication contains  a brief investigation of Scottish trade 
connections with Spain and Portugal. Smout describes how Iberian goods were 
common in Scotland but concludes that until the 1680s Scottish trade with the region 
was only sporadic and that even post-1680 trade was still poor in comparison to 
Scottish connections to England.52 Smout believes that the lack of Scottish trade with 
the area was possibly due to an absence of resident factors with which Scottish 
merchants could conduct business.53  Another scholar, Sue Mowat, discusses  the 
activities of several Leith merchants engaged in trading tobacco from Spain; however, 
this  information is part of a publication on the history of the port of Leith and not solely 
Scottish-Iberian mercantile connections.54  Eric Graham also hints that Scottish trade 
with Iberia occurred in the early modern period, stating that ships of 50 to 80 tons were 
regularly making the journey to Iberian ports by the 1680s, yet he did not pursue this 
further.55  In 2006 an edited collection was published entitled Irish and Scottish 
Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries. Although this publication examines Irish connections with Spain and in the 
process unearths information on Scots, there is still no work included directly focusing 
on Scottish trade with Iberia.56 In 2013 David Dobson’s publication Scots in Southern 
Europe, 1600-1900 provides the first attempt to quantify the number of Scots in Iberia.57 
However, this publications is not without problems. Firstly, Dobson’s work only lists 
Scots and their basic biographical details and provides no historical context or further 
information regarding their activities. Secondly, of the 1,500 or so entries only 89 pertain 
to Scots in Iberia from the period 1580-1730.58 Of those, more than half were students 
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at Scottish colleges  in Iberia with only 30 noted as merchants.59 As  yet, these tantalising 
references have not encouraged more substantial research to establish the relevance of 
the Iberian world to Scotland and vice versa. What is  still lacking is a specific study on 
whether commercial communities developed and whether the mercantile networks 
which we are aware of in northern Europe were replicated in the south, and if so, on 
what scale. 
General economic histories  of Scotland are also somewhat limited in their 
reference to Scottish trade with the Iberian Peninsula. S.G.E. Lythe and J. Butt refer to 
Iberia as a ‘great potential market, never much exploited by Scotsmen’.60  They further 
point to the length of the journey, described as a ‘disincentive,’ and remark that it was 
not until war with France in the late seventeenth century that Scottish trade with the 
Iberian Peninsula became a common occurrence.61 More recent publications by Ian D. 
Whyte do little to revise this view. Whyte briefly mentions that due to the Dutch Revolt of 
1566 and the subsequent embargo against Dutch trade in Habsburg Spain, Scottish salt 
was increasingly demanded by Dutch markets in place of Biscay salt.62  Gordon 
Donaldson, in his history of Scotland between the reigns of James V and James VII, 
makes a brief reference to Scottish trade with Iberia, remarking that the General 
Assembly tried to prohibit trade with Spain in 1593 on religious grounds.63  He also 
focuses on the will and testament of one Patrick Wood, an Edinburgh merchant involved 
in trade with various areas of Europe including Spain and the Canary islands.64  Like 
other scholars  noted above, this limited reference was not followed up but is suggestive 
that a viable trade network worthy of pursuit did exist.
 As discussed above the edited collection Irish and Scottish Mercantile 
Networks does provide information about Scots - most commonly as part of 
investigations on the presence of Irish merchants in Iberia. It could be argued that the 
experience of Irish merchants in Iberia provides a comparison to this  project: however, 
while the Irish merchant community within Spain in the early modern period has 
received serious scholarly attention by several historians, it is markedly different from 
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the Scottish community and does not provide an adequate comparator.65  As Karin 
Shüller has concluded, the Spanish were able to levy over 20,000 Irish troops in the 
mid-seventeenth century, with several Irish regiments serving in the Spanish 
Netherlands.66  Morales has argued that employment in continental armies was an 
attractive option and that this pragmatic element to migration should not be obscured by 
attempts to label Irish migration to Spain as merely confessional in nature.67 
Nevertheless, students did enroll at Irish colleges in Spain, with seminaries providing 
another common link between the Irish and the Spanish.68 As Spain saw England as a 
competitor on the world stage, it was sympathetic to the discontent of Irish subjects 
during the early modern period.69 In periods  of military strife Spain used this  relationship 
to its advantage, with information being passed both ways to assist the Spanish Crown 
and the Irish rebels.70  For example, Tom O’Connor has argued that the Spanish 
Habsburgs used Ireland to distract English attention away from the conflict with the 
Dutch Republic.71  The relationship between Ireland and Iberia, therefore, was 
completely different to Scotland’s experience and has more in common with Scotland’s 
relationship with France during the height of the Auld Alliance. For example, John 
Cross, British consul in Tenerife, discussed the privileges Irish merchants had on that 
island stating that they refused to pay consular fees and dominated the British merchant 
community there.72 In keeping with the actions  of Scottish merchants during the Anglo-
Spanish war in the late-sixteenth century, this domination was due to the War of 
Spanish Succession which allowed Irish merchants to fill the gap created when British 
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merchants left Spain because of the conflict.73  As chapter five will show, during 
Cromwell’s war with Spain, Scottish merchants were considered fair game for the 
seizure of goods, whereas Irish merchants were not - despite the fact that both 
countries were part of the Cromwellian Commonwealth. Habsburg Spain, therefore, 
while not outwardly antagonistic towards Scottish merchants during times of peace, was 
almost benevolent in its treatment of Irish merchants, which was markedly different to its 
behaviour towards those from England and Scotland.
 The start date of this  study, 1581, marks the accession of Philip II of Spain to the 
throne of Portugal under the title of Philip I of Portugal. According to David, Laird of 
Wemyss, the Scottish royal ambassador to France, 1581 also marked the beginning of 
Scottish voyages to Spain and ‘other countries that were not previously accustomed to 
have such intercourse’.74  The report further adds that not only were Scots  merchants 
voyaging to these areas  but that Scottish factors were present within them, hinting that 
connections began at an even earlier date, but fixing 1581 as a date of importance.75 
For this thesis the investigation continues throughout the seventeenth century and 
terminates at 1730. This allows for a full examination of the effect of the 1707 Treaty of 
Union and, subsequent British foreign policy, upon trade. In a few individual cases 
studies are continued beyond this date in order to fully discuss an individuals career. 
Within the space constraints  of this project it was not possible for the thesis to continue 
beyond this date but, as will be discussed in the conclusion, this  is not to say that trade 
relations ceased. 
   The thesis consists  of six chapters. The first chapter examines the economic 
background of both Iberia and Scotland and will provide answers to the questions of 
who controlled this trade, who conducted commercial activity and dictated various 
treaties between the regions which had an impact upon trade. It also, with a comparison 
provided by English and Irish merchants, details the commodities  that Scotland sent to 
Iberia and its dominions and vice-versa. This background to Iberian-Scottish 
commercial relations becomes all the more important when the complexities of the 
Iberian and more particularly Spanish economy are examined. In the second chapter 
the origins of Scottish commerce with Iberia are investigated. Evidence is drawn from 
the period of the Anglo-Spanish war and shows Scottish merchants  were vital in 
keeping a clandestine trade alive between England and Spain. Significant quantities of 
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Iberian goods made their way to Scotland either as part of triangular trade journeys or 
from the entrepôts of London and Rotterdam and this forms the basis  of chapter three. 
Evidence provided indicates that it is  not always wise to rely on official records for proof 
of where a vessel has been and that Iberian trade is often hidden by the fact that ships 
would call into other ports closer to home. Networks of Scots organizing Iberian trade 
from London and Rotterdam on behalf of colleagues in Scotland are included in this 
chapter, bolstering what is already known about Scottish factors in Europe. Commercial 
connections following the Union of the Crowns until 1660 forms the core of chapter four, 
which ascertains  that Scottish merchants were not merely present in Spain for the use 
of their English counterparts. The fifth chapter concentrates on Scotland’s direct trading 
activities with Iberia from 1660 until 1707. This involves scrutiny of ships that arrived 
into Glasgow and Leith, which shows patterns of trade as well as revealing the Scottish-
based merchants involved. The last chapter is an examination of trade from 1707 until 
1730. Finally, a database has been constructed from the information gathered while 
conducting this project.76 It consists of individuals, skippers  and ships, connected with 
the Iberian Peninsular only, which have been discovered during the duration of this 
project.77 Due to the constraints  of time and space the database is not intended to be 
exhaustive but rather to show that trade with the area was far more significant than 
previously understood.  
 Taken together, these chapters constitute the first dedicated research into early-
modern Scottish-Iberian commercial contacts. By covering a 150-year period it has 
been possible to highlight the importance of this trade, or at least the contributions that 
Scots may have made to Iberian commerce or vice-versa. This  thesis, as part of the 
Scotland and the Wider World Project, thus fills  an identifiable vacuum in the knowledge 
of Scottish commercial activities in the early modern period. It should also provide a 
point of comparison with the works  of other scholars previously mentioned and similar 
investigations focusing on other European nations. 
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Chapter One: The Commercial Standing of Scotland and Iberia 
‘The towne of Bilboa has a good trafficke ye Chief commodity it exports is wolle 
and iron’1
In order to fully interpret trading connections  between Scotland and Iberia an 
understanding of the various economies involved is  required. Further, it is necessary to 
comprehend which authorities controlled and legislated for trade. It is also useful to 
discover whether the actions of these bodies had any meaningful effect on how trade 
was actually carried out by merchants. The first section of this chapter will therefore 
outline the relative economic states of the regions involved, while also examining the 
actions of regulatory bodies in relation to trade. For the Iberian world this will include a 
lengthy investigation of Spain, which - as the political and economic heart of the Iberian 
world - is  crucial to this thesis. Moreover, the Portuguese, the Spanish Netherlands and 
South American economies will also be studied. In comparison the outline of the 
Scottish economy and industrial output is far less expansive but given the much smaller 
geographical area involved this is unsurprising. Secondly, this  chapter discusses the 
commodities that were exchanged between Scotland and Iberia, with a comparison 
provided by English and Irish commodities. The relative importance of these goods to 
the economies in question has been contextualised. For example, it has been 
determined whether the goods that were being exported were essential primary 
products, such as wheat, fish or meat, or whether they were luxuries that could be 
forgone in times of economic depression or hardship, such as wine, oranges and 
lemons. Recognising the pattern of goods traded also gives further evidence as to 
which area held the balance of trade. Finally, alternative origins of commodities will be 
established in order to identify goods which must be excluded from entrepôt arrivals. 
 
1. Iberian Economy and control of trade
1.1 Spain
In discussing the economy of the Iberian world several factors become immediately 
obvious. To begin with there are several separate areas that require attention. Spain, 
Portugal, the Spanish Netherlands, the Italian states and the New World all had 
separate economies and forms of economic control despite sharing a monarch during 
1 NAS, GD406/1/6474. Lord Archibald Hamilton to the Earl of Arran, 13 May 1697. 
the early seventeenth century. Spain was the seat of power for the Habsburg monarchy 
and also the region within the Iberian dominions with which Scotland had the most 
prolific trading relations. However this area is  also the most difficult to analyse 
economically. This is  due, in part, to the regionalisation of the country. As Regina Grafe 
and Alejandra Irigoin explain, 
The crowns of Castile and Aragon were ruled by the same monarch after 
their late fifteenth century unification, but they remained fiscally distinct and 
their internal fragmentation lived on. There was also little fiscal integration 
between Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia in the seventeenth century. Parts  of 
Andalusia kept a substantially distinct tax system after their late Reconquista, 
while in the north the three Basque provinces were governed by an entirely 
distinct fiscal regime.2
This  is  not a recent historical interpretation of the Spanish mainland; in 1971, 
Dominguez Ortiz commented that ‘the Spanish empire was not an economic unit. Even 
Spain itself was not economic unit’.3 David Ringrose concurs, stating that the ‘peninsula 
is  best seen as a large mosaic of self-sufficient local economies buttressed by short 
range exchanges of basic commodities’.4  These observations are mirrored in numerous 
other scholarly works which stress the important role of regionalisation in Spain and the 
differing economic conditions  in each separate area.5  It is  far more fitting to describe 
Spain as a composite monarchy than as a single kingdom. When viewed in this  way, it 
is  easy to see why attempting to impose economic legislation upon the whole of Spain 
proved so difficult. 
 In order to guarantee loyalty from its subjects the Spanish Habsburgs were 
forced to allow a staggering amount of autonomy between the regions. One example of 
this  is  provided by the Basque economy, which was fiscally independent from Castile.6 
The inhabitants  of the Basque regions of Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Álava and Navarre were 
allowed commercial freedom as no customs were payable on that coast, in contrast to 
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other regions.7  The Basque lands were also exempt from paying the alcabala, cientos 
and millones, which were the most important of the Castilian consumption taxes.8 While 
the Basque lands retained autonomy from Castile they were by no means the only area 
to do so; in fact, it appears that unity of economic practice was very much the exception 
rather than the rule in early modern Spain. 
 Henry Kamen has pointed out that the Spain of Carlos II was ruled in much the 
same way as the Spain of Philip II, in that areas were largely left to govern themselves.9 
While this divested the Crown of responsibility (for specific regions) it made the passing 
of Spanish-wide legislation notoriously difficult. For example, in 1617, at the request of 
the kingdom of Valencia, and in an attempt to protect domestic production, foreign silk 
was banned from mainland Spain.10  The silk weaving area of Toledo saw this as an 
attempt by Valencia to corner the market and demanded access to imports of silk from 
abroad, which were of course cheaper.11  In 1620 the Cortes was reminded by Toledo 
that Valencia ‘has no greater right [sic. privileged access  to the Castilian market] than 
the others we have been talking about, like China, Naples, Sicily or Italy’.12 Toledo and 
Valencia did not see themselves as part of the same kingdom but rather as separate 
kingdoms who simply shared a monarch, and in commerce they were rivals. 
 As Grafe and Irigoin have pointed out, the number of judicial systems in use 
across Spain allowed for royal orders to be legally challenged, compromised and, in a 
number of cases, refused outright.13  Taxation could not be passed without the 
permission of the Cortes and in the reign of Philip III this body demanded control of the 
new taxes they levied, in order to ensure that the money collected was being spent 
responsibly.14 Until 1665 (following which the Cortes were no longer called) they were 
the point of negotiation between the Crown and the cities.15 By the reign of Philip III, the 
Cortes understood and took appropriate action concerning the levying of state funds 
and those finances  which were granted to the king personally.16 Moreover, the common 
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phrase used in Spain in order to refuse a royal demand, ‘se obedece, pero no se 
cumple', was invoked regularly on the basis  of Roman law.17  It stated that a monarch 
who was properly informed would not do any harm to his  subjects, thus by invoking a 
non-compliance code the subject implied that the monarch was unaware of the full 
circumstances and the harm that such a royal order could cause.18 This explanation of 
Spanish regionalism is important in understanding the state of the economy in the 
Peninsula during the early modern period and also the difficulties faced in crown 
attempts to pass unifying economic policy. Spain, rather than being controlled by an 
absolute monarch, was instead a conglomerate of states  and kingdoms under the 
control, nominally in some areas, of a monarch who desired to be absolute but who 
lacked the power to be so. 
 Considering the scholarly emphasis on the fractured nature of Spain, it is 
surprising that much of the published research on the Spanish economy in the early 
modern period strives to deliver a verdict on Spain as a whole, rather than breaking the 
area into its political constituencies. Until recently the most common and accepted 
school of thought centred around the economic decline of Spain in the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, where any recovery was slow and not in evidence until the 
post-1660 period at the earliest. Common to this central argument is  the decline of 
silver exports from the New World, which led to a serious economic recession not only 
in Spain but also in Europe more generally.19  Spain’s export trade, which consisted 
mainly of primary goods, required silver in order to prop up the region’s unfavourable 
balance of trade and thus, when the amount of silver became limited, the economy was 
in serious trouble.20  As  Casey points out, the huge influx of bullion in the sixteenth 
century lead to a seismic shift in market relations which the Peninsula was unprepared 
for.21  By the 1590s the Crown was already becoming short of silver, at a time of huge 
war expenditure, and decided to debase the currency by using copper coins to replace 
the circulation of silver.22 In 1603 this  vellon was stamped at double its  face value and 
thus began a toxic cycle of inflation which hid the fall in real prices and caused 
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economic destabilisation for the whole of Spain.23 This led to a situation in which goods 
had two prices: a silver price, which to all intents and purposes was theoretical, and a 
price in copper vellon.24  For the sixty years following 1620 the Spanish Crown 
alternated between cutting the value of copper by huge amounts, in an attempt to 
control the spiralling economy, and then legislating more copper issues whenever the 
monarchy needed ready cash.25  In 1680 decisive action was finally taken, with vellon 
being devalued by seventy-five percent. While this resulted in what has been described 
as economic chaos  it also gave the monetary system the stability it needed and finally 
allowed for meaningful recovery.26  This  turmoil in the monetary system has long been 
cited as a major reason behind the decline of Spain’s economy in the seventeenth 
century. 
 However, other factors  have also received attention by historians. An 
unfavourable balance of trade recognised from the period of Ferdinand and Isabella is 
believed to have contributed to an economic system which was perceived to have been 
dominated by foreign traders.27 Henry Kamen has further added that the influx of silver 
resulted in a huge but unsustainable growth in wealth which could not to be supported 
by what Spain produced.28 This led to domination by both foreign wealth and overseas 
traders who could exploit the economic situation in Spain.29 These fiscal concerns were 
worsened by a demographic crisis  at the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
particularly in Castile, with ‘former cities becoming large towns’.30  This  is confirmed by 
contemporary reports, such as  that by William Lithgow of Lanark, who described the 
Spanish countryside:
The most penurious peasants in the World be heere, whose Quotidian 
moanes might draw teares from stones. Their Villages  stand as wast as like 
the Sabunck, Garamont, or Arabian Pavilleons, wanting Gardens, Hedges, 
Closses, Barnes, or Backe-sides: This sluggish and idle husbandry, being a 
natural instinct of their neighbour or paternal Moores.31
Segovia, which in the second half of the sixteenth century was the industrial hub of the 
interior, lost fifty percent of its  population between its 1580 heyday and the mid-
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seventeenth century.32 Furthermore, the expulsion of the Moriscos  in 1609 led not only 
to a catastrophic loss of population, but also to the removal of the most economically 
productive sector of the population.33  This was combined with serious and sustained 
subsistence crises and the outbreaks of pestilence and disease which, although 
common throughout early modern Europe, piled more woes upon Habsburg Spain. 
Between 1596 and 1602 plague is believed to have claimed 600,000-700,000 lives in 
Castile alone. Given that the population of mainland Spain was estimated to be at best 
eight million towards the end of the sixteenth century, this number is staggering.34 
Further plagues and famines which struck throughout the first half of the seventeenth 
century were made more severe due to the fiscal crisis.35 
 Other factors which influenced the economy of mainland Spain also included 
transportation, agriculture and the influence of the Mesta. Commercial transportation 
within Spain was an arduous, costly and time-intensive task.36 There were few items of 
merchandise that were profitable and hardy enough to withstand a long inland journey 
on roads that were so poorly developed.37  Tolls were supposed to be levied by public 
bodies in order to ensure the upkeep of roads and their suitability for commercial traffic; 
however, the money collected was not necessarily used for the purpose in which it was 
intended.38 Beasts  used to transport goods were also in short supply; they were often 
agricultural animals, so would be unavailable when needed on the land.39 Transport by 
water would appear to be the most practical solution for the movement of goods 
throughout Spain, however, most rivers could only support insignificant trade traffic.40 
Agriculture in Spain was  also problematic due in large part to the climate and 
topography of mainland Spain, which was described as being unyielding to agriculture 
and either too dry or, in areas where rainfall was adequate, too acidic.41  As Casey 
describes, a ‘huge problem for Spanish farmers was the sheer lack of water’.42 This  was 
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made worse by agricultural practices: mules were used for ploughing, but they did not 
plough to any great depth and thus quickly exhausted the land.43  Finally, orthodox 
histories of the economy of Spain have stated that agriculture was in competition with 
the Mesta, who desired more land in order to graze their sheep: as a result this made 
Habsburg Spain dependent on imports of basic commodities and unable to support 
itself.44 
 The corpus of scholarly work shows that Spain suffered a serious economic 
decline during the last ten years of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth 
centuries. While Henry Kamen, like his  contemporaries, accepts that Spain suffered in 
this  period he argues that ‘it is difficult to see how so undeveloped a nation could have 
‘declined’ before ever becoming rich’.45 While Kamen’s  viewpoint is  the most radical of 
the ‘decline’ scholars, his  view has been eclipsed in recent years by publications 
designed to shed new light on the state of the Spanish economy and to present an 
alternative representation. 
 Recent scholarship has attempted to view the Spanish economy in the same way 
that the politics of Spain are understood, that is, in a regionalised form. This presents its 
own problems. J. Israel, for example, while acknowledging that Spain was essentially a 
composite monarchy, points out that the Kingdom of Castile provided around eighty-five 
percent of the wealth of the Habsburg monarchy. He argues, therefore, that a 
concentration on the economy of Castile when discussing the early modern Spanish 
economy is justified.46 Yun Cansalilla and Thompson agree and further add that Castile 
was ‘in many ways the hub of the entire economy of Europe’.47 This argument has been 
disputed by Angel Sanz García who points out that, rather than discussing Spanish 
economic behaviour in terms of Castile and the other areas, it is more helpful to 
contrast the economic experience of the coast and the interior.48  Cara Rahn Philips 
concurs and examines the Spanish economy in three sections: Castile, Andalusia and 
the south west coast; the north and the north west coasts; and the east and south east 
coasts.49  By examining the economic performance of coastal areas on a standalone 
basis it is clear that not all of Spain was as severely affected by the economic 
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depression that was so destructive for Castile. Regina Grafe has  argued that a 
fundamental shift took place in the seventeenth century in which inland Castile was 
replaced in economic importance by the coastal regions.50  Due to their maritime links 
with the outside world, coastal areas could expand their industries into new sectors 
confident that the need for basic commodities could be met by trading with Europe.51 
Coastal areas did suffer from decline in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, but it is apparent that, unlike the interior, they began to recover and prosper 
(to levels better than pre-1580) from around 1650.52 While Castile, as the seat of power, 
was undoubtedly the heart of political authority in Habsburg Spain, it does not 
necessarily follow that this  area was imperative economically. In fact, as the 
seventeenth century progressed the coasts and their surrounding areas, which could 
easily connect to the outside world, became the main economic force in the Iberian 
Peninsula. 
 Despite regionalisation and the relative economic difference between areas  of 
mainland Spain, several attempts  were made to try and improve the domestic economy 
in the seventeenth century. This was, in part, due to the government understanding of 
the economic situation but also due to the recommendations of the literary movement of 
arbristas. As Elliott has stated, by the early seventeenth century ‘the Spanish clearly felt 
the need to explain what had happened to their country’.53  The arbristas felt that the 
discovery of riches abroad had tainted Spain, resulting in increasing bureaucracy and 
an extravagant and lazy nobility incapable of running their estates correctly.54  It was 
believed that in the golden age of Ferdinand and Isabella, or occasionally under Philip 
II, the Spanish people had been hardworking, sober and dedicated to religion but that 
the wealth of the Indies had corrupted men and made them idle.55  This was made 
worse by the sale of offices which was a quick way for the monarchy to raise funds but 
which led to an inflated and more importantly, poorly qualified administration.56  The 
writing of the arbristas led to attempts to combat the ‘lack of morality’ and improve the 
economy starting with the establishment of the Junta de Reformación. However, by 
1627 the purpose of this organisation shifted from economic reform to using policy to 
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increase revenue to the Crown.57  In 1623, in an attempt to boost home industry, an 
edict was issued forbidding the import of silk or woollen cloth.58 It was hoped, that by 
banning foreign imports, more domestic wool and silk would remain in Spain and feed 
the home industries rather than being exported abroad.59 In 1699 the export of raw silk 
was banned entirely in a further attempt to expand the Spanish textile industry and this 
legislation was reissued several times in the eighteenth century.60  These attempts to 
improve the Spanish balance of trade recognised that exporting huge amounts of raw 
material and importing manufactured goods stifled home industry and thus prevented 
economic growth and prosperity.61  However, government attempts to protect or 
encourage trade suffered from the regular problems of bureaucracy. For example, in 
1624, an attempt was made to protect trade from Dutch privateers by providing armed 
convoys.62 Goods from Andalusia to Northern Europe would be subject to a one percent 
tax in order to help pay for the twenty-four warships which were meant to protect trade 
in that direction, the rest would be gained from prizes and condemnations.63 
Unsurprisingly the institution (Almiratazgo de Sevilla) did not protect trade and instead 
concentrated on confiscating enemy goods, much to the fury of Spanish merchants who 
believed the institution to be a governmental money-making exercise that restricted 
trade.64  In 1625 an attempt was made to bolster the failing economy with the 
establishment of the Junta de Población, Agricultura y Comerico, but its achievements 
were minimal.65  These early efforts  at improving trade, the economy and even the 
country’s morality, proved ineffective due to the administration’s  overwhelming need for 
money. With short-term fiscal concerns dominating the vast majority of legislation, 
economic stability and growth did not rank highly.
 It wasn’t until the latter 1670s that more serious attempts were made to improve 
the industrial and economic condition of Spain, but even these did not prove successful. 
In 1679 the Junta de Comercio was established by royal decree, its purpose being to 
develop industry and the economy in Spain. One of the first orders of this  institution was 
to bring expert cloth workers to Spain from northern and eastern Europe to attempt to 
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expand the home textile industry.66 However, the Junta was beset with problems and, 
despite being given jurisdiction over all the territories of the Spanish monarchy, it was 
dissolved shortly after the devaluation of the vellon in February 1680. As has already 
been discussed, this  caused economic pandemonium.67 By 1682 the Junta was  up and 
running again, and the king passed legislation allowing the nobility to become involved 
in industry - a move which previously would have resulted in a loss of noble status.68 
Although the achievements  of the committee were not outstanding, it did draw up plans 
to improve inland water transport, passed measures which attempted to restore 
Spanish shipping and gave subsidies to manufacturers.69 For example, in 1688 the king 
stated that Spanish textile factories were to be given preference over foreign merchants 
when purchasing raw materials.70  In the early 1690s  the Junta was reformed to deal 
exclusively with Castile and Madrid, while separate committees were formed for other 
regions.71 By the late 1680s mainland Spain was beginning to recover. The devaluation, 
although causing much short-term distress, worked to boost the Spanish economy.72 
This  led to a period of sustained, although slow, growth which appeared unaffected by 
the war of Spanish succession. Indeed Jean O McLachlan argues that the economic 
effect upon Spain of the new Bourbon monarchy was nothing less than ‘remarkable’ and 
that the French influence balanced the Spanish budget.73  Kamen goes further and 
states that the War of Spanish Succession assisted the Spanish economy as it was no 
longer burdened by the ‘dead weight of its  European territories’.74 National attempts to 
improve industry and commerce were therefore only partially successful. It is clear that 
in the long term the effects of the new Bourbon monarchy combined with the natural 
recovery of Spanish peninsula were far more effective.
1.2 The Control of Trade in Spain
As well as examining and debating the condition of the Spanish economy in the 
seventeenth century, historians have also discussed the question of who conducted 
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trade in particular regions of Spain. Such interrogation can impart much about the 
relative state of the economy in these areas. In this section the two areas with the 
strongest trade links to Northern Europe, Andalusia and Bilbao, are examined to 
discover who conducted trade in these districts and the role of foreign merchants in this. 
Andalusia was the centre for the trade between the Americas and Castile, with Seville 
and, later in the seventeenth century, Cadiz serving as the central ports  for this trade. 
The Indies trade drew foreign merchants to Andalusia to trade either on their own 
account, or on behalf of others.75 Foreigners were prohibited from dealing in the Indies 
trade but naturally this law was largely unsuccessful given that the use of Spanish 
middle-men, naturalisation and forgery of papers  were all common ways for foreign 
merchants to engage in trade with the Americas from Andalusia.76  The use of foreign 
vessels was another way for overseas traders to become involved as the Spanish were 
unable to provide a strong enough mercantile marine to support the Indies trade 
unaided. In July 1642 the government attempted to outlaw this practice but the 
legislation proved impossible to enforce as  there were simply not enough Spanish 
vessels to conduct the trade.77 The Spanish shipbuilding industry had suffered a serious 
decline in the seventeenth century in the face of the innovations of northern European 
shipbuilding, which were not employed by Spanish shipbuilders.78 Spanish shipbuilding 
was further stifled by wars with the Dutch Republic which prevented the import of vital 
shipbuilding supplies.79 This decline in Spanish vessels  led to an increase in the use of 
foreign ships, and by 1612 Spaniards  were shipping only 30 percent of the wool 
exported from Northern Spain, while foreign merchants organised shipments of the bulk 
to their countries of origin or to wherever their employers ordered.80  As the economic 
efficiency of Northern Europe increased in comparison to Spanish decline during the 
seventeenth century, Spain came to rely more and more on foreign shipping, especially 
in the Indies trade.81  This was coupled with the fact that fleets  to the Indies were 
carrying an ever increasing proportion of foreign goods: Sancho de Moncada recorded 
in 1619 that he believed ninety percent of Indies trade was handled by foreigners.82 The 
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number of overseas traders in Southern Spain also gives an indication as  to who 
conducted trade in this area, where Alicante played host to consuls  from all the major 
European nations by 1630.83 The supremacy of foreign merchants in Andalusian trade 
was such that Lamikiz has argued that the Spanish monopoly on colonial trade existed 
in name only.84  Even differing religious beliefs did not dampen this dominance in 
Andalusia as unfavourable peace treaties forced Philip III to allow Protestants to trade 
as long as they did not contravene local laws and behaved with decorum.85 In Andalusia 
at least, not only were considerable numbers of overseas merchants conducting trade 
but they were also controlling large parts of it, both organising trade with their home 
countries and participating, albeit illegally, in the Indies trade.
 Historical analysis into why foreign merchants  dominated the economic market of 
Castile and especially Andalusia has  determined the main cause for this  to lie in peace 
treaties in which Spanish interests were decisively disadvantaged. For example, peace 
treaties with the Dutch, the ‘English’ and the French have been seen to be seriously 
detrimental to the activities of Spanish merchants especially by allowing foreign 
merchants to conduct trade in Spain. The Habsburg relationship with the Dutch, in 
particular, has important resonances for this thesis due to the importance of the re-
export trade in Spanish goods to Scotland.86 Until the Treaty of Münster in 1648 Dutch 
merchants had difficulties accessing Spanish markets due to the almost constant state 
of war between Habsburg Spain and the new republic. However, the Twelve Year Truce 
(1609) provided a brief respite and gave Dutch merchants the right to trade with Spain 
and its possessions with license from the king. This  allowed Dutch traders access to 
Spain and Portugal. By 1621 war was resumed once more and the Dutch were subject 
to an economic embargo lasting from 1621 to 1648.87 This  certainly did not stop trade 
entirely, as Amsterdam became a trading centre for weapons and munitions for both 
sides, and trade continued between the Dutch Republic and Spanish Netherlands via 
overland routes.88 Habsburg Spain, however, simply could not sustain war against both 
the Dutch Republic and France and thus made moves to conclude peace with the Dutch 
Republic.89  The Treaty of Münster therefore recognised the Dutch Republic as an 
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independent state and was followed by the Spanish-Dutch commercial treaty of 1650 
which granted commercial privileges where, for example, Dutch traders were exempt 
from most of the customs inspection system.90  The treaty was to have far reaching 
implications allowing Dutch merchants to ingratiate themselves in the Spanish market at 
the expense of the English, which led directly to the Navigation Acts and the Anglo-
Dutch Wars.
 France also secured advantageous trading rights in the seventeenth century, 
although not until after the Franco-Spanish war of 1635-1659. Evidence suggests that 
during this war, and in contrast to the Dutch experience, French commerce with Spain 
was seriously curtailed. For example, Dutch consuls  in Alicante, Cadiz, Malaga and 
Seville reported that there were no French ships  or merchants in these areas before 
1659 and those French goods that were entering the Spanish markets arrived under the 
cover of Dutch merchants.91 However, following the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 in 
which Philip IV’s daughter was married to Louis XIV, French goods and merchants 
began to dominate the Spanish market.92 This treaty gave French merchants  the same 
rights as the Dutch, with a limitation on customs duties, no inspection for merchant 
warehouses, their own consuls  and a Judge Conservator for any judicial matters 
involving the French.93 The number of French migrants, immigrants  and traders  in Spain 
became substantial thereafter, with it being estimated that in 1680 there were as many 
as 65,000 French workers  in Spain.94  France’s domination of the commercial market of 
Andalucia cannot be under-estimated with with 37 percent of imports to Alicante in 1667 
coming from France.95  It is clear from the evidence above that foreign merchants  were 
heavily involved in and even conducting large parts of Andalusian trade to Northern 
Europe. This foreign control was disastrous for the Spanish economy; a French memoir 
of 1691 stated that only five percent of the goods shipped from Cadiz to the Americas 
were actually Spanish.96
 The extent to which foreign merchants controlled and conducted trade in early 
modern Spain, especially in Bilbao and the surrounding area, has been subject to 
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debate. Cara Rahn Philips and William D. Philips, for example, argue that although 
foreign merchants were well represented in the wool trade, Spaniards  were still 
prominent; this was due to their role as middlemen between the flock owners  and the 
foreign merchants  who were based on the coast.97 In her thesis examining the trade of 
the northwest coast of Spain, Regina Graph has shown that far from being mutually 
antagonistic, Spanish and English merchants in Cantabria worked together in the north 
Atlantic trade.98  Further, she adds  that attempting to treat the Spanish and English 
colonial trades as completely separate networks is ‘clearly wrong’.99 Grafe is not alone 
in investigating the activities of local merchants: Xabier Lamikiz’s publication 
concentrates on Spanish merchants and their overseas trading networks. His work 
provides some of the most comprehensive evidence as to the significant role played by 
Spanish merchants, especially in Bilbao.100  As has been previously discussed, the 
Basque economy was fiscally independent from that of Castile and was therefore 
markedly different. The economic differences between the Basque economy and that of 
the rest of the Peninsula have been recognised by historians for some time, with it 
being understood that the north and northwest coast appeared to have escaped the 
demographic crisis  that was so economically destructive for Castile.101 Kamen concurs, 
stating that international events in the seventeenth century actually assisted Bilbao, as 
war with France drove trade away from San Sebastian and into the Basque port.102 
Bilbao itself was a major centre for the re-exportation of goods from Castile, such as 
Castilian wool, meat, wax and wood, to name only a few items.103  Although overseas 
traders were as numerous in Bilbao as they were in the rest of Spain - Regina Grafe 
estimates there to have been 90 English merchants  in Bilbao in the period from 1630 to 
1650 - foreign merchants in Bilbao were expected to adhere to different rules.104  For 
example, they could not own property and had to live in the houses of local Spanish 
merchants. Moreover, it was a long and arduous task for a such individuals  to gain 
citizenship.105  While this was viewed as a serious inconvenience, Lamikiz argues that 
due to this system foreign merchants in Bilbao had closer connections to local 
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merchants and this assisted trade.106  Grafe differs  in her analysis of the situation, 
stating that ‘on the whole, the English in Bilbao seem to have made no effort to be 
integrated in the local community’.107  How stringently the rules against property 
ownership were actually policed is also debatable, and Grafe provides an example of 
English merchants renting land without any problems.108  The move to Santander by 
English traders  was not merely in response to what they perceived as  a lack of 
privileges but also an ordinance in 1699 which stated that only local merchants could 
conduct trade.109 From the 1660s onward merchants of Bilbao had worked hard in order 
to secure the impartiality and effectiveness of their mercantile court. This  was followed 
in the 1680s by a serious upturn in the number of local merchants becoming involved in 
trade.110  The increasing reliability of local merchants angered foreign merchants, who 
began to see that their services would no longer be required.111  The advantages that 
the Basque lands held in comparison to the rest of Spain, especially the fiscal and 
jurisdictional advantages, allowed this area to escape the worst of the economic crisis 
that was so devastating for Castile. 
  In this investigation it is clear that rather than being one single kingdom, Spain 
was instead a collection of composite regions with each area having separate judicial 
and local fiscal laws. The importance of regionalisation can also be carried into 
discussions of the Spanish economy. While historians agree that all parts  of Spain 
suffered from economic crisis  during the seventeenth century, it is apparent that various 
regions were affected at separate times and with differing levels of severity.112  Some 
areas of Spain fared better than others, such as the northwest coast, and although 
foreign merchants were heavily involved, and it can be argued, controlled trade in the 
major trading area of Andalusia the situation was not as bleak for Spanish merchants in 
the north and interior Spain, where local merchants were still needed to act as 
intermediaries. Moreover Spain was not the only European economic area to be 
affected by decline in the seventeenth century. It has been recognised that with the 
exception of the Dutch Republic, most of Europe suffered some form of economic crisis 
in this period.113
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1.3 Portugal and the Spanish Dominions
Spain, while obviously the political and, arguably, the economic heart of Iberia, was not 
the only kingdom to make up the Peninsula or the Iberian world. The purpose of this 
section, therefore, is provide a brief economic analysis  of those areas that proved 
important to Scottish mercantile relations with Iberia in the early modern period. 
Beginning with Portugal, this section shall then discuss the Spanish Netherlands and 
finish with South America. 
 For a significant period of time covered by this thesis Portugal was under the rule 
of the Spanish Habsburgs. The period after 1580 marked the beginning of the end for 
Portuguese dominance in East Indies trade and signalled the end of a serious trading 
advantage which Portuguese merchants had long possessed: neutrality. Portuguese 
vessels and traders became fair game to privateers of those kingdoms at war with 
Philip, more specifically the Dutch Republic and England.114 Prior to union with Spain, 
the Portuguese had been the first to exploit the direct trading route to the Indies 
discovered by Vasco de Gama in 1498. In doing so the Portuguese directly challenged 
the Venetian monopoly in spices and pepper. The work of the second viceroy, Francisco 
de Alburqerque, helped to secure the Portuguese hold in the East Indies by capturing 
both Goa and the important trade centre of Malacca.115 The Crown took direct control of 
the trade with the cartez system, in which the Portuguese demanded payment from 
Asian ships for safe passage and, later in the century, the concession system in which 
the right to trading routes  was sold, with both bringing revenue for the Crown.116 These 
systems worked with little cost to the Portuguese Crown and much profit; however, by 
the time of Philip II’s ascension to the Portuguese throne, Dutch and English merchants 
were looking for a way to break into the trade with Portugal's new dynastic status 
providing the perfect excuse. As discussed by Victor Enthoven, Steve Murdoch and Eila 
Williamson, the English and Dutch trading companies initially worked together, viewing 
the Portuguese as ‘common enemy’.117  The Dutch East India Company, under the 
leadership of Governor General Jan Pieterz Coen, in particular, dealt the heaviest blows 
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with ships and territory lost throughout the 1620s.118  By the 1630s  the Portuguese 
control of the East India trade was in ruins and after the fall of Malacca following a five 
month siege in January 1641, only a nominal empire remained.119 Being unable to hold 
on to the East Indies trade with such competition meant that Portugal began to 
concentrate instead on its  South American empire and its relationship with other 
European states.120  Nonetheless, Portugal's  foray into foreign dominions had come at 
serious cost to the country and its  economy. Prior to overseas  expansion Portugal had 
been a largely self-sufficient kingdom able to produce basic necessities. The lure of 
empire, however, changed the economic wellbeing of the kingdom with emigration to 
Brazil and the excitement of riches from abroad drawing people away from the 
countryside.121  L.M.E. Shaw concurs, stating that in the same way as Spain nobles 
were forbidden from engaging in trade and that even the most basic goods like dried 
cod had to be imported.122  Portugal did possess some industry for the production of 
cloth; although, as in Spain, these industries  failed to cope with competition from the 
Dutch Republic, England and France.123   Just as  with Spain, and indeed the rest of 
Europe, it is apparent that Portugal suffered a period of intense economic decline during 
the early seventeenth century and it was not until the closing decades of the century 
that the country’s fortunes began to recover. However, from the 1690s the Portuguese 
balance of trade began to improve, with expanding wine exports and an increasing 
demand for the products of the textile industries.124  
 The almost constant state of war between Spain and the Dutch Republic, from 
1581 through to 1648, had an obvious economic effect upon the Spanish Netherlands. 
As C. Bruneel has commented, the Spanish Netherlands became a buffer zone 
between France and the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century: but, in the 
seventeenth century their position served as point of attack for enemies of Spain.125 
Even a return to Spanish control caused problems for important centres of commerce, 
such as Antwerp. After Antwerp was brought back into Spanish jurisdiction in 1585 the 
authorities gave the people of the city a choice: convert to Catholicism or leave. The 
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large numbers of those who chose the latter option resulted in a serious loss  of 
population and, more importantly, skills  as  the population of 80,000 dropped to 42,000 
in 1589.126  Antwerp had previously been the single most important market for London 
cloth, taking 65 percent of cloth exports from London in 1550: although, the upheavals 
meant that many merchants began to re-locate to Hamburg.127 In 1598 Philip II ceded 
the Spanish Netherlands to his daughter, Isabella, and her husband. This Act of 
Abdication listed strict rules, including banning the Southern Netherlands from trading 
with the Indies, which represented another blow for the trade of the area.128  It can be 
difficult to truly understand the economy of the Spanish Netherlands due to the rapid 
and successful expansion of the Dutch Republic, which cast a shadow over its southern 
neighbour.129 E. H. Kossman describes how the economy of the Spanish Netherlands, 
rather than declining, went through a period of transformation in the seventeenth 
century, with expansion in agriculture and rural industry providing the basis of the new 
economy.130 Bruneel concurs, arguing that while restoring urban economic prosperity is 
a long and difficult process rural prosperity returns very quickly.131 Showing similarity to 
some coastal areas in mainland Spain, it appears  that, while suffering some decline in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the economy of the Spanish 
Netherlands was transformed into a more sustainable and prosperous one. 
 South America and its precious metals were pivotal to the economies of Portugal 
and Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Crown of Castile 
professed sovereignty over New Spain, comprising the Caribbean, modern-day 
Venezuela and all the Iberian possessions to the north of Panama, as well as  Peru, 
Chile and Buenos Aires.132 The Crown of Portugal held dominion over the vast territory 
of Brazil, making the Iberian sovereignty of South America complete.133  The historical 
facts relating to the conquest of South America by Iberian forces are well-known and do 
not require discussion for this thesis, although, it is important to note that, rather than 
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make the new colonies a copy of Iberia, they were instead set to produce goods that 
could not be made in Iberia itself.134  While the New World dominions had many 
commodities to export, such as sugar, tobacco, building materials, cochineal and other 
raw commodities, it was the precious metals and stones which excited the most interest 
in Europe.135  Spain used silver from its dominions in the New World to prop up an 
unfavourable balance of trade. However, by the late sixteenth century the amount of 
silver making its way to Seville was decreasing rapidly.136  This was in part due to a 
decline in the volume of silver that was being extracted but smuggling and bribery both 
in the New World and along the Andalusian coast also played a significant role.137 This 
crisis also affected Portugal, with less silver reaching Lisbon in the early seventeenth 
century, and the Brazilian gold rush not underway until the 1690s.138  While this  period 
presented a decline in New World trade from mainland Iberia’s  perspective, it does not 
necessarily follow that South America itself was in any form of economic decline. A 
significant problem faced by the New World economy was a shortage of labour. This 
was in large part due to the decimation of the local population upon the introduction of 
European diseases such as  smallpox.139 The importation of slaves  from Africa became 
increasingly common as a way in which to provide labour for the new plantation 
industries in South America, particularly in Brazil.140  Moreover, it is estimated that 
2-3,000 people a year may have emigrated from Iberia to South America, though the 
total number of Africans and Europeans remain estimates.141  Similarly to the 
development of the Portuguese empire in the east, South America began, over the 
period of the seventeenth century, to develop both an ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ empire. 
The official empire experienced problems with illegal trade, poor bullion exports and 
increasingly bold Dutch infractions upon Iberian-held territory.142 From its formation the 
Dutch West Indian Company was aware that any trade expansion in the region would 
come at the expense of the Iberian monopoly.143 However, in South America the Dutch 
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Republic could not count on additional pressure being applied on their common 
competitor by England. Although north Brazil fell for a time to Dutch control in 1630 it 
was recaptured by the Portuguese in 1654.144 Further, the resources required to try and 
capture the Spanish treasure fleets actually cost more than was gained.145  Despite 
these problems, when the unofficial or domestic economy of the New World is 
examined without reference to the Iberian mainland, the economic situation of the 
region is more positive. The growth of sustainable industries, such as forestry, sugar 
plantations and cochineal, served to provide a stable basis  to an economy which was 
fast outgrowing that of its Iberian masters  as well as fuelling a thriving trade between 
the various areas of South America.146 Although bullion gave cause for initial excitement 
in the New World, more mundane industries provided the stability that in the long run 
made South America more economically sound than its European masters. 
 The purpose of this section has been to show the diversity and complex nature of 
the economic and commercial conditions of the Iberian world in the early modern 
period. The geo-political sphere of Iberian influence was vast and naturally making 
sound economic evaluations as to the state of so large an area would be foolhardy. 
However, what can be ascertained is that during the period covered by this  thesis, each 
of these regions experienced economic recession during the early modern period, some 
more severely than others. This was then followed by an economic revival, although 
once again the rate of recovery was different between areas.
2. Scottish Economy and the Control of Trade
Analysing the Scottish economy in the early modern period poses far less of a 
challenge than analysing that of Iberia, for two main reasons. Firstly, and most 
obviously, Scotland is  a far smaller landmass than the Iberian world, and even than 
Spain. Secondly, although there were local trends, the Scottish economy and trade was 
controlled by centralised regulatory bodies, albeit by separate groups.  Regionalisation, 
which hampers any cohesive study of the Spanish economy, is not a problem for 
scholars  of the Scottish economy in the seventeenth century. This section of the chapter 
seeks to establish the state of the Scottish economy in the early modern period, which 
is followed by an evaluation of who controlled Scottish trade. 
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 Scottish industry and the economy in the seventeenth century has previously 
been viewed as deficient and of too small a scale to be worthy of major consideration. 
Or, perhaps more accurately, the development of Scottish industry in the seventeenth 
century has  often been overlooked by historians eager to discuss the success of 
post-1707 foundations. For example, T.C. Smout and C.A. Whatley describe Scottish 
manufacture in the seventeenth century as poor and economically backward.147  Keith 
M. Brown concurs, stating that Scotland’s exports consisted of a small number of raw 
materials and a very few manufactories.148
 More recently this orthodox view of Scottish industry and the economy has been 
challenged by Allan I. Macinnes, Gordon Marshall and Ian D. Whyte. Whyte’s 
publications on the Scottish economy have made a thorough analysis of the impressive 
industrial advances made in Scotland during the seventeenth century, thus convincingly 
showing that Scotland was not as economically backward as has been portrayed.149 
Gordon Marshall has pointed out that the establishment of large-scale manufacturing 
enterprises, such as the Newmills cloth factory at Haddington, was indicative of the 
presence of a modern capitalist culture, previously believed to have been non-
existent.150  Macinnes has also argued that the legislation of the Scottish Parliament 
from the 1640s onward proves that the government considered the development of 
industry as essential to the kingdom’s prosperity.151 These more enthusiastic views on 
seventeenth-century Scottish industry have been taken further by Steve Murdoch and 
Kathrin Zickermann. Murdoch argues that Scottish manufacturing entrepreneurs were 
well aware of the limitations in their native land and thus  took their skills abroad to areas 
better suited to their particular industry.152  Daniel Young Leijonancker, for example, 
accelerated the textile industry in Sweden making it a sustained manufacture rather 
than a secondary occupation.153  Zickermann concurs, providing evidence of the textile 
manufactory of Robert Hog and his Dutch partner Anton de Pau, who were equally 
successful in establishing their business abroad. These enterprising gentlemen took full 
advantage of the settlement arranged with Duke George Wilhelm of Braunschweig, 
44
147 C.A. Whatley, ‘The Experience of Work’ in T.M Devine and Rosalind Mitchison, eds., People and 
Society in Scotland, Volume 1: 1760-1830 (Edinburgh, 1988), 227; T.C Smout, Scottish Trade, 205.
148 Keith M. Brown, ‘Reformation to Union, 1560-1707’ in R.A Houston and W.W.J. Knox, eds., The New 
Penguin History of Scotland from the Earliest Time to the Present Day (London, 2001), 207.
149 See Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution and Whyte, Scotland’s Society and Economy.
150 Gordon Marshall, Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of Capitalism in Scotland, 
1560-1707 (Oxford, 1980), 129. 
151 Allan I. Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707 (Cambridge, 2007), 
203. 
152 Steve Murdoch, Network North, 202-204.
153 Murdoch, ‘The Stockholm Scots’, 42-44. 
which provided, among other privileges, exemption from excise charges and the right to 
employ impoverished individuals for seven years.154  This new research does much to 
improve previous opinions  of seventeenth-century Scottish manufacturing capabilities 
by demonstrating ownership and establishment of such industries  in areas more suited 
to sustaining them.   
 T.M. Devine and S.G.E. Lythe have argued that economic growth required 
domestic stability, which in Scotland equated to a strong and capable monarch, and 
peace with the neighbouring kingdom of England.155  This was achieved in Scotland 
during the reign of James VI, and finally allowed Scottish industry and thus the 
economy to expand and develop more rapidly than it had previously. The stability is also 
attested to by the changing nature of the Burgh Records of Edinburgh in the early 
seventeenth century; local residents were able to engage fully in industry without fear of 
serious internal disruption.156 This stability did not lead, however, to an immediate free-
for-all in Scottish industry. In comparison to the Iberian economy and especially Spain, 
the Scottish authorities made far more concerted attempts to improve and protect the 
economy in the seventeenth century. James VI and the Scottish Parliament were keen 
to protect Scottish resources from over-exploitation. For example, in 1609 the Scottish 
Parliament passed an act banning the destruction of Scotland’s  forests for the 
production of iron.157  In April of the same year James angrily replied to a protestation of 
coal manufacturers, who were infuriated at a ban on the exportation of coal: he stated 
that coal did not grow and its  supply declined with each day. He then asked the coal 
owners to consider how the kingdom would be affected if the domestic coal supply was 
exhausted.158  This was not the only protectionist legislation passed in regards  to 
Scottish resources. As discussed by T.C. Smout, Scotland was seriously affected by the 
Little Ice Age, which ran from the thirteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries.159 Although 
Scotland was able to sustain itself, there were no reserves on which to fall back when 
times were hard and thus  legislation was passed preventing the export of vital food 
products from the kingdom.160  For example, in 1587, due to poor harvests  in the 
kingdom, Parliament banned the export of any victual and permission was given to 
45
154 Zickermann, ‘Across the German Sea’, 164-166.  
155 T.M. Devine and S.G.E. Lythe, ‘The Economy of Scotland Under James VI’, Scottish Historical Review 
50 (1971), 94. 
156 Marguerite Wood, ed, Extracts from The Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh: 1604-1626 (Edinburgh, 
1931), ix.
157 RPS, A1609/1/10, 27 January 1609.
158 RPS, 1579/10/43, 10 November 1579; A1597/5/8, 13 May 1597; RPCS, VIII, 575-6. 28 April 1609.
159 T.C. Smout, ‘Land and Sea: The Environment’ in T.M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Modern Scottish History (Oxford, 2012), 21-25.
160 Ibid, 25. 
seize ships  which attempted to leave Scotland carrying such cargo.161 As a result of this 
legislation vessels attempting to export corn to Spain were seized in 1591.162 
Environmental concerns were therefore taken seriously by the Scottish administration 
demonstrating not only attempts to avoid hunger in the population but also to conserve 
Scotland’s natural habitats and resources. 
  A further endeavour was made by the Scottish Parliament to bolster home 
industries. In 1581, for example, the wearing and importing of foreign cloth was 
forbidden by all but the king and the nobility. Parliament argued that the Scottish cloth 
industry kept many poor people employed and that the gentry should be supporting 
them.163  This was followed in 1600 by a proposal by King James that 100 Flemish 
weavers and their families be commissioned to instruct their Scottish counterparts  in the 
better production of cloth. Similarly to Philip III in the 1620s and the advisors  of Carlos II 
in the 1680s, James believed that Scotland could decrease her dependence on foreign 
cloth if good quality, finished cloth was made within the kingdom.164 This plan, however, 
did not flourish; the Flemish weavers received a frosty reception from their Scottish 
counterparts  who resented their input and by 1609 they were no longer instructing 
Scottish workers.165 
 The 1640s represented the beginning of a new era for the Scottish Parliament’s  
attempts to bolster the economy. David Stevenson’s  investigation into the legislation of 
the Covenanting Parliaments of the 1640s shows an unprecedented interest in the state 
of Scottish manufacture.166 In August 1641 a commission was appointed to discuss the 
best way to establish and maintain manufactories, while it also had the power to 
establish correction houses for the ‘idle poor’.167 Other attempts  to improve the Scottish 
economy in the 1640s followed: unfortunately, the kingdom’s political instability and 
financial destitution made it impossible for any real change to occur. These acts were 
not useless however, as they formed the basis of Restoration legislation, which made 
serious attempts to encourage and develop Scotland’s manufacturing industry. 
 The Restoration period led to several pieces of legislation aimed at improving the 
condition of Scotland’s  manufacturing industry. 1661 alone saw numerous acts  passed 
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with the sole purpose of creating a favourable economic environment for large industry. 
The most encompassing of these acts was the Act for erecting manufactories, passed 
in January 1661, which allowed tax exemptions and foreign investors  to establish 
manufactories and to be naturalised as Scottish subjects. Further acts  gave permission 
for joint stock companies, prohibited the export of linen and raw materials that could be 
finished in Scotland, and also banned the importation of goods that would compete with 
home production.168  1681 saw a renewal of this legislation in the Act for encouraging 
Trade and Manufactories, which stated
the import of foreign commodities (which are superfluous or may be made 
within the kingdom be encouragement given to the manufactories thereof) 
had exceedingly exhausted the money of the kingdom. 169
Ian D. Whyte has described Scottish economic policy of this period as ‘muddled’, stating 
that the government dealt best ‘with short term crises’ and ‘paid lip-service’ to the 
protection of the home market.170  From the evidence examined above it is clear that 
from the 1640s onward, the Scottish parliament was determined to encourage home 
industries and prevent the import and export of any commodities which would threaten 
the establishment and livelihood of these ventures.
  Discussions regarding Scottish manufacturing and industry during the 
seventeenth century have often been conducted with a bias towards the Treaty of Union 
and its  perceived necessity for the benefit of the Scottish economy. Several historians 
point to falling exports of commodities, such as coal and linen, as indicative of the 
economic crises that Scotland faced in the late seventeenth century.171 Considering the 
protectionist legislation put in place by the Scottish Parliament after the Restoration, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that exports of raw materials, which were prohibited from being 
exported, declined. Unfortunately, smugglers have not left any records for scholars  to 
analyse, although it is  fair to assume that the smuggling of coal and other goods 
continued. On the Isle of Man, for example, smuggling to both Scotland and Ireland 
flourished in the wake of the Navigation Acts.172 
  Prior to the Act of Union in 1707 there were three regulatory bodies that could 
make laws pertaining to Scotland’s trade: the Privy Council, the Scottish Parliament and 
47
168 RPS, 1661/1/344, 1 January 1661; 1661/1/339, 1 January 1661; 1661/1/340, 1 January 1661; 
1661/1/342, 1 January 1661; 1661/1/388, 1 January 1661. 
169 RPS, 1681/7/36, 13 September 1681. 
170 Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution, 274.
171 See for example, Lythe and Butt, An Economic History of Scotland’; Smout, Scottish Trade; T.C 
Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830 (London, 1998); Whatley, ‘The Experience of Work’. 
172 J.R. Dickenson, The Lordship of Man Under the Stanleys: Government and Economy in the Isle of 
Man,1580-1704 (Manchester, 1996), 331. 
the Convention of Royal Burghs. For the most part the Convention dealt with matters of 
trade and were largely left to their own devices by the other regulatory bodies, although 
the Parliament and Privy Council did become involved during periods of conflict or 
dearth.173 During the 1590s these institutions all passed legislation regarding trade with 
Iberia, in large part due to the Anglo-Spanish war, a fear of globalised Catholicism and, 
as previously discussed, famine.174  In January 1593 the Privy Council issued a new 
proclamation in the wake of the ‘Spanish Blanks’ affair which banned Scots from having 
any interaction with anyone from Spain, with grave consequences for those who 
disobeyed.175  As will be discussed in chapter two, this proclamation was largely 
ineffective. 
The Church of Scotland also sought to limit those Scots  trading with 
predominantly Catholic Iberia and made attempts to curtail the trade. In a meeting of the 
General Assembly held in April 1593 it was ordered that every Christian within the Kirk 
should refrain from going to any of the King of Spain’s dominions, where the ‘tyrranie of 
Inquisitioun is vsed’.176 In June of the same year a minister, William Murray, approached 
the Convention of Royal Burghs and read an act that had been passed at the General 
Assembly requesting the Convention to either ban or suspend trade with the dominions 
of Spain.177  The Convention responded that they were unable to make a decision of 
such magnitude but promised to give an answer to the Provost of Edinburgh in due 
course.178  In July 1593 the Convention conceded, ratifying and approving a ruling that 
made traffic and negotiation with the dominions of Spain illegal.179  The next chapter, 
however, will prove that these proclamations were wholly without success and that 
Scottish merchants and skippers continued to trade with Iberia. 
In contrast to proclamations issued against trade with Iberia, trade with France 
was favoured and measures were taken to ensure advantageous rights for Scottish 
merchants.  As Siobhan Talbott has shown, despite the effects  of the Reformation, the 
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‘Auld Alliance’ still functioned, especially on a mercantile level.180  Moreover, France 
contained significant Protestant populations and maintained royal relations with 
Protestant countries including Sweden and Scotland. Both Talbott and Marie-Claude 
Tucker have pointed to the presence of a small but significant Scottish Protestant 
population in France.181  Furthermore, the military aspect of the relationship between 
Scotland and France continued. Levies  of soldiers  for France were held in the 1630s 
and 1640s when Scottish troops  enlisted to assist in the fight against the Habsburg 
aggressors.182  The idea of Scottish soldiers serving in the French army to fight the 
aggression of the Habsburgs also provides another motive as to why trade with Iberia 
was not favoured by the authorities in the same way that trade with France was.
This  was coupled with fear of the Inquisition which invaded popular thought and 
was largely disproportionate to the number of merchants  who were actually brought 
before the institution.183  Helen Rawlings investigated further, arguing that recent 
research has proven that the Inquisition was not as bloodthirsty as has been historically 
portrayed.184 The Church of Scotland was not alone in its suspicion of those who traded 
with Iberia. Jason Eldred has pointed out that, in England, merchants who traded with 
Spain had to face questions about their faith and consequently their national 
obligations.185 After 1605, however, the Convention of Royal Burghs began to ignore the 
‘official’ stance against trade with Iberia. In July 1607 the burgh of Edinburgh and its 
neighbours along the Firth of Forth were given permission to meet and appoint a 
‘discreitt’ man to be the ‘Counsallado in Spayne’.186  This was followed by the 
appointment of William Crawford as conservator in Portugal two years later.187  The 
situation was a delicate one, as in the wake of the ‘Spanish blanks’, affair it was prudent 
for the Convention to agree with the General Assembly’s  attitude to trade with Iberia. 
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However, once initial fears had died away, the Convention was more than happy to 
encourage what it recognised as a valuable trade connection. 
3. Commodities
Evidence of trade with Iberia before the mid-seventeenth century often only becomes 
apparent in printed primary sources when normal trading practices were interrupted by 
untoward circumstances, such as bad weather, sabotage at sea or a change in the 
political relationship between the Stuart dominions and those of Spain and Portugal. 
Merchants would not trouble the Privy Council or the Scottish Parliament when trade 
was continuing as it should. This situation does provide an idea of the normality of trade 
with Iberia because, had the practice been uncommon, reports of those who traded with 
Spain would be expected. As the trade was not generally reported except where 
problems arose, it can be assumed that commerce with the region was  common 
enough not to arouse suspicion of those who participated in it. Scottish customs records 
from the early seventeenth century period are disappointingly scarce. The late 
seventeenth century, however, is  far more comprehensively provisioned with customs 
records providing evidence of Scottish trade with Iberia, along with evidence of the 
commodities exchanged between the two areas. The purpose of this section, therefore, 
is  to determine the commodities that were exchanged between Iberia and Scotland, 
utilising both printed primary and manuscript resources. 
 The customs records of the Scottish cities of Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and 
Leith provide evidence pertaining to the ships entering and leaving their ports and also 
the commodities  on board. For example, ships leaving Leith for Iberia carried salmon, 
cod, lead, tallow, haddock, felt hats, candles, linen cloth, wheat, and occasionally, re-
exports such as Irish butter.188  The Charles which left Dundee for Cadiz in 1664 is a 
typical example, carrying salmon, linen cloth, wheat, plaiding and tallow.189  From the 
records of The High Court of Admiralty we also learn of other commodities. In 1692 coal 
was transported by George Lockhart, a merchant of Glasgow, while Matthew Campbell, 
master of the William and George of Glasgow, delivered the fuel to Lisbon.190  In 1716 
grain was shipped to Lisbon, with beer and tar among other goods making the journey 
to the Peninsula.191 The planned destination of the vessel obviously made a difference 
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to its  cargo as  ships intended for islands under Iberian control carried a far greater 
proportion of finished goods and domestic necessities. In 1682, for example, the James 
of Wairwater sailed from Glasgow to the Canaries with linen cloth, stockings, gloves, felt 
hats, shoes, feathers  (for beds), shoemaker’s thread and plaiding hose.192 The Dolphin 
of Boston, which departed Glasgow for Madeira in August 1686, left with gloves, thread, 
stockings, hats, sack cloth, coals, grind stones and various other textiles.193 
 The commodities  traded with Iberia by England and Ireland can also provide a 
useful comparison. While textiles featured heavily in English commodities to Spain, 
corn, calf skins and hides were also common.194  Ireland also had a thriving trade with 
Spain.195 Ireland’s exports to Iberia were mostly unfinished and primary goods, such as 
hides, fish, meat, wood and wool.196 It is clear from this evidence that imports  to Spain 
from the British Isles consisted mainly of primary and low-grade manufactured goods. 
Grain, whether corn or wheat, was common, as was beef. Vessels engaging on 
voyages to islands such as the Canaries and Madeira carried a fuller range of goods, 
normally of the domestic variety such as candles and gloves, thus showing the islands’ 
dependence on foreign imports for everyday items.
A large number of commodities came from Iberia to Scotland with some, like 
tobacco, originating in the Iberian empire. Due to its increasing popularity tobacco 
appears in printed sources frequently from the early seventeenth century. More 
specifically, this involved attempts to legislate and regulate the use of this  new 
consumer product. King James despised tobacco and, although there is  evidence to 
show that it was present in Scotland prior to 1612, on 22 May 1616 the import of 
tobacco was banned and its  sale within Scotland prohibited.197  James believed the 
weed was destructive and bewitched people, keeping them from their lawful duty. 
Interestingly, the act also stated that the customs officer who seized the commodity 
could keep half with the other half going to the king.198 It appears, therefore, that while 
the king personally disliked the weed, he was certainly interested in generating revenue 
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for himself from the product. In contrast, James did not ban tobacco in England, instead 
he levied a heavy tax on the commodity.199  While the tax imposed a 4000 percent 
increase on that of his predecessor this did give him an avenue with which to dispose of 
tobacco that he had seized in Scotland, once again demonstrating his shrewdness.200 
Essentially James had made tobacco a crown monopoly and as he procured it by 
confiscation he did not have any of the costs associated with its transport.201  Despite 
the act, the importation of tobacco continued. By the end of 1617 nearly 50 men from 
Edinburgh and Leith had been fined for selling it.202  In 1621 a Leith skipper, John 
Auchmowtie, died at Puerto Real north of Cadiz and among the goods  listed on his ship 
was almost a 180 lbs of tobacco, presumably destined for Scotland.203 
In July 1622 the previous act of 1616 prohibiting the import of tobacco was 
modified, with an admission that imports of tobacco could not be stopped. James 
allowed its  importation, but under very strict conditions and with a customs duty for the 
Crown.204  Captain William Murray gained a monopoly over the import of tobacco in 
March 1623 and plans were discussed for planting tobacco in Scotland in order to 
combat those who were evading the customs tax.205  A further act passed in July of the 
same year attempted to prevent the evasion of the customs tax by prohibiting the 
landing of goods and passengers until all tobacco had been declared.206  Tobacco was 
clearly a fast growing commodity and the Crown was determined to have its share of 
the wealth. Unfortunately, it is  difficult to gauge the success of the acts passed 
regarding tobacco regulation. Smuggling was obviously a problem and the extent of it is 
unclear. 
Salt was another common commodity that came to Scotland from Iberia. Biscay 
salt was vital for the fishing industry and it is  therefore unsurprising that it features in 
printed sources when it became difficult to obtain. In September 1630 it was deemed by 
the Privy Council to be illegal to re-export French or Spanish salt out of the kingdom as 
it was  so important for the curing of fish.207  A number of records mention the import of 
salt from Iberia, such as the will and testament of James Logan, who died owning a 
share in The Diamond, which was collecting a cargo of salt from Spain at the time of his 
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death.208 In 1641 the James of Kirkcaldy was seized by Royal Navy vessels. On board 
were 1,100 bolls of Spanish salt. The bolls were valued at £9 Scots each, the value of 
the salt therefore being almost £10,000 Scots.209  By the 1650s salt from the Bay of 
Biscay was becoming harder to acquire and the Council of Aberdeen pleaded with the 
Cromwellian Council of State to be allowed to procure it from friendly sources.210 Jacob 
Davidsen, a Scoto-Dane from Denmark-Norway, for example, was able to procure 
Spanish salt from Copenhagen in 1611.211  Kathrin Zickermann has also provided 
evidence that Iberian and French salt reached Scotland via the merchants of Bremen 
and Hamburg, who brought the commodity to the Shetland Islands.212  Later in the 
seventeenth century salt was once again procured from Iberia directly; in 1681 the 
Speedwell of Glasgow returned from Cadiz with a cargo of Iberian goods, including 
almost 700 bolls of salt.213 In 1689 the Walter of Glasgow returned from Lisbon similarly 
laden with a significant cargo of salt.214
Iberian fruit was also a standard import, with oranges, lemons and dried figs 
often cropping up in lists of goods from Iberia. In a letter to Colin Campbell, Laird of 
Glenorchy, for example, Archibald Campbell wrote in the postscript that he had sent ‘his 
lady’ two dozen Spanish oranges and was  awaiting the arrival of ‘good new sack from 
Spain’.215  The customs records  from Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith all show 
fruits such as figs, lemons, oranges and raisins, as common imports  along with olives 
and olive oil.216 There were also small (compared to French) but significant imports of 
Iberian wine, which were sold to numerous Leith merchants  in quantities  both for 
personal consumption and obvious re-sale.217  Notable amounts of wine were also 
making their way into the port of Glasgow.218  Other imports included sugar, with the 
passengers of David Robertson bringing aboard with them at Lisbon 12 baskets  of 
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sugar and 2,000 oranges at Lisbon.219  In 1641 a ship, which was on its  way to Leith 
from Cadiz, was seized by Captain Green, an English parliamentarian captain, and was 
found to be carrying Spanish fruits  as well as wine.220  John Auchmowtie’s vessel, the 
Grace of God, contained 36 barrels of figs as  well as the previously mentioned cargo of 
tobacco.221  Finally, another regular import was the cloth die cochineal, which arrived in 
all of Scotland's major ports.222
The popularity of Iberian wines in England is somewhat debated by historians, 
and this discussion provides useful comparison information for Scotland. Davis  states 
that the import of Spanish wine to England grew substantially in the mid-part of the 
seventeenth century, partly due to their higher alcoholic strength than other wines.223 
Shaw concurs similarly for exports  of Portuguese wine to England, albeit this  trade did 
not see significant growth until the 1690s and beyond.224 However, Francis  disagrees, 
pointing out in his  publication on the European wine trade that while Iberian wines were 
being exported to England their quantities were still small in comparison to French 
wines.225 In the case of Portuguese wines Francis argues that they ‘were little heard of’ 
and that when English merchants  submitted a memorial to parliament in 1677 they 
pointed out that, in comparison to the 7,000 tons of French wine imported, only 33 tons 
of Portuguese wine were brought in despite the merchants’ insistence that the wine was 
good wine.226  Figures calculated by Gravil showed that there were 176 tons of wine 
imported from Portugal in 1677, although this is  still markedly less than the 9,645 tons 
imported from France and the 4,012 tons imported from Spain.227
The import of Spanish wine deserves to be given further attention due to the 
taxes placed on this specific commodity. The effects of taxation, in general, led to 
increased expenses  for merchants. Goods  from Iberia were no exception and, in the 
case of Spanish wine, were penalised for their very origin. General customs on goods 
entering the country became a permanent fact in trade during the early years of James 
VI’s adult reign when poor crown finances forced him to establish a customs tax.228 The 
Act Regarding the Impost of Wine, passed in July 1590 allowed the King three ‘crowns 
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of the sun’ of every ton of French and Spanish wine brought into the kingdom.229  Until 
over 50 years later this remained the case, with French and Spanish wine being taxed 
in the same manner. However, in the 1640s a flurry of legislation changed this situation 
and Spanish wine became more expensive than its  French counterpart. The Scottish 
kingdom was in a dire financial position due to the costs of financing armies for both the 
Bishops’ Wars and the requirements of the Solemn League and Covenant.230  Thus, in 
January 1644, to much public disgust, an excise tax was passed which, among many 
items, included Spanish wine.231  Of more interest to this study, however, is the 
difference in tax between French and Spanish wine, with French wine costing only one 
shilling and four pence to import whereas its Spanish counterpart cost two shillings and 
eight pence, double the price.232  This distinction continued into the 1660s and 1670s 
with no reason given in the legislation for the difference between the taxes placed on 
the wines.233 In 1690 the taxes became even more prohibitive on Spanish wine, which 
was charged at £70 pounds more per ton than French and Rhenish wine in 
Edinburgh.234  As yet there is  no evidence to provide an explanation for this  disparity; 
however, it is possible that the more cordial trading relationship with France allowed 
privileges to merchants bringing goods from that kingdom. It may be that initially French 
wine was subject to a lower duty due to the assistance the French government had 
provided, in the form of neutrality, to the Covenanting government in the 1640s.235 
However, after the 1640s there is no clear reason as to the continuing tax discrepancy 
between French and Spanish wines.
Iberian coin is also occasionally recorded, with over £400 Scots  worth of 
Portuguese testans part of the cargo of the previously mentioned James of Kirkcaldy.236 
In August 1591 the Act Regarding the Coin restricted the types of foreign coin allowed 
in the kingdom, in response to the number of false coins  that were circulating and 
differing values being ascribed to coins  that held the same worth.237 In October 1598 the 
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Act Regarding the Course of Foreign Coin attempted to further define the value of 
foreign coins, including those from Iberia.238  By establishing what amounts to an 
exchange rate, King James tried to ensure that all foreign coins in the kingdom would 
command a uniform price. The fact that Spanish and Portuguese coins were listed 
provides evidence as to their presence as a commodity in Scotland. Further, in 1604 the 
family of Sir Thomas Kennedy of Coiff brought their case to the Scottish Parliament. 
They were seeking justice for their brother who was murdered. While the court case 
was a lengthly one, for the purposes of this  thesis  it is  only necessary to note that listed 
among Kennedy’s stolen possessions were Portuguese Ducats.239 It is  possible that, for 
merchants, dealing in foreign coin was preferable to Scottish currency, as Spanish coins 
were internationally recognised. This certainly appears to be the case in the 1680s. 
During his time in Scotland, the Duke of York made attempts to obtain Spanish coin in 
the hope it could improve the buying power of Scottish merchants.240  In one example 
James Gilchrist, merchant of Edinburgh, requested that if any profit remained after 
James Home had bought Iberian goods on his behalf it was to be returned in pieces of 
eight.241
Evidence of Iberian trade is further complicated by the use of non-Iberian ports 
as intermediary staging posts through which Iberian goods were shipped to Scotland. 
When examining the cargoes of ships arriving into Leith this  appears to be the most 
common way for Iberian goods to enter Scotland. By identifying Iberian goods which 
arrived from direct journeys (as shown above) this information can then be used to 
recognise such goods arriving in Scotland from other ports. One vessel from Rotterdam, 
for example, which arrived in July 1691, records among its cargo, figs, raisins and 
sweet oil.242  There are numerous other examples  in the customs records for Aberdeen, 
Dundee, Glasgow and Leith. While this does provide another avenue for which to 
examine Iberian trade it is not without problems. Brandy, indigo, salt, sugar and 
tobacco, in particular, are problematic and unless arriving directly from an Iberian 
source are discounted from this present analysis. Brandy was produced in Spain; but it 
was also produced in France and, thus, when arriving in Scotland from a third party port 
it is impossible to determine the origin of the beverage. While indigo was produced in 
the Spanish colonies it also arrived from the East Indies and the Caribbean.243 The vital 
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mineral of salt also requires careful examination. There is certainly evidence of salt 
arriving directly from Iberia as previously discussed; however, often salt was referred to 
merely as ‘Biscay salt’ or ‘bay salt’ and thus  it is impossible to tell if it originated in 
France or Spain. For example, in April 1672 the Fortune of Borrowstones arrived in 
Aberdeen with a cargo of pepper, figs and salt for the merchant Alexander Burnet, but 
there is  no indication as to the origin of the salt.244  The commodities of sugar and 
tobacco are in the same position: they were both produced in Iberian dominions, but 
from the mid-seventeenth century were increasingly grown in Caribbean plantations or 
colonies in North America under Dutch or English control and thus, until a proven way of 
establishing point of origin is made available, they have been discounted from this 
thesis unless demonstrably from an Iberian port.245  However, this should not detract 
from the importance of third party ports in this body of work: as long as goods can be 
identified as Iberian the use of third party ports was an extremely valuable way of not 
only identifying the extent of Iberian trade, but also the individuals involved.
Conclusion
This  chapter has confronted the difficulties of analysing Scottish-Iberian commercial 
connections in the early modern period. Iberia was, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, a large geo-political area with several different structures  of government in 
place. Indeed, in the case of Spain, regionalisation was so extensive it is almost 
impossible to discuss it as  a unified kingdom and as concerns the economy it would be 
misleading to do so. Possessing such a large overseas empire not only gave Iberia 
great wealth but also caused significant problems, with Castile unable to cope with the 
fundamental market shift brought about by the influx of precious metals. Spain was not 
alone in experiencing economic instability though with Portugal and the Spanish 
Netherlands similarly affected. As a much smaller kingdom, examining the Scottish 
economy does  not prove as much of a challenge, although it is not without problems. A 
tendency to focus on the growth of the Scottish economy during the eighteenth century 
has led to limited interest in Scottish economic development during the late sixteenth 
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and seventeenth centuries. Finally, an examination of primary sources shows the wide 
range of goods exchanged between Iberia and Scotland and vice-versa. However, it is 
important to note that while Scotland imported luxury goods that could be forgone in 
times of hardship, the goods exported to Iberia were essential items such as grain or 
fish. From this analysis the balance of trade was clearly in Scotland's favour.
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Chapter Two: The Anglo-Spanish War and Early Mercantile Connections
‘the samyn day, ratefeis and approvis the act of burrowis maid agains the traffik 
and negotiatioun of burrowis within the dominiouns of Spayne’1
In essence, early mercantile connections between Scotland and Iberia were only 
recorded as a knock-on effect of the Anglo-Spanish war of 1585-1604. While this thesis 
begins in 1580 this  certainly does not suggest that Scottish-Iberian trade relations 
began at that point. However, it was only from the 1580s onward that significant 
evidence of Scottish-Iberian mercantile activities  was recorded in any detail. The reason 
behind this is two-fold: firstly, surviving manuscript sources regarding trade, such as port 
books, are rare prior to 1600 and in Scotland still so even up to the 1660s. Secondly, as 
previously discussed, evidence of trade between Scotland and Iberia often only 
becomes apparent when that trade did not proceed normally. In the late sixteenth 
century this  equated to the disruption caused by the Anglo-Spanish war in which, due to 
their close geographical proximity and language similarities, Scots were either mistaken 
for Englishmen or traded on behalf of their English counterparts. This led to the 
questioning of Scottish skippers  by the English and Iberian authorities who were 
desperate to gain information on the military activities of their enemies. The Anglo-
Spanish war has proved pivotal to this  thesis  by giving evidence of Scottish trading 
activities during this  period. Without such a major political event involving Scotland’s 
closest geographical neighbour and Iberia, evidence of early mercantile connections 
between the two may have gone largely unrecorded.
 The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is  to investigate trade between Scotland 
and Iberia during this early phase. Initially, this involves scrutiny of the delicate political 
situation that Scotland found herself in during the Anglo-Spanish war and how this 
influenced trade. Further, an examination of Scots  who traded with Iberia in this period 
has been conducted. Finally the chapter discusses the activities of Scots who traded on 
behalf of their English counterparts. 
 As might be expected much of the information for this chapter has been 
discovered via English sources, in particular the early modern state papers. As Stephen 
Alford has described these documents were the working papers  of daily government 
and provide an impressive insight into all aspects  of domestic and foreign relations.2 
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Moreover, and importantly for this study, they often do so while at the same time 
illuminating various factors of ordinary life in the sixteenth century. Of the papers used 
for this  study most report on Scottish-Spanish activities which were, due to the conflict, 
of particular interest to Elizabeth’s government, such as the collation of sensitive or 
potentially valuable information concerning England’s enemy. 
 As with all historical documents an element of caution is required in the use of 
these papers which were mostly the personal observations of one individual to another. 
When an ambassador or agents  writes of his own daily actions  one must consider our 
understanding of the individual concerned and whether historians  have concluded that 
person trustworthy or not. If there is no consensus, we have to consider the 
correspondents motives and such issues as  attempts to self-aggrandise or deceive for 
some personal motive. We must also consider how far from the origin of the source the 
author of a letter is and balance first hand reports with general gossip, hearsay or 
information derived through direct interview with a third party. Thus we are left in the 
usual historical quandary of finding that some reports  can be corroborated from other 
sources while others remain more difficult to substantiate. That said it is difficult to see 
why English agents would deliberately lie; and to disregard all reports  where 
corroboration from other sources is not available would be foolish. There are certainly 
cases where informants  can be shown to be misled, or to have misread the information 
they have been given. As such the information derived from state papers here has been 
robustly tested against other sources  where available and correspondents treated as 
legitimate unless there has been good reason to doubt their testimony. 
 Another source utilised in this  chapter which requires more caution are the 
Inquisition records. The theological arguments presented in the records can be complex 
and at times difficult to make sense of. However for the purposes of this  thesis  it is  only 
the details of the individual such as name, place of origin and occupation that are 
utilised.  It would be difficult to discard such important information that tells  us of a 
Scottish skipper and his ship trading with Iberia in this period - and in many cases 
reveals  information on goods and destination. The discussion of whether the said in 
individual was indeed a heretic, an agent of England or a good neutral trader as found 
in the final verdict of the Inquisition is more difficult to evaluate. Nonetheless, scrutiny of 
this  archive has added considerably to the statistical data this  thesis has provided and 
the research is enriched as a result. 
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1. Diplomatic relations and its effect upon trade with Iberia
From 1586 onwards the Anglo-Spanish war placed James VI in a difficult position.  As 
Saenz-Cambra has pointed out, the advent of the 1580s marked a renewed period of 
Spanish interest in Scotland. Scotland’s unstable position at the beginning of James’s 
adult reign, coupled with the rising influence of his Catholic cousin, Esme Stewart, the 
Earl of Lennox, made the kingdom increasingly attractive to Philip II.3  Scotland was and 
generally had been considered the back door to England by various European 
dynasties, usually the French. That it was also thought of as small, insignificant and in 
need of money only supported this  perception.4  It is therefore unsurprising that 
Elizabeth’s network of agents kept a close eye on the Scottish king, his  kingdom and his 
dealings with Philip’s dominions. Their reports consisted of sightings of Spanish ships 
arriving in Scotland, and of Scottish ships  leaving for Spain. For example, in a letter 
from Robert Bowes, an English agent, to Lord Burghley, advisor to Elizabeth, Bowes 
recorded the interview of Englishmen captured by Spanish ships and freed in Orkney. 
He wrote that they believed that a Spanish ship would continue to stay near the islands 
until a ‘fleet of this country bound for Spain come that way’, upon which they would sail 
to Spain in convoy.5  Furthermore, Bowes added that two ships of Kirkwall were 
preparing to sail to Spain although he was unaware if they would ‘have any fellowship 
with the Spaniards’, thus allowing for it to be a purely commercial connection.6 In March 
1595 a report to Bowes from George Nicolson recorded the activities of Scottish ships 
that appeared to be detained in Spain. Nicolson had heard a rumour that they were not 
being allowed to leave due to fears that they would carry intelligence to England. He 
further noted that a Scot, Walter Lindsay, was also there ‘well furnished with treasure, 
but not men, for these parts’.7  This corresponds with an earlier report about Lindsay 
which suggested that he was due to return to Scotland with treasure which he had 
received ‘at the hands  of many princes, and of the clergy and in the churches’; this 
treasure was earmarked for the rebels, presumably the Catholic lords of Scotland.8 
Considering the previous  attempts of Philip II’s agent for Scottish affairs, William 
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Sempill, to both fund and encourage the Earl of Huntly, Lord Maxwell and various other 
Catholic nobles, the assumption that the purpose of this treasure was for covert
operations seems plausible.9  This  was not the only incidence of Scottish ships being 
impounded in the territories  of the Spanish Habsburgs; in 1598 John Udale reported to 
the Earl of Essex that all Scottish vessels had been stopped from leaving Spain, along 
with their masters, so that they could be utilised by the Habsburg king.10 Occasionally, 
Scottish vessels were used in the knowledge that they would go, or were going near, 
the English coast, for example, in the repatriation of prisoners of war. In 1594, a 
Scottish vessel of Dundee was employed to transport Englishmen home from Spain, 
after the men had been captured by Spanish privateers.11  These reports are often 
difficult to substantiate and references to the Scots involved are rarely repeated in 
multiple sources despite extensive searching. 
  As English merchants and vessels were technically banned from trading 
with Philip’s  dominions, gaining information about war-like preparations proved difficult 
for the English authorities. Thus there were occasions when Scottish ships were 
intercepted by Tudor warships and their crews ordered to give information regarding 
their observations while trading with Iberia. In February 1596 John Lowrie, a Scot 
returning from Bordeaux, stated that he had met a fellow countryman who was returning 
from Lisbon, who had told him that Scottish, Irish and Flemish masters were being 
prevented from leaving in order to act as pilots  for the transportation of the Spanish 
army.12 A Scotsman, sailing from Portugal with a cargo of salt in July of the same year, 
reported that two small Spanish vessels had taken several fishing boats in order to 
question the Englishmen on board.13  In September 1601 Gilbert Gardin, master of a 
ship from Dundee, was questioned by Henry Hayworth, the mayor of Dartmouth. Gardin 
reported that he had seen 8,000 troops ready to embark on 35 ships, with more 
expected.14 In a rare piece of corroboration, just over a week later Sir Walter Raleigh 
wrote to Secretary Cecil that two merchants of Aberdeen had reported that 36 large 
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ships had left Lisbon. They were accompanied by Irish vessels, an Irish bishop and 
many priests, with the ships containing 8,000 men, 6,000 of whom were soldiers  and 
were headed, or so the Aberdonians believed, for Ireland.15  John Sempill was also 
questioned on 5 August 1602 in Bristol following a journey from Lisbon.16  In 1603 
conflicting reports were given in a matter of weeks, with Sir Nicholas Parker reporting to 
Cecil that one Scotsman told him of preparations for a great armada in Lisbon. Fifteen 
days later, however, Thomas Brown from the west of Scotland had informed him that 
there was no threat as  the fleet was bound for the East Indies.17  The validity of 
information being gathered obviously has to be questioned and the English agents were 
probably well aware of this. However, the quizzing of Scots  was one of the few 
intelligence-gathering resources available to the English and was presumably better 
than no information at all.
  The desire for information worked both ways. In August 1588 mariners  from ‘little 
Leith’ gave details  to the Spanish authorities on the political affairs in Scotland, such as 
the marriage of the Earl of Huntly to the sister of the Duke of Lennox.18 In March 1598 
John Gibson, the Scottish master of a ship which arrived in Ayamonte, Spain, brought 
information about England to the Spanish authorities.19  These events  proved to be 
simply intelligence gathering rather than suggestive of hostility towards the Scottish 
merchants themselves.20  Occasionally more sinister plans  were discussed. For 
example, in April 1587 the Duke of Parma advised using Scottish triangular trade to 
load Spanish troops onto Scottish ships at Dunkirk, from where they could then be 
taken to Leith.21 In November 1600 the Council of State debated a plan by an Irishman, 
Richard Owen, who stated that Scottish, along with Irish and Breton, ships  should go to 
Spain for wine. Instead of wine, the masters of the vessels  would be paid to load men 
and arms thus creating an invasion force.22  However, far more interest was shown in 
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regards to Scottish diplomatic relations  with Spain, and trade or the improvement of 
trade factored into this diplomacy. 
 In February 1592 Roger Aston wrote to James Hudson that one [John] Ogilvy, 
Laird of Poury, had proposed to go to Spain and procure liberty for Scottish merchants 
to transport English goods to Spain.23  Ogilvy, son of Gilbert Ogilvy of Poury had a 
checkered past and had been implicated in the ‘Spanish blanks’ affair.24  The author 
confidently wrote that ‘he will get no such commission’.25  The following day in a 
communication to Burghley, Bowes stated that King James had told Ogilvy that he 
would not give his permission unless he had the Queen of England’s request to do so 
and the authorization of the ministers  and the merchants.26  It appears that despite 
James VI’s ideas on the matter, Burghley was determined that Ogilvy would not 
succeed in his quest. In a letter to Burghley, Bowes stated that he had written to Aston 
and asked him to ‘dashe’ Ogilvy’s mission to Spain by ‘the delivery of weighty causes 
and reasons expressed in your lordship’s letter mentioned’.27  Furthermore, Bowes 
claimed to have written to Ogilvy attempting to dissuade him from going on his 
journey.28  By 13 March it appeared that despite the efforts of Aston and Bowes, Ogilvy 
had been given leave to travel to Spain.29  In further correspondence, on 22 March, 
Aston had clarified the situation and explained that he had conversed with King James, 
who had informed him that Ogilvy was given permission because ‘he told the King he 
had received letters from yourself commending the journey to be profitable for both the 
realms’.30  However, regardless of the opinion of the Scottish king or Elizabeth’s 
advisors, the Scottish Privy Council clearly thought Ogilvy was dangerous. In 
September 1594 they denounced Ogilvy as a rebel, along with the previously 
mentioned Walter Lindsay, ‘for thair oppin avowing of papistrie’.31
This  ruling did not seem to stop Ogilvy from continuing in his attempts to achieve 
a Scoto-Spanish agreement, for in 1595 he once again advocated a trip to Spain, this 
time with a commission from James to conclude an alliance with Philip II.32 In this  Ogilvy 
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challenged a number of Scots, including ‘Colonel [William] Sempill’, to establish whether 
‘they knew any evil opinion formed of the King of Scots  by Catholics as he could 
remove it’.33  In June of the same year Ogilvy was  in Flanders representing ‘the 
Catholics of Scotland’, though the appointment was entirely of his own making and 
carried no official authority.34 December found Ogilvy in Rome, carrying a sealed paper 
which he claimed showed that James VI wanted to become a Catholic, although the 
Spanish Ambassador, the Duke of Sessa, remarked that he believed Ogilvy to be 
‘cunning’, implying some sort of deceit.35  Unfortunately for Ogilvy his travelling 
companion, John Cecil, an English priest, was actually an informer for Robert Cecil.36 
After travelling to Spain, Ogilvy’s web became unravelled with the Spanish authorities at 
last aware that Ogilvy did not carry a royal commission. This, combined with the report 
of John Cecil, resulted in Ogilvy’s imprisonment for a time.37  For his part, James 
claimed to have no knowledge of Ogilvy’s  actions  and promised to punish him 
severely.38 In January 1601 a letter from Willoughby to Sir Robert Carey, later Earl of 
Monthmouth, informed Carey to search for Ogilvy as he was believed to be in his district 
in the company of an Italian companion.39  He was arrested by Carey and Sir Robert 
Cecil described him as ‘the man I have heard as evil as I have heard of any’.40  On 9 
March 1601 James ordered Ogilvy to appear before the council for his ‘disobedience’.41 
Finally on 17 March, Ogilvy was once again denounced as a rebel and it was declared 
illegal to hide or assist him in any way.42 
Ogilvy was an interesting character whose career and activities are at times 
difficult to follow. However, of prime importance is the reaction of Elizabeth’s  circle of 
agents when it appeared that Ogilvy wished to go to Spain to secure a trade treaty. This 
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was something that simply could not take place in the eyes of Lord Burghley and all 
attempts were made to ensure that Ogilvy’s plan did not go ahead.
 When James did appoint a Spanish conservator, William Orde, it was a hushed 
affair. In June 1593 Bowes wrote to Burghley that a Scottish Catholic by the name of 
Orde, sent to Spain ‘in favour of the papists’, had been apprehended by the local 
authorities on his return to Dysart and sent to the provost of the town.43 This  was not the 
only English report concerning Orde. A letter from Anthony Standen to Anthony Ralston 
from the French town of Fontenay-le-Comte stated that Orde had passed through the 
town on his  way to Scotland and that he had obtained a licence from the ‘King of Spain 
that Scotch merchants  may come and go with all sorts of merchandise’.44  When Orde 
was arrested he was found to be carrying papers from un-named individuals in Spain 
and Flanders  addressed to local Scottish merchants and other burghs. More 
importantly, Orde was in possession of a commission from the Scottish monarch which 
appointed him ‘conservator’ and gave ‘him power and authority, for the benefit of the 
Scottish merchants trading to Spain’.45  King James confirmed that this was the case 
and that he had given Orde his commission under the Great Seal.46  It appeared that 
James had provided Orde with this commission in response to the activities  of English 
merchants who had ‘coloured’ their goods in Spain by pretending to be Scots, which 
had brought Scottish merchants under suspicion.47  Orde was therefore assigned the 
commission to protect Scottish merchants and the king requested that Orde be released 
unless he was held for other charges.48  James obviously wished to provide Scottish 
merchants in Spain with a conservator but did not want to advertise this fact to 
Elizabeth’s agents. The Scottish king was aware that having dealings with England’s 
enemy would reflect badly upon his  reputation in a kingdom that he one day hoped to 
rule. 
The problem of English merchants  pretending to be Scots was obviously 
widespread. As shall be discussed later in the chapter there are numerous  examples of 
the practice. Indeed, in the February prior to Orde’s arrest James had apparently written 
to Philip II and Philip had discussed the matter in a letter to Diego de Orellana de 
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Chaves, the Corregidor of several towns on Spain’s north coast.49  Philip stated that 
James had informed him that many merchants  were forging his  seal and his signature 
in order to be able to trade with Spain illegally.50  Orellana was therefore ordered to 
embargo all Scottish ships and send an inventory of their cargo and more particularly 
their artillery.51  The practice of forging the seal of the King of Scotland was as 
widespread as  English traders pretending to be Scottish. In his attempts to lessen his 
sentence from the Inquisition on the Canary Islands Bartholomew Cole discussed the 
practice, stating that (in regards to forged passports) ‘any stamps needed can without 
difficulty be made in England’.52  He further confessed that he had made a number of 
stamps to mark merchandise that he traded and that he knew that merchants also used 
French and Flemish stamps.53 In August of the following year John Clerk was arrested 
in England for forging the seal of the King of Scotland: however, he was released and 
according to Anthony Bacon, was believed to be on his way to Spain.54 The fact that he 
was released does suggest complicity by the English authorities who, despite their state 
of warfare, knew the economic effect of the conflict was devastating to their own 
commerce. In this light Orde’s appointment appears all the more important. 
 The description of William Orde as ‘Conservator’ by Bowes in the letter to 
Burghley is also of interest. The term conservator was normally reserved for the title of 
the administrator of the Scottish Staple in the Netherlands. The conservator had wide-
ranging powers as  the staple’s highest representative and was the administrator of 
justice in matters concerning Scottish merchants. The Staple in the Low Countries itself 
was, in effect, a Scottish outpost, where Scottish merchants were provided with safe 
anchorage, their own church and the promise of safe lodgings  should it be required.55 
As Murdoch has shown, the idea of a ‘conservator’ who represented all the merchants 
from one nation did cause problems with other British merchants who failed to fully 
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understand the Conservator’s role.56  Therefore, the description of Orde as  a 
conservator, and not merely consul or factor, is of great interest. 
 Political discourse also provided tantalising references to the normality of 
Scottish-Iberian trade. Scottish vessels  were obviously a common sight around the 
coasts  of Spain, with one informer suggesting to his English masters  that, rather than 
try and catch the Spanish fleet returning from South America while at sea, English 
vessels should merely disguise themselves as Scottish and wait in the mouth of the 
Guadalquivir.57 In October 1592 Richard Tomson wrote to Burghley informing him that 
he had been told that many Scots who were ‘evil affected to theire Kinge and countrye, 
are gotten into Spaine and there enterayned bye the kinge’.58 Tomson wrote that he had 
been given this information by Scots who traded to Iberia over the summer.59  In 1592 
the Earl of Huntly arranged for a ship of Dundee to sail to Danzig and then onto Spain 
on the pretext of trading. Unfortunately its  true purpose is not clear, however, the vessel 
was considered suspicious enough for Christian IV of Denmark to assure Queen 
Elizabeth that no Scottish vessels would pass through the Sound.60 Huntly’s plans give 
an indication of the normality of Scottish triangular trade involving Iberia. If the trade 
was considered suspicious, Huntly would not have contemplated such a plan as it 
would have drawn attention to his  scheme; as it was  he was caught out by English 
intelligence.61
2. Scottish trade with Iberia during the Anglo-Spanish War.
While these political dealings  show James VI walking a tightrope between England and 
the Spanish Habsburgs, Scottish merchants themselves were also affected by the 
conflict. That said, Scottish merchants  also traded as normal with their activities 
recorded by the English authorities. In October 1591, for example, it was reported by 
Bowes that four ships from Scotland were ready to sail for Spain.62  In August of the 
same year Juan Velazques, Captain of the province of Guipuzcoa [Basque region], 
granted a trading licence to the Scot William Home.63 This allowed Home to enter into 
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any port in the province with his vessel in order to trade.64 In January 1596 James VI 
wrote in favour of Thomas Bogg, a Scottish merchant trading in Spain.65  In another 
example, John Simpson skippered the New Ship of Aberdeen to Spain in December 
1596 returning in February 1598 with no consequences arising from the war.66  Scots 
were also resident in Spain during this period and in May 1586 Gerald Paris, who was 
in Madrid, wrote to his Scottish friend, Thomas Ray, noting that he hoped that Ray’s 
business would be completed successfully.67 A letter from Philip II to Diego de Orellana 
de Chaves also sheds light on more Scottish traders, based, it appears, in the north of 
Spain. Jacques Lavar, David Devni, Thomas Valeux, David Balcar, Thomas Vallart, 
Baltar Morton and Thomas Enque were all described as carrying authentic licences 
from James VI in order to trade.68  A letter from George Nicolson to Sir Robert Cecil 
noted that two ships of Leith owned by Watty Morton and Solomon Barker had sailed to 
Spain in June 1600 both carrying a cargo of coal.69 In February 1603 William Clepham 
stated to English examiners that he had lived in Portugal for eighteenth months prior to 
his return, with the same entry additionally recording that an Englishman had arrived in 
Lisbon via a Scottish ship.70 Spanish goods were also present in Scotland as William 
Lermouth of St Andrews owed James Flescher, master of the Pearl of Dundee, the sum 
of £300 Scots for Spanish wine.71  Finally, the will and testament of John Whippo, 
master of the Dolphin of Leith, records that Whippo died in Lisbon while he was on a 
trading voyage.72  Scottish commerce with Iberia clearly continued despite the Anglo-
Spanish war with Scottish traders living in and including the dominions of the Spanish 
Habsburgs in their trade. 
 That said, Scottish trade with Iberia did suffer due to the conflict.  An unsigned 
letter, written in early 1588 and obviously intended for English intelligence, indicates that 
Scottish ships were in danger of being seized for use in the Armada stating:
They embargo all kind of ships they can take, except Frenchmen; there was 
chase given to fourteen sail of English, Scottish, Flemish, and French ships 
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as they came out of the Straits by some of the Spanish Armada, whereof 
there are five taken.73
It is not clear if any of the Scots escaped or were captured. Nevertheless, there are 
more specific examples such as Alexander McMath, a merchant of Edinburgh, who in 
1590 loaded his ship, The Angel, with goods and sailed to Bilbao. Upon his  arrival his 
ship and goods were seized because, according to the testimony of five Portuguese 
and Spanish witnesses, the goods were English.74 McMath had gone to some length to 
get the goods restored with petitions from the King and magistrates  in Edinburgh all 
stating to the authorities in Bilbao that the goods were Scottish.75 However, it appeared 
that ‘the Spanish would not listen to the testimony of heretics’.76 In 1592 McMath was 
called before the Inquisition in Madrid for a profession of faith. He stated that he had 
been baptised Catholic as a child and that his father was a Catholic but that, when he 
was seventeen (after the death of his parents) he was persuaded into the Calvinist 
faith.77 However, he had been trading with Spain for three years and saw the truth of the 
Catholic faith and the mother church. He had in all probability been trading with Spain 
since at least 1586. This was possibly an attempt by McMath to gain some form of 
restitution for the loss of his ship. If this  was his intention he was unsuccessful as in 
February 1607 the Scottish Privy Council wrote to King James regarding the matter, and 
McMath was yet to receive any compensation.78 While it is  not known whether he ever 
did, it is interesting to note that by December 1607 a ship called The Angel with a cargo 
of tallow was arrested by the direction of the council and Alexander McMath was 
cautioned for 5,000 merks.79 
 This  was not the only time King James’s assistance had been requested by 
Scottish merchants who suffered during the Anglo-Spanish war. In June 1591, in a letter 
to Philip II, James complained ‘of the wretched condition of very many of his subjects’.80 
The Scottish king provided the example of John Mowbray whose vessel was 
intercepted while on a trading voyage.81 The crew were imprisoned, with Mowbray and 
70
73 Lincolnshire Archives, 8ANC3//58. March? 1588.
74 Cecil Papers, CP120/61. The Scottish Privy Council to James VI, 5 February 1607; NAS, GD1/1126/1 
February 1607.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 ANH, Inquisición 108, Exp. 24.1592.
78 Ibid.
79 RPCS, VIII, 25. 17 December 1607. 
80 AGS, Estado Legajo. 839. James VI to Philip II, 4 June 1591. Many thanks to Cynthia Fry for drawing 
my attention to this reference and to Peter Maxwell for the translation. 
81 Ibid.
Christopher Burkhead allegedly being consigned to the galleys.82  While it is  unclear 
whether this ship was going to Iberia, James stated in his letter that Scotland should be 
able to trade freely without such incidences occurring.83 Scottish vessels were also at 
risk from English warships and in September 1598 the Scottish king wrote to Queen 
Elizabeth complaining that a Scottish vessel from Kirkcaldy, the Grace of God, 
skippered by James Birrell, had been badly damaged by an English man-of-war, the 
Green Dragon of Bristol.84 The vessel had been returning from Cadiz, laden with wine 
and cinnamon, when it was set on ‘thirty-five leagues west of the Cape of St. Vincent’.85 
According to James, many of the crew were killed and the ship, taking on water, only 
just made land.86 However, the vessel had landed on the Barbary coast and the men 
who had survived the attack on the vessel were enslaved. Freed by the actions  of 
English factors, James VI requested that the master of the vessel be able to seek 
redress for his ship, his  goods and interest from the inhabitants of Bristol - possibly 
threatening a letter of reprisal.87 With characteristic shrewdness James pointed out, 
yet we may more particularly recommend this  injury done to the joy and 
contentment of our common enemy, to the disturbance of that trade which 
might be profitable to us both and noisome to our said enemy.88 
While not directly naming the Spanish Habsburg's (and thus protecting himself from 
accusations of partiality) James did implicitly refer to the Anglo-Spanish war and 
inferred that Scots were perhaps trading where Englishmen could not. Moreover, 
repercussions continued after the war. 
 In another example the Hart of Leith, owned by Edinburgh merchants James 
Arnott and Thomas Marshall, was attacked off Cape Finisterre in January 1597 by two 
ships of Plymouth owned by Sir Ferdinando Gorges who was Captain of Plymouth 
castle.89  The ship was carrying a cargo of Scottish goods and over the space of four 
days and nights was entirely ruined by Gorges’s vessels  and the ship itself was 
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damaged. The ship managed to make port in Lisbon but due to contrary winds was 
stayed there for 15 weeks.90 As the cargo had been spoiled the ship was unable to load 
a cargo for home and also had to pay a charge of £450 sterling for disposing of the 
spoiled cargo, which itself was valued at £420 sterling. According to Douglas’s letter 
King James had ‘very earnestly written to her Majesty craving that redress  may be had 
in this matter’.91  Douglas’s recipient Dr Julius Caesar was an acquaintance of Sir 
Ferdinando Gorges and Douglas wrote that he had done his  best to ensure that 
James’s complaint did not reach Elizabeth in order to give Gorges the opportunity to 
satisfy the Edinburgh merchants.92 It must be remembered that Douglas was an English 
agent as well as a Scottish ambassador and it is possible in this case that he was 
attempting to expand his own network. By giving Gorges the chance to resolve the 
matter without English royal involvement Douglas could gain himself a new ally. While it 
is  not expressly stated that the Hart was journeying to an Iberian port as the vessel was 
carrying a cargo of goods to be sold and was attacked close to the North West Spain it 
is a reasonable assumption that it was in the area to trade. 
 The fate of the Bruce (possibly of Leith) provides a final case in point, albeit a 
slightly bizarre one. According to the information of George Bruce, the master and 
presumably owner of the Bruce, the ship was making its  way from Ferrol back to 
England or Scotland, when it was met at sea by an English man-of-war the Julian and 
another man-of-war.93 These ships had two pinnaces in their company which they had 
taken prize. The pinnaces’ crews were also still on board and consisted of North 
Africans and Portuguese men. Bruce claimed that Julian fired upon his ship and then 
forced him to take on board 52 of the prisoners, before letting the ship go.94 These new 
passengers were unwelcome and Bruce decided to sail his ship to the Portuguese 
coast hoping to discharge the men there. While on its  way the Bruce was met by 
another, presumably English, man-of-war. The master of this vessel, a man named 
Busbrig, decided that due to the number of Portuguese men and North Africans on 
board, the ship had some affinity with the King of Spain and took the Bruce as prize.95 
Busbrig brought the ship to England and according to Bruce the ship was detained so 
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long that when it eventually made it to Leith its cargo of wine was spoiled.96  Bruce’s 
story was corroborated by his crew whose depositions were taken in Scotland by 
Robert Bowes, English ambassador, and Alexander Home, provost of Edinburgh, on 
orders from the English Admiralty.97  The case was heard by the English Privy Council 
who, while accepting that without the intervention of the Julian the Bruce would have 
completed its  journey, also felt that the other man-of-war and Busbrig’s vessel were to 
blame.98  Therefore they could not decide how to compensate Bruce. While George 
Bruce’s account is dated November the English Privy Council’s  indecision attracted the 
attention of King James in October as he wrote to David Foulis and ordered him to use 
his influence to gain an end to the case and secure justice for Bruce.99
 In May 1609 the Scottish Privy Council retrospectively appealed to James VI & I 
on behalf of Thomas Henderson. Following a journey to Spain, Henderson’s vessel and 
goods were seized and he subsequently spent four years as a galley slave.100  It is 
further noted that Henderson was promised restitution but was yet to receive it and this 
delay was described as ‘not aggreeable with conscience, equitie, nor justice, nor with 
the honour, credite, and reputation of thair placeis’.101  The date on which Henderson’s 
ship was taken is not given but he is likely to be the same Thomas Henderson who was 
noted as returning to Scotland from the Canary Islands in December 1601.102 Given the 
time it took for such cases to reach the Privy Council’s attention and in conjunction with 
Henderson’s time as  a slave it is fair to assume he was arrested while the Anglo-
Spanish war was ongoing.103
  Vessels landing in Scotland from Iberia were also in danger. In 1600 the William 
of Anstruther, mastered by David Strang, sailed to Loch Ryan in Galloway with a cargo 
of salt from Portugal. However, upon deciding to leave for a more profitable market, 
Strang, who was on shore, was held captive by the admiral of the local area, Sir Robert 
Gordon of Lochinvar and his deputy Alexander Gordon. According to his  testimony, 
Strang was tortured into agreeing to hand over the vessel.104 However, the ship was not 
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harboured correctly and the cargo was badly damaged by a storm and thus the 
merchants, James Strang, Thomas Watson and Robert Campbell, hoped to gain 
redress.105  This is obviously an example of blatant piracy. In combination, this  case, 
along with McMath’s pleas to the Scottish authorities, the tale of Mowbray and his crew, 
and the fate of the Grace of God of Kirkcaldy provide interesting examples of problems 
that the Scottish merchants could face. Clearly, the Lochinvar example highlights  that it 
was not merely Spanish or English vessels that caused problems for Scottish ships. 
  Scottish vessels freighted for trade by merchants from other kingdoms also 
came under attack. In January 1585 the French king, Henry III, wrote to Elizabeth 
regarding a Scottish ship of St Andrews, the Salamander, Thomas Lantion master. She 
had loaded goods at Rouen on behalf of French merchants but was taken by William 
Fenel, captain of an English vessel, and sailed into Falmouth despite carrying passports 
from the French king.106  Another incident occurred in July 1588 and the French 
ambassador Monsieur de Chasteauneuf wrote to Burghley to complain about the 
seizure of a Scottish ship that was transporting corn from Dieppe to Lisbon on behalf of 
French merchants.107  The vessel had been seized by Tudor warships and carried into 
Dartmouth, where it was being detained.108  In a final example Sir James Elphinstone 
wrote on King James’s behalf to Sir Robert Cecil regarding the Marie Galland of 
Dundee.109  The ship, owned by William Man of Dundee and skippered by George 
Duncan, was freighted by French merchants with wine and captured by a Spanish 
vessel as it was believed to be carrying English goods.110 The ship was then retaken by 
an English vessel and Elphinstone wrote to Cecil to request that the ship and goods be 
released without further delay. 
 The Anglo-Spanish conflict was not the only war which affected Scottish ships: 
the Dutch-Spanish wars were also a threat to Scottish trade. In August 1589 Robert 
Tomson, an English agent in Calais, reported to Walsingham that four Scottish ships 
had been chased by Dutch warships off Dunkirk.111 The ships had reportedly refused to 
strike their colours and were also carrying Spanish survivors from the Armada. Three of 
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the vessels were chased to shore and one was captured.112  These four vessels are 
highly likely to be the ships that were commissioned to take 600 armada survivors  from 
Scotland back to Spain, having left Leith and Burntisland to sail towards the Low 
Countries on 25 July.113  Interestingly, William Asheby, an English agent, believed that 
some of the armada survivors, in particular high-ranking captains, would be kept in 
Scotland in order to use them to force the release of a Scot called Gilbert Lamb, who  -
along with several others - had his ship and cargo seized by the Inquisition.114 Ten years 
later the States of Holland issued a proclamation informing ‘all princes’ that any ships 
taken (by privateers) which were journeying towards Spain would be considered 
prize.115  It was also recorded that several Scottish ships laden with corn for Spain and 
Portugal had been captured by Dutch men-of-war due to this proclamation.116  King 
James had responded angrily to this  proclamation informing the States General that his 
subjects could trade with whom they pleased and that the Dutch Republic consisted 
‘only of rebels  and rebellion’ who had no right to order ‘lawful princes and their 
subjects’.117  While transportation by sea is always  subject to risk from catastrophe or 
random acts of violence, these examples show that during a period of war, whether 
Scotland was involved in the conflict or not, Scottish ships were at risk. 
3. The Inquisition. 
Occasionally Scottish merchants experienced problems that were not due to the war 
and were instead interrupted by the Spanish inquisition. In 1583, for example, Thomas 
Ucci from Dumbarton, master of the Minona, was  sentenced to three years in the 
galleys due to his  religion.118  In November 1586 a Scottish vessel was seized at San 
Lucar after the discovery of ‘Lutheran books’ on board.119  An Englishman resident in 
Seville, James White, was recommended as an interpreter for the 24 Scots  onboard the 
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vessel.120 White was not the only interpreter used by the Spanish authorities. In January 
1588 Ralph Hassal, an English Catholic refugee from London, requested a residence 
permit.121 In his petition he pointed out that he had assisted the authorities as interpreter 
‘por lengua y inglesa y escosesa en algunas occasiones’.122 Two other Scots were also 
sentenced by the Inquisition at Toledo in the 1590s, though it is unclear if they were 
both traders. William Baird, noted as ‘marinero escoces’, was sentenced to be ‘relaxed’, 
with David Chinaloc’s sentence being postponed.123 In 1588 John Murray, master of the 
Susanna of Aberdeen, sailed to Dieppe with a cargo of salmon, then onto Bordeaux and 
from there to Middleburg with Gascon produce.124  From Middleburg Murray sailed to 
San Lucar in Spain.125  Unfortunately for Murray, while the journey proved free from 
interference, his arrival in Spain was not. Murray became embroiled in an argument with 
Breton sailors which led to Murray and his crew being imprisoned.126  They were still in 
prison in June 1592 with it being noted that James Sunderland, the second helmsman, 
had died while in prison.127  Other members of the crew were sentenced by the 
Inquisition, with 13 sentenced to two years in the galleys.128  Interestingly, the records 
show a crew member from Porthcawl in Wales as well as  men from the east coast of 
Scotland. John Gardiner, one of the sailors, was sentenced to three years of seclusion 
with Catholic teaching and was also banned from the coast and sent to interior Spain.129 
Gardiner’s  punishment for his alleged ‘Lutheranism’ was  mild in comparison to Murray 
and Peter Gualcar (sailor) who were sentenced to be ‘relaxed in person’, which was 
often the sentence for those who refused to repent or relapsed into Protestantism.130  It 
is  noted that Murray was sentenced in this way due to his ‘heretical teaching and 
imperfect confessions’, while Gualcar was remanded in prison rather than executed.131 
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 In December 1594 the, presumably Scottish, crew of the Elizabeth were 
questioned by the Inquisition authorities  of the Canaries islands, although it is  unclear 
why they were questioned and what the result of the interrogation was.132   As Alexis  D. 
Brito González has investigated the Inquisition in the Canaries islands would try to 
catch out suspect crews by questioning separate crew members and ask where the 
vessels was going, if it carried any pictures or books  and the religious practises of the 
crew.133 How the crew answered these questions would then determine how they were 
treated, with discrepancies in answers  an obvious cause for suspicion. As shall be 
discussed in chapter 4 the threat from the Inquisition diminished considerably after 
1607. That said, considering the previously discussed frequency of Scottish vessels to 
Spain and its  dominions, it seems unusual that Scots, and in particular, Murray and his 
crew were brought before the institution. However, it may only have been their 
disagreement with Breton sailors in a Spanish port that brought them to the attention of 
the authorities. As  Pauline Croft has pointed out, most merchants who traded with Iberia 
would ensure they did not draw attention to themselves and ‘conformed to local 
practises when necessary’.134  It would perhaps be unwise to attempt to convert 
Catholics and criticise Catholic practices while living as a merchant in Lisbon - as the 
Englishman Hugh Gurgeny found out to his cost.135 
 There is a danger of lending more prominence than is necessary to the actions of 
the Inquisition. For example, Alison Games has discussed the actions of the Inquisition 
which meant that ‘merchants and mariners were confined to their ships until the officer 
of the Inquisition inspected the men and their goods and searched for forbidden 
items’.136  Quite apart from this being a normal practice when a suspicious vessel 
entered a port in a time of war it must be remembered that in the 1520s the English 
consul in Antwerp John Hackett intended to partake in exactly the same action in order 
to stop reformation material arriving from the continent to England.137  Further, Games 
points to the ill-treatment that some English merchants received in the 1584 to 1600 
period, perhaps forgetting that the ongoing Anglo-Spanish conflict would mean that 
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(Inquisition or not) English merchants  and their refusal to accept/conform to local 
practices would not be welcomed.138  Steve Murdoch has investigated this point further 
in regards to Scottish emigration to northern Europe stating that:
In many continental cities and most countries  it was simply unfeasible not to (be 
seen to) conform to the local religious orthodoxy. An individual’s  rejection of the 
established religion was simply not an option.139 
Indeed, he records Calvinists appearing to convert to Anglicanism, Lutheranism, 
Russian Orthodoxy and even willingly to Islam, with many ‘converting’ back again on 
their return home.140  Sincere devotion to Catholicism also did not appear to prevent 
merchants from working with their English and Scottish counterparts as Óscar Recio 
Morales has shown in his work on the Irish commercial community in Spain.141 It is clear 
therefore, that with the exception of a few cases, merchants cared more about profitable 
business than religious ideals and were sensible enough not to challenge a region's 
religion nor allow an individual’s orthodoxy to stand in the way of a good deal. 
4. Intermediaries and Exploits. 
As Pauline Croft has stated, Anglo-Iberian trade was mutually beneficial and the Anglo-
Spanish war was an unmitigated disaster for merchants  from both areas.142  Richard 
Wernham goes  further, arguing that the difficulty that English merchants had selling 
their cloth abroad had a knock-on effect for the whole country and damaged the 
economy.143 Thus, there was a need to find a way round the trading embargo. It was not 
merely English merchants that found the war damaging, Spanish merchants also 
complained. In 1591 the Venetian ambassador reported that merchants in Seville were 
demanding to be allowed to import goods ‘from any country whatsoever, especially from 
England, otherwise they declare that customs dues will be reduced to nothing’.144 Some 
merchants made a thin attempt at disguising their destinations and over 25 vessels 
were freighted by numerous English merchants ‘for the straits’ and the return between 
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late September 1588 and June 1591.145 However, for those Englishmen who wished to 
trade without revealing their nationality it was easiest to imitate their Irish and Scottish 
neighbours.146 This led to some amusing, almost farcical, situations where English ships 
attempted to disguise themselves as Scottish, with varying results. For example, in 
September 1587, the James of Leith sailed to San Lucar; however, the Scottish crew on 
board had been picked purely for their nationality and the vessel was  actually named 
the Dog of London.147 It had purposely sailed to Leith from London in order to pick up a 
Scottish crew and to change the name of the ship. Due to these activities William 
Semple was appointed in November 1597 to help weed out those Englishmen 
disguising themselves as Irish or Scottish.148  Semple was successful in his task and it 
was revealed that the vast majority of the ‘Scots’ and ‘Irish’ ships at Huelva and 
Ayamonte were in fact English.149  In the same correspondence it is noted that four 
‘Scottish’ ships in Ayamonte were proven to be English despite their insistence that they 
were from Scotland.150 Other Englishmen resident in Spain were arrested for attempting 
to conceal their origins, such as  Richard Lawrence, Walter Thomas, Ronald Bainsley 
and John Barrett, all from Bristol but residing in Andalusia and pretending to be 
Scottish.151 Loomie has discovered other men in Andalusia from Bristol who attempted 
to assume Scottish identities. It is, therefore fair to assume that if Bristol merchants 
were trying to remain in Spain under this guise then other Englishmen were doing so 
too. One Edward Firman, who was actually a Scotsman, was  also arrested allegedly for 
keeping property and business in Bristol.152 It was difficult for the Spanish authorities  to 
tell the difference between English and Scottish merchants mainly due to the language 
similarities as lamented by Pedro de Aldaya, the author of the letter and judge at the 
Royal Court of Seville in 1598.153 
 Despite Ireland’s status as an English dominion, Óscar Recio Morales has 
proven that the Spanish authorities wished to protect Irish interests partly due to the 
affinity felt between the two nations, but also because of the role that Irish merchants 
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could play in providing information.154  The Spanish were aware that not only were 
Englishmen pretending to be Irish, but that some were actually using Irishmen as 
intermediaries. In January 1598 Aldaya wrote that an Irish ship had arrived in Ayamonte 
from Dublin with a cargo of fish.155  Aldaya seemed suspicious pointing out that the 
Irishmen were subject to the Queen of England and casting doubts as to the true owner 
of the cargo.156 In another letter around a month later, Aldaya stated that Irishmen were 
conducting business in illegal goods on behalf of Englishmen and said that the 
discrimination in favour of the Irish was allowing this  to continue unchecked.157  The 
attempts of English traders to disguise themselves as Irish or Scottish was obviously 
one way to get round the trading embargo but it was not without risk. There was a far 
easier way for English merchants to proceed: pay Scottish merchants  to conduct their 
trade for them. 
 This  approach, however, could be dangerous  for the Scottish merchants who 
chose to deal in banned English goods. One prominent Scot who took part in this 
practice was William Hunter. Hunter had the King of Scotland’s  letter of commendation 
which allowed him to trade in Spain. This was issued in August 1586 and was signed by 
James VI stating
this  William Hunter, a citzen, servent and trader of ours, sending him forth to 
your Spain now and again, so that he can purchase certain good wines and 
other wares..... for use in our court.158 
The document goes further, asking that ‘he himself and all his men are treated rather 
friendly..... and to be free from injustice’.159  In January 1587 another Scot, Alexander 
Scott, stated to the local authorities  that a vessel in which Hunter may have been 
master, was actually English.160 However, it appeared that the master of the vessel had 
a stroke of luck (of sorts) when Drake’s force arrived in Cadiz and this, combined with 
some careful bribery of the local officials, allowed him to claim that as their ship had 
been boarded and ransacked by Drake’s  forces, they could not possibly be English.161 
While Hunter had managed to escape prosecution on this  occasion, suspicion over his 
activities remained. On 5 April of the same year Bernardino de Mendoza reported to 
Philip III that he had 
80
154 Morales, ‘Identity and Loyalty’, 198-201.
155 AGS, Estado Legajo 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 7 January 1598.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid, Estado Legajo 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 23 February 1598. 
158 Ibid, Estado Legajo 839. August 1586. Many thanks to Matthijs Wibier for translating this document. 
159 Ibid.
160 TNA, HCA 13/26. 319.  28 July 1587. 
161 Ibid.
heard from a good quarter that a Scots merchant, who says he is the King of 
Scotland’s banker, is in Spain with twelve well fitted English boats freighted 
with merchandise from there [England].162
In May 1588 Bernardino de Mendoza wrote to Martine Se Idiaquez that ‘You will see by 
the reports how they [the English] trade under the name of that Hunter, and that the 
King’s [James VI] letters are only a cloak for it’.163 A copy of this letter was also sent to 
Philip II. The letter goes on to say that Scott could reveal for certain that the goods were 
English as ‘from their character it was impossible they could be Scotch’.164 
 Hunter was further condemned by the actions of Patrick Morris  and Philip 
Shenston, who in October 1588 had, via an unnamed intermediary, sent forth 
intelligence to Spanish officials that they would shortly be landing in Spain with a 
consignment of ‘English’ goods.165  The two Scottish vessels, the New Ship of St 
Andrews and an unnamed ship of Leith, were carrying goods for Edward Johnstone and 
a Mr Sapers, who is described as the ‘principal dealer for the English and Scots  in 
Turkey and Tripoli’.166 Morris himself and Edward Johnstone owned 1,800 crowns  worth 
of the cargo with the rest - including the goods on the second vessel - belonging to Mr 
Sapers.167  The report described the goods on board as being English and Dutch but 
carrying ‘the leaden seal of Edinburgh... and the seal is placed on them to deceive’.168 
The vessels were expected to travel with two other Scottish ships, in ballast, to either 
San Lucar or Cadiz and then a particular sequence of events  was to be played out.169 
Mendoza instructed that when the vessels arrived Morris and Shenston were to be 
arrested along with all the officers. When questioned Morris would admit not only that 
the goods on board the vessel were English, but that he had carried letters  from Spain 
to Queen Elizabeth and her advisers.170 Morris would then tell his interrogators that the 
letters  had been given to him by William Hunter, who had received them from English 
merchants.171  Mendoza requested that Morris and Shenston be well treated and 
released once they had given their statements, ‘as  the affair has been managed through 
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them’.172  The vessels and their cargo were believed to be worth £14,000 sterling.173 
Morris and Shenston would be given 1,800 crowns for their information, with Morris 
stating that he must be arrested along with his  fellow officers so that when he returned 
to Scotland the owners of the merchandise would not blame him.174 The event did take 
place with Hunter apparently none the wiser to the deceit of Morris. For his part Morris 
cheated everyone by returning to London overland and providing military information 
about the Spanish to Elizabeth and her council.175 Hunter believed it was the actions of 
Morris leaving for England with military information which led to his imprisonment and 
not Morris’s betrayal of Hunter to the Spanish authorities. As a result of Morris’s  actions 
Hunter was imprisoned from 9 November 1588 to late February 1589 as indicated in a 
letter from John Ogilvy to Archibald Douglas  and Hunter’s own letter to Queen 
Elizabeth.176 
 Being imprisoned did not prevent Hunter from continuing his correspondence 
with both Walsingham and Burghley, with letters being written in January and February 
1589.177  In 1591 Hunter wrote to Burghley informing him that he had sent word to 
James VI of the events and that because of Alexander Scott’s  actions he had been 
questioned ‘to his  great danger’ - clearly he had no idea it was actually Patrick Morris 
who betrayed him.178 James VI had ‘deemed the said Scott worthy of punishment’, and 
Hunter requested that Burghley write to the Lord Chancellor of Scotland to ensure that 
Hunter would be defended.179 The fact that Hunter chose to write to James VI suggests 
that the Scottish king was aware of Hunter’s trading activities, at the very least. Indeed, 
the fact that James ordered the informer, Scott, to be punished indicates that James 
sanctioned Hunter’s role as a conduit for English goods, although whether this 
permission extended to the role of informer is unclear. Despite being imprisoned, Hunter 
continued to trade for English merchants well into the 1590s, and was given a licence to 
export wheat and beer, although suspiciously the destinations of this  cargo are not 
recorded.180  Further, Hunter persevered in his efforts  to gain military information on 
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behalf of Queen Elizabeth and in 1597 organised two ships to Spain with this purpose in 
mind.181  In December 1598 Hunter was in France and wrote to another Scottish 
merchant, John Wilson, who, from Hunter’s  letter, had arrived in Wales  in late 
November.182 Hunter discussed general business matters and stated that he had bonds 
due to him from a Flemish merchant based in Lisbon, Burchart Bruckman.183  Hunter 
went on to say that he expected Wilson to receive the money due and that another Scot 
in Lisbon, John Descosse, would act on his  behalf.184 The instructions are complicated, 
so much so, that Hunter hoped that Wilson could come to Brest to discuss the matter 
face to face.185  Hunter concluded with the news that he had received James VI 
permission to trade with Lisbon and indicated that if Wilson came to visit him he could 
give the pass to Wilson as long as certain conditions were met.186  Interestingly, the 
Scottish king also tried to secure permanent employment for Hunter on two occasions. 
In 1599 James wrote to the Convention of Royal Burghs requesting that they appoint a 
Conservator (similar to the position in the Scottish Staple in the Dutch Republic) for 
England.187 Hunter was recommended as James’s  preferred candidate for the position. 
English agents in Scotland were also aware of the Scottish king’s plan, with William 
Bowes writing to Robert Cecil that Hunter was Scottish-born and was ‘richly married in 
Bristol’.188  Bowes went onto say that James planned to give Hunter letters for his 
employment, presumably the appointment of Conservator.189  For a variety of reasons 
the Convention declined to acquiesce to the king’s request.190  Two years later James 
recommended Hunter again, this time to Queen Elizabeth, for his  ‘long and faithful 
service done to us and his  unfeigned affection of the continuation of the th’amity betwixt 
our two estates’.191 Hunter continued to involve himself with Scottish merchants, such
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as when Mark Dougal, a merchant of Edinburgh, used the services of a William Hunter 
‘indweller of Bristol’ to sell his cargo of cloth in Spain.192
 Hunter was  not the only Scotsman trading on behalf of Englishmen: William 
Scott, a merchant from Kirkcaldy, conducted commerce for London merchants from the 
Azores.193  Scott had traded from the islands  for at least four years, as stated in a letter 
written by James VI to Lord Burghley.194 However, two Portuguese ships at the Azorean 
island of St Michael were captured by the Earl of Cumberland and as a result Scot was 
arrested while loading his own vessel, the Christopher. He was subsequently 
imprisoned for two and a half years  and those who remained on board his vessel sailed 
it back to London in his absence.195 Upon Scott’s release merchants in London pursued 
him for sums owed, thus hindering his attempts to begin trading again. James 
requested that Scott be granted protection by Elizabeth in order to re-establish his 
trade.196  This provides a clear example of a Scottish merchant trading to Spanish 
dominions on behalf of English merchants. James mentions that Scott had been trading 
there for at least four years, which would date Scott’s entrance into this  trade to the late 
1580s. This is  corroborated by the information given by Bartholomew Cole to the 
Inquisition, when he stated that he had seen Scott on the island of St Michael in 1587, 
1588 and 1589.197 Further, Cole added that on his last visit Scott came with two ships of 
his own and another vessel which he had bought in London with a mixed English and 
Scottish crew. Cole stated that he knew the cargo belonged to an Englishman in 
London.198  If Cole’s confession was correct the seizure of Scott’s vessel takes on a 
different light, and Scott’s operation seems more substantial than the letter from James 
VI indicates.
 Archibald Dawson provides another example and carried goods on the behalf of 
English merchants in 1587 and 1588.199  According to Cole this merchandise was 
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consigned to John Rankin on both the islands  of St Michael and Terceira. John Rankin, 
it appears, either was a Scot or had done a very good job of convincing the authorities 
that he was.200  Whatever the case, his  position came under suspicion due to Cole’s 
testimony which stated that he was English and from Bristol.201  Rankin’s brother 
Nicholas, captain of a vessel owned by the previously mentioned Archibald Dawson, 
was examined and questioned by Don Luis de la Cucua, governor of St Michael, in late 
spring 1591. He had sailed to Santa Cruz and then loaded his vessel with goods 
belonging to a local Canaries merchant, Pedro de Vchales, for a journey to St 
Michael.202 Despite the questioning there was no evidence as to Nicholas Rankin’s true 
nationality and so he was set free, although his ship and property were confiscated.203 
This  ship may well have been the St Thomas. In his witness statement regarding the 
case of Cole in July 1591, Alonso De Corral was asked if he was taking action against 
any other Englishmen (with the exception of Cole and the crew of St James).204  Corral 
replied that he was also investigating Nicholas Rankin and William Home. It is likely this 
is  the same William Home who in August 1591 obtained a licence to trade from the 
Captain of the province of Guipuzcoa, showing a quick but not impossible return to 
trading.205 
 George Fausset can also be added to this trading group, again named in Cole’s 
information. Cole stated that Fausset had been to the island three times in the years 
1589 and 1590 and brought commodities on behalf of an Englishman.206  Richard 
Doddridge, the owner of these goods, was the mayor of Barnstaple and a prominent 
English merchant in the sixteenth century. Finally, the vessel on which Cole was 
arrested looks to have been part of a similar scheme. Cole was a supercargo aboard 
the St James, skippered by James Brown.207 Alonso de Corral also cast doubt as  to the 
nationality of the crew, stating that some of the men on the vessel were from the town of 
Saltash in England.208  In his evidence to the Inquisition Diego del Billar Vgarte stated 
that all aboard the vessel claimed they were Scottish but that two Portuguese witnesses 
stated that they had been robbed by some Englishmen and indicated that Robert Brown 
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was one of the party.209  Robert Brown admitted to being the boatswain on the pinnace, 
but argued that he himself had been captured by the English on his way to Scotland 
which was the only reason he was involved. However, a third witness, Juan Lopez, the 
procurator of the Royal Court of the Azores stated that
in their confessions they declared that they were natives  of the Kingdom of 
England, as well all the men on the ship, with the exception of one; and that 
they had left England some five months since; and that the said Cole in his 
first two confessions declared himself to be Scotch, and afterwards said he 
was English as well all the rest with the exception of one, the pilot, who was 
Scotch and that the ship was also an English vessel.210
 It is  not clear what happened to Brown, but within a short space of time (and 
following torture) Cole saw the error of his  heretical ways, converted to Catholicism and 
assisted the local authorities in their attempt to clamp down on illegal trading.211 While 
Cole’s testimony must of course be questioned due to the circumstances in which it was 
made, his information appears to confirm other sources. In the case of the trade to the 
Azores and the Canaries it importantly shows that the trade was far more common than 
has been previously accounted for and that several Scottish skippers  were regularly 
making the journey to the islands.
 Scottish merchants in the new Dutch Republic may have also provided access to 
Iberia. In September 1599 a Dutch lawyer employed by Robert Offeley, a merchant of 
London, was instructed to prosecute Thomas Morey, a Scottish skipper, regarding a 
cargo of Spanish salt and a voyage from Rotterdam to Lisbon and London.212  While 
Rotterdam was by no means a neutral port in the eyes of the Spanish authorities, the 
connection of Scottish merchants with the Dutch Republic (due the presence of the 
Scottish Staple at Campvere) was well-established, and thus the arrival of a Scottish 
vessel to an Iberian port from this  area was likely to be less  suspicious than the arrival 
of a Scottish vessel from an English port. In another (albeit later) example, a 
Portuguese merchant resident in Amsterdam received un-named goods from Captain 
John Low a ‘Scotsman of Lisbon’.213
 These examples indicate Scottish opportunism, as  well as  a pragmatic solution to 
trading difficulties  for the English. These cases do show problems for the Scottish 
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merchants involved, although due to his actions as a spy Hunter must have been aware 
of the danger he was placing himself in. However, this could also provide an idea of the 
normality of these trading practices, and Hunter and Scot may only appear in historical 
records because their enterprises ran into difficulties. Hunter found himself under 
scrutiny when a fellow Scot informed the authorities of his activities. William Scot 
appears to have been the victim of a revenge attack by the disgruntled officials of the 
Azores, although the extent of the trading subterfuge involving the islands  of Madeira 
and the Canaries was clearly far more substantial than previously understood. Reports 
from Spanish and English sources show that Scottish vessels  were regularly trading 
with Iberian ports  and were probably carrying English goods. Given that the trade 
embargo between England and Iberia was a disaster for both kingdoms, it is probable 
that officials turned a blind eye to Scottish merchants bringing English goods  to Iberia. 
This  hypothesis is accredited in several instances. A report in February 1593 by E. 
Palmer, another English agent based at St Jean de Luz in France, reported that 24 
Scottish ships  carrying cargoes of wheat, rye and salmon had sailed to Bilbao and San 
Sebastian in the previous two months.214 Palmer went on to write,
In all these parts  of Spain the King had given order that all Scotsmen should 
be well used. If the truth were known, these goods, would be found to be 
Englishmen's, taken in at Lynn market or thereabouts.215
Around two months later Palmer dispatched a similar letter to Lord Burghley reporting 
that the Scots, along with Bretons and Flemings, were providing San Sebastian with 
corn which ‘would be found Englishmen’s goods’.216  Even travellers from the time 
commented on the practice with Fynes Moryson, a Cambridge university graduate on a 
grand tour of Europe writing in 1598, 
And whill the English had warre with the Spaniards, the Scots as neutrals  by 
carrying of English commodities into Spaine and by having their ships for 
more security leden by English merchants, grew somewhat richer and more 
experienced in Navigation, and had better and stronger shippes then in 
former time.217
This  trade also continued in reverse; in February 1598 Pedro de Aldaya wrote that a 
Scot by the name of George Al had dispatched four ships from Huelva carrying wine 
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and fruit to Bristol.218  Aldaya believed that George and his brother William had a 
sophisticated operation and were in contact with a number of English merchants, 
including Edward Lewis  and Richard Almeyton.219 Another way to get round the trading 
embargo was to lie about the intended destination of the vessel. In a letter to Cecil, M. 
Chasteaumartin wrote from Bayonne that Scottish and Irish ships would load a cargo of 
grain in England stating the destination to be the south of France, but the cargo would 
actually be delivered to Spain.220  Further, once in Scotland, Iberian goods did not 
necessarily have to stay there. Commodities which were commonly found on ships 
arriving from Iberia were re-exported to Newcastle from Leith. For example, a cargo of 
figs  and raisins  were on board the Andrew of Anstruther, Alexander Thompson master, 
which arrived in Newcastle in November 1593.221  It would have been difficult for the 
Spanish authorities to find out the true destination of many vessels and it is probable 
that many going to Scotland, the Dutch Republic and other ports stopped in an English 
port along the way. The need for Iberian goods would have dictated that trade continued 
despite the political situation between Queen Elizabeth and Philip. By 1602 the Spanish 
authorities could no longer ignore these activities and banned Scottish and Irish goods 
from Iberia along with English ones, in recognition that a significant proportion of 
‘Scottish’ and ‘Irish’ commodities  were probably English and hoping to halt the trade 
between the two areas.222
Conclusion.
All of these events  give a sense of the precarious but highly profitable position that 
Scotland and Scottish merchants were in. Due to the dynastic situation with England, 
James VI was anxious not to anger Elizabeth, but he also did not want to cut off 
relations with the powerful Habsburg empire. Thus, he handled the case of Ogilvy with a 
pragmatism that may have bordered on duplicity. James was also in a profitable position 
as the Spanish Habsburgs viewed Scotland, and its remaining Catholic population in 
particular, as a way to antagonise England and turn the war in their favour. For her part, 
Elizabeth needed Scotland to remain neutral but still required the intelligence brought 
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by Scottish merchants. James could have heavily exploited the situation to his  own 
ends, however, he instead utilised the cautiousness which his reign became known for. 
The appointment of William Orde as a Conservator was not widely announced as 
James did not wish to irritate Elizabeth; after all, Orde had been appointed in part due to 
the actions of English merchants who were pretending to be Scottish. Scottish 
merchants also had to be careful because of the difficulty that Iberian officials had in 
distinguishing between the different nations of mainland Britain. This occasionally led to 
strife as Scottish merchants were assumed to be English or even just considered a 
suitable target for revenge as in the case of William Scot. However, it was also a period 
of opportunity for Scottish merchants, who could take advantage of the trade embargo 
between England and Spain by acting as carriers between the two areas. Numerous 
merchants took advantage of this  situation and, in the majority of cases, there was little 
the Iberian authorities could do. On the island of Madeira the true state and complexity 
of the role of Scots as conduits for English goods was only revealed when an 
Englishman confessed all to the Inquisition. Moreover, economic necessity superseded 
proclamations from Castile; Iberia required the goods that Scots were bringing but also 
required a market for their own commodities. The Habsburg authorities were woefully 
unable to prevent merchants from other regions from dealing in English goods  and 
Scottish merchants took advantage of the opportunities offered to them during this 
period of conflict.  
89
Chapter Three: Triangular Trade and the Importance of London and Rotterdam.
‘I am glad the uglie debate with our friends at Barcelona is ended thou at a loss’.1
So far this thesis has focused on direct trade between Scotland and Iberia up to 1603 
and has shown that Scotland and its merchants had a significant trading relationship 
with Iberia. However, there is another angle to consider - the role of triangular trade and 
secondary ports. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explore these concepts in 
relation to Scottish-Iberian Commerce and provide a detailed examination of how they 
offered another conduit for the trade of Scottish merchants. 
 In regards  to this investigation the importance of triangular trade cannot be over-
estimated. To sail to Iberia was a considerable journey and, as shall be discussed later 
in this  chapter, presented risks beyond the norm. Nonetheless, triangular trade provided 
merchants and skippers with a chance to gain an advantage. By exchanging 
commodities at several ports and instructing their skippers to contact factors at those 
ports  merchants could receive information about a voyage which could take many 
months as well as maximise profits. Sailing along the coast proved safer for skippers 
than venturing into the open seas where North African corsairs  or deadly storms could 
await. By visiting several ports skippers could join up with small local convoys for safety 
as well as  carry out private trade to their own profit. Therefore, when sailing to Iberia 
triangular trade was the norm, not the exception, and to ignore the practice would prove 
seriously detrimental to this study. The investigation of triangular trade in its own right is 
also important; firstly, to show just how prevalent it was and secondly, to understand the 
networks created by merchants across Europe which involved Iberian trade. Initially, this 
chapter examines  the role of triangular trade in Scoto-Iberian commercial relations. 
After an analysis of historiography surrounding this  concept, with examples of other 
European destinations and Scotland, incidences involving Iberia are considered. The 
discussion includes more in-depth case studies, such as that of Baillie John Steuart of 
Inverness who was heavily involved in European trade. 
 Questions are raised and include topics such as why Scottish merchants and 
traders might prefer to obtain Iberian goods from entrepôts  rather than travelling directly 
to the source of origin. By providing examples of Scottish ships that were attacked or 
captured by North African corsairs it is proven that for many the risks of sending a 
vessel to Spain could easily outweigh the profit of a successful voyage and thus it was 
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safer to obtain these commodities in other ports. An examination of London and ports  in 
the Dutch Republic highlights their significance in European trade and includes a 
discussion of their representative Scottish communities. Scottish port records are again 
utilised to show that Iberian goods  were arriving in Scotland via these ports facilitated 
by Scottish merchants within them. Their motivations for locating to given ports and their 
choice of merchandise are contextualised alongside their incentives for participating in 
specific areas of commerce. 
 The investigation conducted in this  chapter proves that direct links, though 
present, were not necessarily required for Scotland and her merchants to maintain 
commercial connections with Iberia. Iberian goods  could and did enter Scotland from 
other ports, showing not only the advanced international management of commodities 
between European ports, but also the ability of Scottish merchants to obtain 
commodities of international origins  at ports which were far less dangerous to voyage to 
and geographically closer to Scotland. Thus, the minimal risk endured could still 
generate enough profit while ensuring demand for Iberian produce could be met. 
1.1 Triangular Trade
The importance of triangular trade in the early modern period has been well established 
for several decades. The premise of triangular trade is simple: it involves a ship 
travelling to a number of ports in a single voyage in order to exchange commodities. In 
his 1963 publication Christopher Smout showed that Scottish merchants would collect a 
cargo of grain in the Baltic and sail to Bergen in Norway in order to exchange the grain 
for timber before returning to Scotland.2  Thomas Riis has investigated Scottish 
triangular trade in the Baltic, providing evidence of Scottish vessels visiting more than 
one port once they had passed the Danish sound.3 Triangular trade allowed merchants 
to take advantage of the commodities  that several cities, ports  and regions had to offer. 
However, port records only list the last port visited when noting where a ship had arrived 
from. A ship could be recorded as  arriving from London or Rotterdam; but what is not 
documented is the fact that this  vessel may also have visited other ports in the same 
journey. Therefore the final cargo did not necessarily reflect the various ports  visited and 
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other cargoes carried. This can cause problems for historians  trying to establish where 
vessels actually went on a trading voyage. Thus, once again, it is not unless trade is 
interrupted in some way that the historian generally becomes aware of the occurrence 
of triangular trade, as  shown in the records  of the High Court of Admiralty. However, 
there are other sources  which reveal triangular trade involving Iberia, such as  extant 
merchants’ letters and charter parties.
While Scottish triangular trade with Iberia has not received scholarly attention 
prior to this thesis, historians have shown English and Irish merchants  to be engaged in 
this  practice. For example, Pauline Croft points  out that due to coastal trade with Spain, 
destinations in English port books were often just listed as ‘Hispania’.4  The Calendar of 
State Papers Domestic also provides similar examples of such trade which might 
otherwise have gone unnoticed. In 1638 a petition to King Charles I by a group of 
London merchants described how they were forced onto the coast of Picardy due to 
poor weather after a voyage from Cadiz and the Canary Islands.5  English voyages 
between the Canary Islands and Andalusia are also recorded in the Archivo General de 
Indias with numerous  examples, such as the St George, captained by Thomas Grose, 
which sailed from Tenerife to Cadiz in 1721.6  In a letter from King Charles to his 
treasurer it became apparent that some English merchants were using triangular trade 
with Iberia to avoid customs charges.  Merchants would sail to France in ballast to pick 
up a cargo which was carried to Spain or Flanders and then back to France without 
coming to Dover to pay customs.7  Irish merchants were also utilising triangular trade, 
between the west coast of Ireland, France and Iberian ports.8  The activities of English 
and Irish merchants  not only provide a comparison but also show a plausible model for 
how Scottish merchants might engage in similar practices. 
 Examples of Scottish triangular trade involving Iberia or Iberian dominions 
are numerous. In December 1676 John Nesbit and other owners of the Peter of 
Cockney instructed the skipper of the vessel, James Cockburn, to sail from Scotland to 
Ostend and on to France.9 Unfortunately the ship was still in Ostend in May 1677 as the 
pass the vessel carried had been declared void by a proclamation of the Privy Council. 
The owners had attempted to petition the provost of Edinburgh for a new pass but had 
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been unsuccessful and had, therefore, taken their case to the Privy Council, who 
ordered the provost to issue a pass.10  In another example involving the Spanish 
Netherlands, John Hall and Andrew Stevenson, merchants of Edinburgh, pursued 
William Grierson, a skipper of Leith.11 The Susanna of Leith had been commissioned in 
April 1676 to load coal in Fife for Ostend before sailing first to Rochelle for salt and onto 
Findhorn, Norway for timber, and then onto the Clyde for a cargo of fish and, finally, to 
the Danish Sound before sailing home to Leith.12  While the vessel made the agreed 
destinations as far as Findhorn the skipper then refused to sail any further, stating that 
the vessel was too badly damaged. This breach of charter party resulted in the 
merchants claiming over £8,700 Scots in damages.13 
Vessels were not necessarily commissioned for a triangular trade journey by 
merchants from one city. In February 1688 merchants in Glasgow, owners of the newly 
built Concord of Glasgow, sent her on her maiden voyage to Lisbon.14 While the vessel 
was in that port it was freighted by merchants (nationality unspecified) to sail to 
Amsterdam.15  Unfortunately, while en route it was captured by a French man-of-war, 
only to be recaptured by a Stuart Royalist vessel. However, it was then taken to 
Plymouth and the owners petitioned the Scottish Privy Council to plead for its  return.16 
In January 1714 John Stupartt recorded his  payment of crown money for a voyage to 
Lisbon and then onto Danzig.17 David Deas documented his triangular trade journey in 
February 1715 in the Sophia from Leith to Rotterdam, Seville and Amsterdam.18 Later in 
the same year Thomas Gibb paid his dues for a sailing from Leith to Bilbao, Bordeaux 
and home; while Robert Gray paid £45 Scots for a voyage from Leith to Norway then 
onto Ireland and Portugal before returning to Leith.19
Focussing in on some of these post-Union cases, we learn even more due to the 
detailed record keeping of the time. In 1712 the Catherine of Leith sailed from Leith to 
Ireland, Bilbao and Cadiz, with the case coming to the attention of the High Court of 
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Admiralty as the crew were seeking wages due to them from Robert Kay, the master.20 
Kay, counter-claimed that the crew were seeking payment for a month longer than they 
had worked. He stated he had only agreed to pay them under duress as they were a 
‘mutinous crew during the curse of a voyage’ and that the promise he had made, ‘could 
no more subsist than a promise made to a robber on the highway’. The judgement is not 
explicitly set out, although it does appear that the opinion of the court was in favour of 
the crew. We also have good evidence of how many ports  could be involved in a 
triangular trade voyage. For example, in 1723 the James of Leith sailed to Lisbon and 
then on to Scilly, Cadiz, Alicante, Ostend and Bimmell before returning to Scotland.21 
The owner of the ship, James Murray, claimed that the master, Robert Trail, had 
damaged the vessel beyond repair in Leith harbour, while Trail counter-claimed that he 
had not received expenses.22 The instructions given by Murray to Trail indicate the level 
of trust required in such transactions. In the charter party Murray stated that Trail was to 
present his cargo of coal to Mr Main and co. in Lisbon and subsequently endeavour to 
sell the vessel.23 However, if this could not be done, Murray was to consult Main and 
freight for any port thought reasonable by themselves with the proceeds of the coals to 
be remitted to Murray.24 Even further contingency is  discussed, with Murray stating that 
if freight could not be sourced, Trail was to proceed to Norway with salt and present 
himself to a Mr James Wallace. Wallace was either to assist in selling the salt and 
procuring a cargo for Scotland, or to sell the vessel for £700 sterling or ‘good bills  of 
London or Holland’.25 With such extensive contingencies and a degree of carte blanche 
it is  easy to see how disagreements arose. Murray probably never intended for Trail to 
undertake such a long voyage involving so many ports. Indeed, during his testimony 
Murray stated that Trail had disembarked his supercargo (Gustavus Sinclair) in Cadiz in 
order to ‘obtain his fraudulent ends’, although no mention is made of this  man in 
Murray’s original instructions.26 Murray was pursuing Trail for £500 sterling, the alleged 
profit from the voyages that Trail had undertaken, and £300 sterling which was to pay 
for damage to the vessel that Trail had allegedly caused.27  This total amount is £100 
more that Murray expected to receive from the sale of his ship; perhaps this  indicates 
his true motive for bringing the complaint. The High Court of Admiralty agreed and ruled 
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in favour of the master Trail, and decreed that Murray pay him £164 sterling for the 
expenses of the voyage.28  Without the example provided by this case study it would 
have been difficult to understand the degree of autonomy bestowed on skippers by 
merchants. 
North West Germany appeared as a destination in conjunction with Iberia on one 
occasion when the Isobel of Leith, skippered by Bartholomew Bell, sailed to that region 
and then on to Cadiz in Autumn 1728.29 In the same year Robert White, along with other 
crew members of the Dorothea of Queensferry, pursued the skipper Edward Hill for 
wages due for a voyage from Leith to Aberdeen and then on to Barcelona and Cadiz.30 
Having sailed to Barcelona, arriving on 2 December 1726, the vessel then sailed to 
Malaga with the crew taken prisoner in February 1727 and held until April.31 The crew 
demanded wages for seven months and two days, and Hill was ordered to appear 
before the admiralty to answer the said complaints.32  In a more informative example, 
George Ryder of Livorno wrote to the Marquess of Huntly regarding the St George 
skippered by James Crispin.33 Crispin had loaded a cargo of fish and grain for Lisbon 
and was loading salt for his return to Scotland.34  Ryder wrote that he had put on the 
vessel ‘three chests of y best red wine’ but that Crispin had ‘found encouragement’ in 
Spain and loaded Spanish sack ‘for this place’ and returned the wine which was 
destined for the Marquess. So, it appears  that Crispin had sailed to Lisbon and was 
supposed to load a cargo of salt and Ryder’s goods for the Marquess which he had sent 
from Livorno. However, Crispin instead decided to load a cargo of Spanish sack for 
Livorno and returned Ryder’s wine in the process. It must be assumed that he then 
loaded his salt in the return journey, stopping at an Iberian or French port to do so.
Considering that Scottish skippers  stopped at English ports during the Anglo-
Spanish war, it is perhaps unsurprising that triangular trade involving English ports was 
popular. In an early seventeenth century peace-time example, the Marie of Leith was 
chartered by William Cochrane to sail to Plymouth and then on to Cadiz.35  In another 
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instance, the Joseph of Berwick sailed from Leith to Newcastle for coal, which was then 
to be delivered to Edward Main & co. in Lisbon.36 Similar situations  happened in reverse 
with Spanish goods making their way from Scottish ports to England, thus providing 
further evidence both of triangular trade - in the distribution of commodities - as well as 
the presence of Spanish commodities in Scotland. Evidence for this  practice has been 
provided through the research of Matthew Greenhall, which has shown that Scottish 
ships sailing to the North East of England did not merely carry Scottish domestic goods 
but also French wine and goods from Iberia and the Mediterranean.37 Spanish salt, for 
example, was re-exported, making its  way from Scotland to Berwick in May 1606.38 The 
reverse occurred too, with Iberian goods being imported into Leith from Newcastle in 
the later part of the seventeenth century.39 
 Scoto-Iberian triangular trade was not restricted to European ports. In January 
1686 Thomas Pearson sailed to New Jersey with passengers and on the return journey 
visited both the Canary Islands and Madeira for a cargo of wine.40  In his extensive 
investigation of the wine trade of the island of Madeira, David Hancock has pointed out 
that by the 1640s the island was an essential stopping point for ships sailing across the 
Atlantic.41 Stopping at Madeira solved the problem of an empty hold during the journey 
to America.42  For example, in Autumn 1686 the Dolphin of Boston was freighted by 
Glasgow merchants  for a journey to Madeira, the cargo consisting of gloves, stockings, 
hats, coal and linen goods.43 The ship had arrived in Glasgow from the Americas, and 
by stopping at Madeira on the return journey essential goods could be taken to the 
island, with wine then loaded for the colonies. As there was no domestic wine 
production in the Americas at this  point the population was dependent on European 
wine and exports from Madeira increased five-fold in the seventeenth century.44  The 
Endeavour of New England and the Salisbury of Boston were also freighted in 
September 1689 for the same journey, suggesting that these vessels were travelling 
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across the Atlantic together.45 It is interesting to note that the majority of vessels  sailing 
to Madeira from Glasgow were not Scottish but were either colonial or Irish in origin.46 
This  and the preference to sail to Madeira may have been a ploy to circumvent the 
Navigation Acts. As discussed by Allan Macinnes, the 1660 Navigation act stated that 
goods and commodities either being imported or exported from the colonies could only 
be transported in English ships with a master and crew that were predominantly 
English.47  Sailing to Madeira and chartering vessels that were for the most part not-
Scottish appears to have been a somewhat grey area. Glasgow could neither control 
which vessels came into its port nor where they sailed to, allowing trade to continue 
unhindered. While triangular trade can be difficult to establish, these examples show 
that this trade involving Scotland and Iberia was  a well-known trading practice. The 
frequency of disputes in particular is telling. Most charter parties would have been 
carried out without problems which required the attention of the authorities. Therefore 
the number of successful triangular trade journeys involving Iberia could easily be in 
tens per year. With Iberia a more distant sailing than the ports of Scandinavia and 
northern France it is unsurprising that ships  chose to stop at ports along the way and 
increase their profits.
1.2 Case Studies
1.2a. John Steuart of Inverness. 
One prominent example of a Scottish merchant engaging in triangular trade is Baillie 
John Steuart of Inverness. As a merchant based in Scotland and of moderate means 
Steuart provides an excellent example of how merchants relied on trusted contacts to 
expand their business. Further his case provides evidence as to how geographically 
varied one merchants business dealings could be and as such, is an excellent example 
of how Scottish merchants traded with Iberia while utilising triangular trade. For 
example, Steuart was in correspondence with a Scottish merchant in London, George 
Ouchterlony, and in November 1722 Steuart decided to take up Ouchterlony’s  proposal 
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of freighting a vessel for Barcelona and Livorno.48  The Ann of London was thus 
prepared for the voyage with Alexander Rose, a friend of Steuart’s, accompanying the 
vessel skippered by James Cuthbert.49  Upon Ouchterlony’s  recommendation Steuart 
included a letter to two gentlemen in Barcelona, Messers Windar and Ferrand, 
requesting their assistance in selling the cargo, remitting the profits of the fish to London 
and ensuring that the vessel was to be sent to Livorno as soon as possible.50 William 
Windar would later become the British consul in Barcelona and Steuart clearly felt that 
this initial contact could led to further trade involving these men stating,
If this  small adventure finds a good market it will be ane inlet to a further 
corispondance and much greater Consignations of this kind hereafter, but will 
entirely depend on the encouradgment we find from you at present, and 
particularly your making speedy remitances of the proceeds of the Cargo as 
above.51
However, the event did not go entirely to plan as the cargo was apparently damaged. 
Steuart wrote to Ouchterlony in April 1723 asking him to remind Windar and Ferrand 
that the cargo was insured ‘against all hazards’.52  While this debate raged on, the 
vessel sailed for Livorno with a letter similar to the one for Windar and Ferrand 
addressed to Messers Aikman and Windar in Livorno.53 In this letter he requested their 
assistance in selling salmon and again hinted at a continued trading relationship if this 
task was completed successfully.54 Steuart further wrote that Cuthbert should load salt 
at either Spain or Portugal on the return journey.55  He also wrote to Alexander Rose 
advising him that he had written to Aikman and Windar regarding freighting the vessel 
with salt and giving instructions  for the vessel’s return home, telling Rose what to 
purchase depending on whether or not the vessel stopped at Cadiz or Lisbon.56  If 
stopping in Cadiz, Rose was to purchase 20 barrels of raisins, six chests of oranges 
and two of lemons; if stopping at Lisbon he was to purchase four half hogsheads of 
white wine, and oranges and lemons.57 Steuart was not the only merchant whose goods 
were aboard this vessel, and letters discussed a cargo of cod fish and salmon owned by 
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Mr Dawson from Forres, who was also purchasing salt for the return journey.58 Part of 
this  return cargo may have been sold within Scotland; in June of the same year Steuart 
wrote to Donald Steuart, presumably a relation, instructing him to sail to Garloch and 
deliver 280 bushels of Spanish salt to the Laird of Garloch. The debate regarding the 
cod sent to Barcelona dragged on for sometime. In July 1725 Steuart wrote to 
Ouchterlony in London stating, ‘I am glad the uglie debate with our friends at Barcelona 
is  ended thou at a loss’.59 It is likely that Windar and Ferrand could not, or indicated they 
could not, sell the cargo for the price that Steuart expected thus leading to the 
disagreement. However, the connection made with Aikman and Windar at Livorno 
continued, with a letter in October 1725 informing the men that the Lark of Inverness 
had left Scotland to sail to Livorno with a cargo of salmon which was owned by William 
McKay & Company.60  Alexander Rose was aboard this  vessel and was described by 
Steuart as ‘your acquaintance’, with Steuart recommending William McKay and 
company as reputable traders.61 As  Steve Murdoch has discussed, when used by Scots 
in the early modern period the term ‘acquaintance’ meant more than it does in its 
modern day understanding. It signified a ‘strong and active relationship’, suggesting that 
Rose was more than a mere business partner to Windar and Aikman.62  It is highly 
unlikely that this vessel merely visited the port of Livorno on the off chance and the 
connection made by Steuart obviously assisted fellow Scottish merchants. As Steuart’s 
example shows, triangular trade was  far from simple for the merchants  who undertook 
it. It required contacts in the cities  that the ship would visit and crucially those contacts 
had to be trustworthy. For example, Steuart’s contacts in Barcelona and Livorno were 
recommended to him by a fellow Scot living in London. Further, Steuart ensured that his 
personal friend and protégé was on the vessel to protect his interests. While the 
Barcelona connection proved to be unsuccessful, the Livorno connection was not and, 
like Ouchterlony before him, Steuart recommended both his Livorno contacts and his 
merchants’ acquaintances to each other. 
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1.2b. The Northern Continental Scots
Scottish merchants based away from Scotland also conducted trade with Iberia. The 
Scotland Scandinavian and Northern Europe Biographical Database provides examples 
of Scottish merchants in Scandinavia who engaged in trade with Iberia and other 
European ports. John Spalding is one example, with the Spalding family extensively 
researched by Steve Murdoch.63 Born in Scotland at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, Spalding arrived in Gothenburg in the early 1620s, and by 1640 was listed as a 
merchant and a councillor.64  Spalding is noted in the Gothenburg shipping lists from 
1639 to 1666 with his destinations listed across  Europe, including Spain and Portugal.65 
Evidence also suggests that he traded with other Scots based in Sweden, England and 
the Dutch Republic, thus making his involvement in triangular trade likely.66  This is 
made more probable by the economic influence of the Spalding family, which had 
expanded from small trade within Scotland to trade with England and, once established, 
trade overseas.67 John’s son, Gabriel, was also in the family business and followed his 
father as President of Commerce in Gothenburg, as well as trading with ports all over 
Europe, including Lisbon.68  John MacLean, another Scottish merchant based in 
Gothenburg also traded with many European ports including those in Spain.69  The 
Spaldings and MacLeans were not alone in engaging in triangular trade involving Iberia. 
The Scot Peder Sanderson was a councillor in the Oldenburg territory of Malmø, now 
part of modern day Sweden. In 1608, along with three other merchants of the city, 
Sanderson freighted his ship to Norway and from there to Spain with timber.70 
Another family heavily involved in trade which included Iberia was the Jolly 
family. Similarly to the Spalding family, the activities of the Jolly family have already 
received scholarly attention from Kathrin Zickermann.71  The brothers  Alexander and 
Robert Jolly wrote regularly to each other, and particular letters discussed trade to 
Spain in November 1678 and a trading voyage to either Alicante or Marseille in July 
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1684.72  In October 1678 Alexander freighted the James of Leith to Otto Danke, a 
merchant of Hamburg.73  The vessel was to sail from Hamburg to Cadiz and back 
again.74  Thus a Scottish ship was freighted on behalf of a Scottish merchant who 
resided in Scotland to a German merchant for a journey to Spain and then back to 
Germany. 
 This  section has proved beyond doubt that Scottish merchants and ships 
engaged in triangular trade involving Iberian ports. Evidence also suggests that 
triangular trade was not confined to European waters with vessels, registered in 
America, setting off for Madeira from Glasgow, almost certainly as part of a triangular 
trade voyage.  As can be shown from the Scottish High Court of Admiralty examples 
and the case study of Baillie John Steuart, the organisation of these voyages was 
complicated. In a sense, the physical presence of the ship in various ports was the 
simple part, while creating and maintaining links  with merchants in different cities  was 
far more complicated. As Natasha Glaisyer has stated,
For merchants, a good reputation was an essential asset, not only because 
trust was required in credit transactions but because every stage of buying 
and selling goods required trust.75 
The necessity of a trustworthy man in an area of commercial importance cannot be over 
emphasised. The term ‘credit’ did not merely have a monetary value: the credit of a 
reputation was  just as important.76 Xabier Lamikitz concurs, stating that ‘reputation was 
the backbone of trade, as  it was thanks to his good reputation that a merchant had 
access to credit’.77  With such heavy emphasis  on the importance of trust it is 
unsurprising that some merchants and skippers  were so eager to defend their 
reputations in a court of law. The perceived loss of trustworthiness could easily lead to 
bankruptcy. As John Steuart found out to his cost, however, a merchant 
recommendation was no guarantee that a journey and its expectations  would pass 
successfully. Whatever the reason for his disappointment, however, he certainly blamed 
the Barcelona contacts for it and subsequently did not conduct business  with them 
again. As shall be seen in chapter six, this did not affect Windar and Ferrand, although it 
is easy to see how such an incident could lead to ruin for a merchant. 
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2.1 The Importance of London and Rotterdam. 
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter this  section is designed to evaluate and 
analyse Iberian goods that came into Scottish ports via the ports of London and the 
Dutch Republic. These locations have long been marked as re-exporters of international 
commodities. However, it is  clear that Scotland maintained direct trade links with Iberia, 
which begs the question why did Scottish merchants obtain significant amounts of 
Iberian goods from London and Rotterdam rather than from the actual source? 
 Sailing a vessel, no matter how far the distance or the time of year, has always 
presented significant risks. Whole ships could, and did, disappear. Pirates could cause 
devastation while straits, bays and harbours were rendered dangerous by sandbars and 
the weather was a huge consideration at all times. Nonetheless, some journeys were 
considered more dangerous than others, and the journey to Iberia - especially if 
travelling through the straits of Gibraltar - was one such route. The actions of North 
African corsairs made the voyage to the Mediterranean particularly dangerous. 
European vessels were regularly taken by corsairs from Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli and the 
Algiers.78  The early to mid seventeenth century, in particular, was the peak of corsair 
activities in the Mediterranean - for a number of reasons.  Firstly, due to the advice and 
skills of renegade Europeans, the corsair vessel of choice changed from galley ships to 
the faster and more manoeuvrable Dutch-style sailing ships.79 Indeed, some of the most 
successful ‘Barbary pirates’ were actually Europeans, such as John Ward who dined 
with William Lithgow in September 1615.80 Secondly, the major European powers  were 
too absorbed in conflicts with each other to join forces and tackle the threat posed by 
North African corsairs, with the best opportunity - between 1604 and 1621 - passing 
unused and not resulting in any significant action against these vessels.81  This 
distraction was even pointed out by contemporaries at the time, as when James VI & I 
wrote on this  subject to Pope Gregory XV in September 1622.82  In this letter James 
respectfully pointed out that both Catholics and Protestants worship the same God and 
that Christian rulers should work together - an acknowledgement of the threat from 
North Africa and the Ottoman empire.83  The number of ships and people involved in 
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corsair engagements, as scholars have pointed out, are often exaggerated and need to 
be treated with caution. As a result of the harsh consequences  of being captured by a 
North African corsair, the practice gained notoriety which has given a common 
conception that vast numbers of people were involved. For a suitable context we need 
only consider that between the years of 1695 and 1713 French privateers took around 
600 ships a year, with 400 being either English or, more generally, British.84 In contrast, 
North African corsairs only captured 15 English ships a year, even in their peak years of 
the 1620s and the 1630s.85 However, as Linda Colley has discussed, the implications of 
being captured by the French as opposed to being captured by corsairs were very 
different. Capture in the Mediterranean meant enslavement in North Africa with (for 
British mariners at least) little chance of swift release or return home at all.86  The 
ransom asked was beyond the means of most relatives and varied depending on 
gender; women and children commanded a higher price than men. For example, a 
ransom for a man was around 500 dobles while Alice Hays of Edinburgh was  ransomed 
for 1,000 dobles.87 Precise figures of those enslaved are difficult to accurately calculate 
due to the numbers of people who converted to Islam or died in captivity. Nevertheless, 
David Hebb estimates that there were over 7,000 ‘English subjects’ who were taken by 
Barbary corsairs  between 1622 and 1642.88  Unfortunately, for British captives the 
chance of release was much lower than for their European counterparts, mainly 
because those Britons captured were common sailors and not people of importance.89 
According to Jamieson, this caused a detrimental effect for the Barbary states, who 
complained that ‘English governments show little interest in ransoming the English 
slaves captured’.90 Capture by North African corsairs was a constant threat and unlike 
capture by a ship from another European kingdom, not only was there little chance of 
release but there was none at all of receiving compensation for the ship and the cargo. 
 Numerous Scottish vessels were captured by North African corsairs and it is 
certain that of those several vessels  were journeying to Iberia. For example, in 
September 1619 the William of Burntisland was taking pilchards from Ireland to Alicante 
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when it was captured by Algerian corsairs  and the men sold into slavery.91  The Privy 
Council had sent a circular letter to churches and burghs detailing the men’s condition in 
order to assist in the collection of their ransom money. In a similar case, a warrant was 
issued for a collection for William Dawson who was on a Scottish ship (John Williamson 
master) from Malaga in September 1622 when it was captured.92 December 1624 saw 
another incident when the Blessing of Kirkcaldy was captured while journeying to 
London from the Canary Islands.93 In this case all of the crew were released except the 
gunner George Wilson, who was apparently kept due to his skill in attempting to hold off 
the attack.94 Another warrant was issued in February 1637 for the crew of the Phoenix 
of Ayr who were on a voyage to Bilbao.95 A curious case was that of William Rankin, a 
Scottish skipper of a Spanish vessel which was sailing from Malaga to France when the 
vessel was seized.96  However, according to Rankin the pilot for the corsairs fell 
overboard and he was requested by the pirates to steer the vessel. He took them to 
Dublin but was himself arrested and thrown in prison for piracy.97 In November 1674 the 
families  of the skipper and mate of the Mary of Inverkeithing requested to be allowed to 
collect money for their release after the ship was taken by a Turkish man-of-war.98 The 
ship was on a voyage from Scotland to Nantes and on to Lisbon when it was taken, and 
the skipper and mate were unable to escape with the rest of the crew in the ship’s 
boat.99 In the spring of the following year the Privy Council ruled that wives and families 
of a ship bound for Cadiz could no longer collect money for their ransom as they were 
believed to have either escaped from captivity or to have died.100  In another incidence, 
the William and Jean of Glasgow was taken by an Algiers corsair in July 1675 while on 
a journey from Scotland to Lisbon, but the ship was then retaken by the crew.101 
However, the vessel was to suffer even more misfortune when it was taken by a 
Portuguese warship and, due to the presence of ‘Turks’ on board, was in danger of 
being taken as prize by the Portuguese.102  Even in the eighteenth century, when the 
threat had diminished considerably, a few Scottish merchants were still affected. While 
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on a journey from Barcelona to Gibraltar (having sailed to Barcelona from 
Newfoundland) the Scottish ship the Christian, skippered by Alexander Hutton, was 
approached by two Algierian ships. Although they allowed the ship to sail on after 
inspecting its pass the captains of the North African ships still helped themselves to 
some of the Christian's cargo.103 These examples provide a sense of the hopelessness 
of the situation. With the exception of the Christian, there is no information regarding 
any of the other vessels and it is not known if any of the men returned to Scotland. 
These are also only the examples which involve Iberian trade which, while providing 
more evidence of commercial relations between the Peninsula and Scotland, also show 
the extent of the corsair problem.
 To sail safely in the Mediterranean, therefore, a larger vessel was often required, 
preferably in convoy with others. Norman Macdougall, in his study of James IV, 
discusses the issues that the Stewart king had with his naval ambitions due to the lack 
of deep water harbours  in Scotland.104 While Newhaven and Port of Airth were chosen 
by James IV as suitable deepwater harbours, Newhaven was exposed due to its 
position east of the Inchgarvie defences and Port of Airth was 12 miles  west of the 
Queensferry narrows and thus a sizeable distance from the important Leith market.105 
Aberdeen’s harbour was notorious for its  dangerous northern approach, where a sand 
bar at high tide was covered by a mere two feet of water.106  Thomas Tucker’s report, 
regarding the economic state of Scotland in the 1650’s, discusses the vessels in 
Scottish harbours and pays particular attention to their small size.107  In the early 
eighteenth century the Convention of Royal Burghs alluded to the lack of suitable 
Scottish vessels for Iberian trade and requested that Scottish merchants be allowed to 
import foreign salt from neutral ports as ‘we are not furnished with convenient ships for 
bringing salt from Spain or Portugall’.108  As  Scottish harbours could not accommodate 
larger vessels it is  unsurprising that, in comparison to vessels which sailed to Northern 
Europe relatively few Scottish ships sailed to Iberia. 
 As has been shown in the previous paragraphs sailing to Iberia was risky and 
understandably some merchants were wary of putting cargo on vessels sailing to the 
region. For merchants without significant reserves  of capital the loss of one cargo could 
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lead to financial ruin. Maritime insurance was therefore required but in the early modern 
period this form of business was not regulated. The insurance market was still fairly 
informal and insurers  would often only take responsibility for part of a consignment, 
meaning that merchants would have to contact a number of insurers to protect an entire 
cargo.109  Fraud was also a problem and insurers  regularly asked for proof of damaged 
or lost goods before agreeing to pay out. Resulting disagreements often led to legal 
action which, on occasion, were lengthy and costly.110  For example, in 1707 the 
Providence of Leith was sailing in convoy to Lisbon when it was taken by French 
privateers leaving the skipper, Robert Gray, fighting to have the insurer pay for the 
loss.111 Until the 1800s  Scottish merchants often obtained insurance abroad such as the 
Marie of Leith, which obtained insurance in London for a journey from Leith to Plymouth 
and Cadiz in March 1621.112  Baillie John Steuart commonly secured insurance from 
abroad with there being only one occasion where he insured a vessel in Scotland.113 
Scots were not alone in obtaining insurance in this way. As Christopher Ebert has 
argued this ‘decentralisation’ was  common and had emerged in the 15th century.114 
Ebert provides examples of Catalonian merchants insuring vessels carrying cloth 
between Florence and England as well as arguing that such practices became more 
common as the 16th century wore on with Amsterdam, in particular, hosting a booming 
insurance market.115  Other methods  of risk avoidance were also utilised, most 
commonly, risk distribution, whereby a merchant would place cargos on different ships 
so that if a ship was lost other cargos would, hopefully, provide a profit.116  Insurance 
was not merely confined to goods either with individuals obtaining insurance for their 
person, presumably to provide a ransom if captured. For example, in a letter to his 
father, John Dunlop discussed the impending journey of his brother to Cadiz.117 In this 
letter he wrote that a Mr Foulis was seeking to find out how much a man would insure 
himself for on such a voyage whether it be £100, £200, £300 or £400 (presumably 
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sterling).118  The danger of sailing to Iberian ports meant that some form of insurance 
was required and it would be foolhardy to send a vessel or indeed a person on such a 
voyage without any form of financial protection. With such risks in mind it is  unsurprising 
that some Scots did not deem it worth sending cargo or ships to southern waters. 
 Further, while it is clear that there were Scots  living in Iberia, this community was 
small and disparate in comparison to the large Scottish communities in both London 
and Rotterdam. There is, as yet, no substantial research available on the size of the 
Scots community in London in the seventeenth century, but preliminary research 
involving the index of the register of deeds in the Scottish national archives indicates 
the existence of a large community with several hundred merchants. The Scottish 
presence in the Dutch Republic, particularly the communities  at Scottish staple at Veere 
and Rotterdam, has also received significant scholarly attention. Matthijs  Rooseboom, 
John Davidson and Alexander Gray all investigated the Scottish staple at the turn of the 
seventeenth century.119 Recently, Douglas Catterall’s work has proven that the Scottish 
community in Rotterdam was not only numerically substantial but also economically 
influential.120 These ports, as well as containing significant Scottish communities, were 
also geographically closer than Iberia and well placed for triangular trade voyages 
involving the Baltic and Scandinavian ports.  
 In order to ensure that the goods brought from London and Rotterdam were 
Iberian in origin an investigation was undertaken of other areas from where goods such 
as lemons, oranges and figs may have originated. This was to counter the fact that 
there is  a certain assumption among historians that these goods originated in the 
Levant.121  However, following a detailed investigation of the historiography, it can be 
ascertained that, with the exception of a few years  between 1675 and the early 1680s - 
where the English were granted the right to export two boats per year of figs  and raisins 
expressly for the king’s table - the chief import from the Levant trade to England was 
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textiles.122  Oranges and lemons are not mentioned in any of the historiography as 
originating in Levant. This, combined with the knowledge that Spain was England's chief 
market post-1630, to the point that when the Dutch Republic threatened this  trade in 
post 1648 it caused outrage among English merchants, makes  it highly unlikely that 
lemons, oranges, raisins and figs would have come from anywhere other than Iberia.123 
It is possible that goods were assumed to be coming from the Levant due to triangular 
trade - Dutch vessels would often load a cargo at Cadiz or Alicante and then sail on to 
Livorno, Genoa or Venice meaning that a visit to Iberia may not be recorded.124  It has 
also been pointed out that the Dutch Republic was likely to use their direct East India 
trade for the spices and other Asian goods often available at market places in the 
Levant, which in conjunction with their strong re-entry into the Spanish market 
post-1648 makes it unlikely that these goods were coming from the Levant.125  
2.2. London
During the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the city of London experienced a 
population boom. In 1560 the population of London was around 110,000, but by 1680 
this  had risen to 430,000.126 This  growth led to the development of a crucial trade from 
the countryside around London and, indeed, the wider British coastline, which provided 
the goods necessary to allow the metropolis  to function.127  London’s  importance as a 
centre of trade during the seventeenth century was such that four-fifths of English 
imports during the period came through the city.128 It has  been estimated that the port of 
London, along with the shipping and supporting trades, possibly employed a quarter of 
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the capital’s  population by the early eighteenth century.129 It was not merely Londoners 
who were involved, with Margrit Schulte Beerbühl stating that until the late eighteenth 
century the history of foreign merchants in England is ‘essentially the history of the city 
of London’.130  Studying actual statistics  for the trade of London has been stated to be a 
difficult task due to the poor survival of London port books from the seventeenth 
century.131  Despite this, several scholars have made inroads into discussing both the 
volume of and goods of trade in London in the early modern period. Keith Wrightson, for 
example, has discussed the dominance of cloth in London’s export trade, which he 
states made up just over 92 percent of London’s domestic export trade in the 1640s.132 
This  had declined by 1700 but still consisted of an impressive 72 percent, with an 
expansion occurring in exports of goods such as victuals and items such as hides, 
coals, tin and salt.133  A significant change in both the geographical origin and, 
subsequently, the type of imports reaching London also took place during the 
seventeenth century. Several historians agree on the increasing importance of and, 
indeed, fundamental shift in trade from eastern Baltic ports to southern Europe.134 This 
shift was not confined to southern Europe as  trade to the Americas and Asia also made 
its mark, although with some disagreement on their significance.135  The seventeenth 
century also saw a noticeable increase in the practice of re-exporting goods, with it 
being noted that London merchants found the practice of selling imports more lucrative 
than exporting products.136 From this very brief overview it can be surmised that during 
the seventeenth century London grew from a city into a metropolis, with a large growth 
in population and gaining an increasing standing in trade. London’s trade expanded 
both in quantity and geographical reach with trade from southern Europe gaining a 
greater share of the market during the period investigated by this thesis. 
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 As established in chapter two, English trade with Iberia and its dominions, or 
rather the lack of it, was disastrous to the English economy prior to 1603. However, as 
the seventeenth century wore on, the resumption and continuation of this trade became 
economically vital. Ball has argued that trade with Spain, in particular, became more 
attractive as the economic situation in the Peninsula became worse, with the balance of 
trade becoming more favourable to foreign merchants.137  English exports to Spain 
increased mainly due to the trade in ‘New Draperies’, which were lighter than traditional 
cloths.138  This  was supplemented by the trade in fish from Newfoundland, especially 
post-1630, which involved triangular trade with Biscay salt being taken to Newfoundland 
followed by salted fish to Iberia and then wine or fruit supplied for the return to 
London.139  Other goods sent from Iberia to London were the same as those 
commodities discussed in chapter one. With London’s previously established entrepôt 
status, commodities from Iberia exported to London were likely to be re-exported to 
other ports and in the case of Scotland this can be proven.
 While the lack of London port books does cause problems for scholars  wishing to 
examine the trade of that city, Scottish port books provide ample evidence of trade with 
London, particularly in the late seventeenth century but also earlier. For example, one 
Leith port book running from November 1626 to November 1627 deals  with imports of 
tobacco with several of vessels collecting their cargo from London.140  This example is 
useful for two reasons: one, it proves Scottish trade with London and two, it shows that 
London was acting as an entrepôt for foreign goods. Greenhall’s  thesis examining 
Anglo-Scottish trade in the early modern period has  argued that despite the lack of 
London port books in the early seventeenth century, some pattern of trade can be 
established.141  Scottish ships trading with the English capital took victuals and other 
basic products in return for a range of goods including, but not limited to, gloves, hats, 
stockings, beer, drinking glasses, figs and raisins.142 Furthermore, Greenhall points  out 
that those Scottish vessels  which visited London usually did so either going to or 
returning from Europe, supporting the idea that trade to Iberia may well be hidden 
behind the ‘last port’ in a triangular trade journey.143  An example of this  is  found in the 
Crown Money Book of Leith, with Archibald Drummond recording in October 1710 that 
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he had undertaken a journey to Bilbao from Leith, stopping at London on the return.144 If 
this  journey had been recorded in a port record book it would have stated that the 
vessel came from London - without mentioning the prior stop - thus it is only due to 
Drummond’s diligence in recording the whole journey that historians  are aware of the 
Iberian element.145 Later in the century evidence of Scottish trade with London becomes 
far more obvious, with the Leith port books in particular detailing dozens of ships 
arriving from London or going to London in the period 1663-1691.146  Scotland’s 
increasing trade with England during the seventeenth century has already been 
investigated by several historians and in the scope of this  thesis a re-evaluation of this 
information is not necessary. It is only required to note that Scotland had a direct trade 
with London and that thus Iberian goods arrived in Scotland from this port. 
 Of the four major Scottish ports surveyed for this chapter in the period 1668-1696 
- Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith - the vast majority of ships from London which 
carried Iberian goods were destined for the port of Leith. Very few ships carrying Iberian 
goods made it into the other major ports, with only one vessel from London arriving in 
Aberdeen, the Richard and John of London leaving Glasgow for Cadiz, and the 
Providence of Dundee arriving in Dundee from London.147  Many of those merchants 
noted as buying Iberian goods do not, despite investigation, appear in any other 
records. One example is  Andrew Kelmuir, who purchased several thousand lemons and 
oranges between December 1688 and March 1689.148 John Smeaton was the recipient 
of figs, oranges, lemons and Brazil wood a number of times from December 1672 until 
March 1675, but again no further mention can be found of his  activities.149  Another 
example is  that of James Miller, who purchased the same cargo of oranges  and lemons 
several times between February 1681 and March 1685.150 In Miller’s  case, however, the 
problem is not a lack of evidence but more the impossibility of connecting the different 
merchants of that name to the merchant who purchased the Iberian goods. An 
interesting occurrence is the number of women who were involved in purchasing Iberian 
goods. Anna Thomson, for example, is  named several times in December 1685 as 
purchasing 3,000 lemons and oranges from John Brune’s vessel which had arrived from 
London.151  The following spring she purchased over 10,000 lemons and oranges from 
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three separate vessels  arriving from London.152 Isobel Mitchell bought the same cargo 
in January and May 1685, along with Margaret Mitchell in March of the same year.153 
There are many more examples  with several theories as to why there is so little 
information upon the activities of those who bought goods from the Peninsula. One 
possible reason, which is borne out by the frequency of Iberian commodities among the 
gentry classes, is the idea that those buying such goods were doing so on behalf of 
their masters with the amount purchased only for household consumption and not 
resale. While 2,000 oranges  and lemons may seem a rather excessive amount for one 
household it must be remembered that they, along with figs, were seasonal goods 
arriving in London in the late autumn and winter months from Iberia and making their 
way to other ports in late winter and early spring.154  Thus, the cargoes bought would 
have had to last until the next season’s  produce arrived and, of course, be in plentiful 
supply for the correct occasion. Another theory is  that merchants  who purchased Iberian 
goods were involved in domestic trade or trade to Northern Europe and only 
occasionally dealt in Iberian goods  if a profitable opportunity arose. A combination of 
these theories seems most probable. 
 This  does seem to be the case in the example of James Balfour, who is  shown 
as buying Iberian goods from vessels arriving from Holland, London, Rotterdam and 
Spain throughout the 1680s and 1690s.155  Balfour also bought Spanish wine, for 
example in April 1686, purchasing six and a half butts from the cargo of the Alexander 
of Leith which had arrived from Spain.156 Balfour did not necessarily keep these goods 
for himself as  documentation notes that in May 1693 Lord Bargany was due Balfour £17 
13 shillings  and sixpence for a variety of goods, including sack and raisins.157  Balfour 
was also involved in a soap manufactory and a tobacco business in Leith.158  One 
William Blackwood is another example of a prolific buyer of Iberian goods in Leith, 
purchasing oranges, lemons and raisins from 1673 onwards.159  But he, too, was 
involved in other trade; in letters from John Carmichael in Amsterdam to Andrew 
Russell, Blackwood receives mention with Carmichael noting that he enclosed a bill 
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from him.160  Blackwood resold goods: for example, in April 1690 he was due the 
significant sum of £197 and 17 shillings from Lord Forret.161  As shall be shown below, 
Blackwood was also heavily involved in trade from London. Both Balfour and 
Blackwood were prolific merchants dealing in commodities from all over Europe and not 
merely Iberia. 
  A case study in this trade is encapsulated by the activities of William 
Blackwood’s contact in London, William Fraser. Fraser’s inclusion in a number of 
different documents, in conjunction with his ledger and his will and testament show that 
he was a successful businessman who was trusted by the individuals  that he dealt with 
and sourced commodities for.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, due to a lack of 
research into the Scottish community in London, it is  difficult to judge how typical 
Fraser’s  activities were. In regards to this thesis, however, Fraser provides an 
informative example of how a Scottish merchant based in London could have operated 
and shows the path that Scottish goods could travel once they reached the metropolis. 
Fraser’s  journal gives insight into both his trade with Iberia but also the life of a Scottish 
merchant in London. The journal covers  the period from 1699 until 1711 and shows that 
he procured a wide range of goods for numerous merchants in Scotland.162  A great 
number of Fraser’s transactions were with William Blackwood. Unfortunately, the source 
involved sometimes records the transactions merely in terms of money exchanged 
without a record of what that the commodities  concerned actually were. For example, in 
April 1705 Fraser wrote, ‘I sent to Wm Blackwood Wm Skeen bill on John Murrie for 
£5:15’.163  Another example involving Iberia has  Fraser recording that he had sent £50 
for his own account on the George of Leith from Lisbon to London.164  It is also unclear 
which form of currency Fraser was using in these transactions, although it is 
presumable, due to Fraser’s residence in London, that he completed his transactions in 
sterling. Thankfully, he occasionally elaborated upon his transactions allowing a 
complex trading pattern to emerge. In November 1704 Fraser recorded one such 
venture with William Blackwood. He had sent a cargo of cloth to Lisbon on board the 
Amelia, of which Thomas Tertam was master.165  This cargo was to be consigned to 
Messers Strange and Bonning for the account of both Blackwood and Fraser himself. 
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Fraser also documented how the cargo was originally paid for, with Blackwood paying 
for half and Fraser paying for the ‘carriage’ to London as well as the cost of dying and 
packaging the cloth.166 Unfortunately, there is no further mention of this  particular cargo 
and its profits. Despite this, the details contained in the example provide proof as to 
what the Leith port books suggest. Scottish merchants were dealing in Iberian goods 
both to and from Iberia via London. It is much easier to spot Iberian goods coming to 
Scotland purely due to the nature of the commodities; however, this example 
demonstrates that Scottish goods which were recorded as going to London did not 
necessarily stay there and were shipped onto third destinations. For example, without 
Fraser’s  journal it may never have become apparent that the final destination for 
Blackwood’s cargo of cloth was Lisbon.
 Fraser was also heavily involved in sending supplies to the Newmills  textile 
factory in East Lothian. This  enterprise functioned with the assistance of legislation 
which allowed the tax-free importation of commodities essential to cloth production.167 
In July 1701 a commission to Fraser from the factory requested that he buy ‘fyve balls 
of best Sigovia wooll for accompt of the company’.168  Fraser provided these items 
regularly, shipping goods for the Newmills  factory, for example, in late October and early 
November 1701. The essential dyes of indigo and cochineal came from Spanish 
America and Fraser shipped both of these to Scotland on several occasions.169  Other 
examples are given of Fraser detailing Iberian goods sent to Scotland. For example, in 
November 1707 Fraser recorded that he had shipped for William Murrie aboard the 
Margaret of Leith Spanish sack and Spanish claret, as well as  cargo dated two days 
previously for Murrie that included indigo.170  Moreover, in January 1708 a Newcastle 
vessel took oranges, lemons and sack to a Mr Campbell.171  The journal also makes 
several references to salt; however, as discussed in chapter one, as there is no definite 
proof of origin they cannot be included in this survey.
 The High Court of Admiralty of Scotland provides further proof of Fraser’s  
activities, where he was named in a dispute between a skipper of Leith, Arthur Reid, 
and Henry Bothwell of Glencourse.172  Reid was pursuing Bothwell in a dispute 
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regarding wine from the Canary Islands which had been bought at Lisbon, and Fraser 
was named as one of the merchants who was intended to receive half a pipe of wine.173 
Despite his relocation to London, Fraser never forgot his Scottish origins as  a will 
written in December 1715 makes apparent. In his will he bequeathed the vast majority 
of his estate to his  brother James, including government bonds worth £1500 sterling.174 
Fraser also left £50 sterling to the charity schools in Inverness with a further £50 sterling 
for schools in the Highlands.175  Interestingly, Fraser notes that these legacies and 
similar gifts of money to his nephews and nieces should be paid for out of the interest 
‘of the money I have in the ffunds in the government of England’.176 Other items in his 
possession included two diamond rings and a gold snuffbox bequeathed along with the 
remainder and the personal estate to his brother James, with Alexander Grant, Fraser's 
nephew, appointed executor.177  Fraser’s estate shows him to be a wealthy and 
successful merchant who, although he did not have any children himself provided for 
the children of his siblings, as  well as Scottish institutions. While Fraser made his will in 
1715 he was alive until at least 1723, with John Steuart writing in a letter to Alexander 
Rose that Fraser was involved in a cargo of salt.178 
 Fraser was not alone as a London-based Scot dealing in Iberian trade with other 
examples providing more evidence of how Scots in London acted as a conduit for 
Iberian trade. John Home also bought quantities of Segovia wool on behalf of the 
Newmills textile factory from London, which placed a request for 3000 lbs of the wool in 
January 1682.179  By the end of February George Home, likely to be a relation, was 
ordered to write to John asking him to purchase 700 (of an unknown weight) of the 
finest Segovia wool, along with 300 of the lesser quality and 100 of the poorest quality 
on behalf of the company.180 These transactions also show the wealth and reputation of 
both Home and the company, Home being instructed to pay for the wool in ‘ready 
money’ and draw it from the company’s  accounts.181  June 1683 saw another letter to 
Home where he was requested to purchase 50 bags of Spanish wool on behalf of the 
company. Further, the company asked that he obtain credit for six to eight months.182 
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He was also instructed to find out the difference between paying immediately for the 
wool or buying on credit, amounting to the interest that would be charged on the six-
month loan.183 Home was clearly one of the main suppliers for the company as he was 
again asked to buy more Spanish wool in June 1684.184 James Foulis, previously noted 
in the letters of John Dunlop, also provided Castile soap for the company in February 
1701.185
 Merchants in London were not necessarily connected to the Newmills textile 
factory and dealt in other commodities. Walter Stewart was noted as a partner involved 
in the shipping of cod to Lisbon on the Jacob of Pittenweem.186  The shipment was in 
conjunction with James Gordon, a merchant of Edinburgh, and John Innes, writer of the 
fishing company Dunbeath and Cromarty, with the cargo made up of both dry and fresh 
cod.187  Another Scot, John Hossack, also arranged trade from London, albeit on an 
intermittent basis. Hossack was a merchant and baillie of Inverness whose career 
spanned over twenty years and was in London at least twice in 1722 and 1727.188   In 
July 1722 Hossack wrote to William McLean & Co to inform them that he had 
purchased twenty tons of Portuguese salt, which was to be shipped on Mr Rankin’s ship 
to Inverness.189  The redistribution of Iberian goods  from London continued in the 
eighteenth century, with Charles Dalrymple writing to Hew Dalrymple from London that 
he had shipped Madeira wine from London to Leith for him.190
 Unfortunately, serious scholarly investigation into the Scottish merchants’ 
community in London is currently lacking and it is  not possible within the scope of this 
thesis for this subject to be fully examined - even though it is  probable that such an 
examination would uncover more Scots involved in dealing in Iberian goods. For 
example, in the London Metropolitan Archives  a three-volume source exists of the 
business dealings of John Richards and John Rooke. The first volume of this source 
consists of over three hundred pages of business transactions - the vast majority 
involving Spain- from October 1617 to May 1672. Following a brief consultation with this 
source it is possible to establish that Scots, such as  William Gordon, purchased Iberian 
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goods from these men.191  The Richards and Rooke manuscript reveals that Scots 
received Iberian goods in considerable quantities from London. However within in the 
scope of this  project it is simply not possible for every avenue regarding London based 
Iberian trade to be explored. This  would require a far more detailed analysis of the 
London economy and the importance of Scottish merchants  in London as a whole. 
Further a comparison would be required in regards to the prominence of Iberian trade 
for Scottish London merchants compared to trade with other areas. 
 That said, what can be seen here is that Scottish merchants were involved in 
redistributing Iberian goods from London. William Fraser, George Home, John Hossack 
and George Ouchterlony all engaged in shipping Scottish goods  from London to Iberia 
or vice versa. There is  also evidence of Scots  in England organising or taking part in 
journeys to Iberia from English ports, such as William Dunlop. The previously mentioned 
John Dunlop wrote several letters to his father discussing the preparations of his brother 
William’s journey to Cadiz from Plymouth.192  In particular, John discussed the attempts 
to gain the security of an armed merchant vessel as they did not expect a royal vessel 
to travel with them.193 When William did eventually undertake his  journey, his ship was 
accompanied by three merchant ships, one of 36 guns, one of 22 guns and one of 16 
guns.194  William was preparing for another journey to Spain by August of the following 
year.195  By May 1686 William had emigrated to South Carolina and kept up a 
correspondence with Sir James Montgomery and discussed his brother James who was 
a merchant in Rotterdam.196  The Dunlops were obviously heavily involved with trade; 
John in London travelled to New York in 1683, William traded to Spain and Holland and 
settled in South Carolina and, James was based Rotterdam.
2.3 Rotterdam
The Scottish connection with the Dutch Republic, both with the staple port and with 
Rotterdam, have already been examined in this thesis. The trading activities of the 
Dutch Republic itself have also been subject to intense scholarly scrutiny due to both its 
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meteoric rise and its  conflicts with the Cromwellian Protectorate and the Stuart 
monarchy in regards to trade.197  Following the Treaty of Münster in 1648, the Dutch 
Republic was at long last recognised by Habsburg Spain, and for the first time since 
1621, was allowed legal access  to ports and markets within the remit of the Spanish 
Habsburgs. As a result, Dutch freight and insurance prices dropped significantly, 
allowing the Dutch to challenge a market that England had held control of since 1630 - 
Spanish trade.198  In short space of time merchants of the Dutch Republic had strongly 
reasserted themselves in this  trade.199 With such evidence, it is  unsurprising that a vast 
number of ships arriving in the ports  of Aberdeen, Dundee and Leith came from ports in 
the Dutch Republic and that they carried a diverse array of goods. As with London, a 
variety of Iberian goods such as  sack were imported into Scottish ports.200 There is also 
evidence of Scots taking part and re-exporting Iberian goods from the Dutch Republic to 
Scotland. 
 Take, for example, the case study of Alexander Andrew, a Scottish merchant who 
lived in Rotterdam. Andrew was heavily involved in trade and dealt in Iberian goods, for 
example with John Steuart of Inverness. In October 1716 Steuart wrote to Andrew 
questioning why he was yet to receive 300 pieces of eight that he had ordered to be 
sent from his correspondents in Bilbao.201 Earlier in June Steuart had written that Van 
Duffle and Archer (both discussed in chapter six) were due him money for fish and he 
had requested that they send the funds to Andrew in Rotterdam.202 In this  letter Steuart 
wrote that he did not find a very good market for fish in Bilbao and asked Andrew’s 
advice on whether fish would sell well at Hamburg and Bruges.203 A year later two other 
merchants from Inverness, James Mackintosh and Thomas Robertson, wrote to Andrew 
to discuss the voyage of the Good Success of Inverness.204 Mackintosh and Robertson 
wished for Andrew to load the vessel with 40 tons of Lisbon salt as well as 24 tons of 
French brandy.205  In July 1721 Steuart wrote again to Andrew via the Marjorie of 
Inverness, which was carrying a cargo of beer to two other Scots  in Rotterdam, Hugh 
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and Andrew Munro.206  Steuart further explained that the skipper would pay money due 
to Andrew and because he did not want the vessel to return home empty, Andrew was 
to load enough Lisbon salt to ballast the ship, along with other goods.207 In April 1725 
Steuart wrote again to Andrew stating that he believed that a cargo of fish which he had 
sent would not sell for the desired price in Rotterdam.208  Thus, he instructed Andrew to 
keep the salmon until September and then to wash the salmon and repack it in clean 
pickle so that it could be sold as new salmon either at Bilbao or La Havre.209  From his 
base in Rotterdam Andrew was heavily involved in trade with other Scottish merchants, 
providing Iberian goods for Steuart, Mackintosh and Robertson.  
 The activities  of the Scottish merchant Andrew Russell based in Rotterdam have 
received scholarly attention by T.C Smout. Smout notes that while it is unclear why 
Russell moved to Rotterdam he started acting as  a factor immediately.210 Russell was a 
prolific merchant who received letters from almost 90 different Scottish merchants in 
1680 alone and procured a huge range of goods  for them.211  Through his  business 
Russell dealt with trade involving Iberia and traded in Iberian goods, as shown by his 
correspondence with Francis de Muilinares and co. from the Spanish Netherlands city 
of Bruges. While the letters do not provide any details of the goods brought or 
exchanged they do show Russell had business transactions  with merchants from 
Iberian-held territories.212  The sums of money involved in his agreements with 
Muilinares are significant, with a letter of 10 May 1671 stating ‘I had order from Mr 
Peiter Fratex to pay unto your order £318. 10sh’.213  Another letter eight days later 
similarly discusses the sum of £221 pounds, 17 shillings and sixpence, this having 
being converted from ducats.214 In his letter to Andrew Russell in February 1678 Robert 
Turnbull discussed a letter he had received from another Scot, John Robertson, based 
in Lisbon.215 Turnbull was acquainted with Russell due to business dealings carried out 
in Stirling in the 1660s before Russell left for the Dutch Republic.216  Russell and 
Turnbull, along with Alexander Baird and Patrick Thomson, formed a joint stock 
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company in the 1680s with links all over Europe.217 Robertson had written in his letter to 
Turnbull that he was going to travel under convoy for Cadiz and load salt for his owner’s 
account before returning home.218  Presumably, ‘home’ was Scotland as  Turnbull added 
‘I shall be glad to see him in safety’.219  In a postscript to the same letter John Brown, 
another merchant of Edinburgh, requested that Russell send 200 lbs of ‘fynest whyt 
powder shougar’ as  well as  50 lbs of orange skins.220  Robert Mein was another 
correspondent of Russell. Mein, who was appointed keeper of the letter office in 
Edinburgh by Charles II following the restoration, wrote in November 1682.221  In his 
letter to Russell he discussed some general business before ordering goods, including 
confected oranges and lemons.222 Another correspondent, Thomas Gourlay, was based 
in Lisbon. In March 1685 Gourlay stated that he had been worrying about consigning 
‘any salt’ although he wrote that it is  said (by whom is not disclosed) to be ‘altogether 
impossible’.223  A second letter sent four days later remarked that English and Dutch 
merchants were in his company and that they had been there for around twenty days.224 
In this  letter Gourlay talked about his attempts to get salt shipped for Russell, saying 
that he had sent the account for the loading of salt.225  As Smout has  shown, Russell 
was heavily involved with trade all over Europe, providing a crucial link for merchants 
based in Scotland to the continent. Russell was not just involved in traditional trade with 
Northern Europe though as he also kept links with the Spanish Netherlands and 
Portugal, as well as probably sourcing Iberian goods.  Russell and Andrew were not the 
only Scottish merchants based in the Dutch Republic who were involved in Iberian 
trade. William Dundas, for example, comes to light as a merchant of Rotterdam who 
was pursued by Matthew Robertson on behalf of John Laing, previously a merchant in 
Cromarty but at the time a minister in Maryland.226  Dundas owed Laing £102, six 
shillings and eightpence sterling for cod exported from Cromarty to Bilbao.227                   
 Once again the textile demands of the Newmills  factory provides evidence of 
Scots in the Dutch Republic dealing in Iberian goods as  well as showing the strength 
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and breadth of that manufactory’s  supply network. In February 1701 Alexander Herriot 
was instructed to enter into the company records that Mr John Drummond and his 
business partner, both based in Amsterdam, had been paid the sum of £4,048 sterling 
for twelve bolls of Spanish wool sent via William Bell’s ship in May 1700.228  Another 
sixteen bolls  were sent via John Matheis’ ship in July of the same year leading to a bill 
for the company, including the postage of letters and interest payments, of £4,868 
sterling.229 Another invoice followed in April 1702 with Drummond and Vanderhoyden’s 
billing for ten bolls of Spanish wool which, with charges, amounted to an invoice of over 
£5,000 sterling.230  This  wool had been requested by the company in February 1701, 
with it noted in the same entry that the men were to be paid £3,000 sterling for bills 
remitted by them, suggesting the wool sent in the summer of 1700 was still being paid 
for.231  Further, Drummond’s letter noted that another 26 bolls had been purchased 
amounting to £8,000 sterling.232  In June of the same year the minutes instructed that 
Drummond and another man, James Muriesone, were to be commissioned to buy 
twenty and ten bolls  of Spanish wool respectively.233 Muriesone replied to the company 
in July stating that he would purchase the wool and informed the board that the price of 
exchange was 24 and a half pence per pound sterling.234  This was not the first time 
Muriesone had been requested to purchase Spanish wool, as he had been asked to 
buy eight bolls  in January 1701. The bill for this, amounting to just under £2,500 sterling, 
was received by the company on 12 March 1701.235 William Fraser was  also involved in 
these transactions, mainly being instructed by the company to remit bills  to Amsterdam 
for the payment of Drummond and Vanderhoyden and Muriesone. In December 1701 
the company recorded that money due to Drummond would be remitted via Fraser ‘as 
formerly’, suggesting this form of payment had occurred before.236  By March 1702 
another 20 bolls had been ordered from Drummond and his partner, with Muriesone 
asked to provide ten bolls.237 Drummond sent his invoice to the company for this order 
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in May, charging just under £9,000 sterling for 24 bolls.238 Drummond appeared to have 
problems being paid on this occasion as the company ordered Alexander Weir to write 
to Drummond and tell him to draw upon William Fraser for a portion of the money 
due.239 Once again a complex financial system emerges in the dealings of the company. 
Fraser had paid Drummond, and the company now owed Fraser £910 sterling, which 
was to be paid in bills payable in London.240  However, the bills had to be made out to 
the value of £1,000 sterling as, unlike cash, bills incurred a ten percent deduction for 
exchange.241 For his part, Muriesone invoiced the company in March 1703 and was, like 
Drummond, advised to draw the money from Fraser in London.242 Fraser was clearly an 
important link between the company and their Scottish Dutch-based suppliers. The 
expectation of the necessity of trust is once again evident with the merchants in the 
Dutch Republic trusting that they would be paid and the company, trusting that Fraser 
would act in their best interests. While the Newmills textile factory is one of the only 
manufactory for which records  survive, its importance surpasses that of mere record 
survival. It also provides evidence of how Scottish merchants worked together to obtain 
Iberian goods and provides evidence of a complex network in which to pay for them. 
This  provides further evidence that Scottish merchants resident in the Dutch republic 
did not just deal in goods from Northern Europe but also from Iberia.                                 
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that Scottish trade with Iberia did not 
necessarily have to be direct and that due to the prevalence of triangular trade Scottish 
trade was almost certainly more prolific than port records account for. Thankfully, there 
is  significant evidence of triangular trade involving Scotland and Iberia. The evidence 
shows that this  was not merely an occasional and sporadic trade but regular and 
significant. John Steuart is a perfect example of a Scottish merchant involved in Iberian 
triangular trade, arranging for vessels to visit ports  in the Mediterranean and giving 
detailed instructions both to his representative on the vessel and the merchants of the 
ports  visited. In providing more detailed evidence of triangular trade Steuart’s examples 
also show how complicated this practice was, with trusted connections required at every 
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stop for the venture to be a success, as well as the trust of those on board the vessel to 
execute the interests of the merchants funding the vessel. 
 However, as this  chapter has shown, trading to Iberia and beyond was perceived 
to be more dangerous than voyages to Northern Europe. The entrepôt status of both 
London and Rotterdam, therefore, gave another avenue for Scottish merchants  to 
obtain Iberian goods, while also acting as a one-stop-shop for goods from Asia, the New 
World and the rest of Europe. Similarly to evidence already published for Scottish 
merchant activities in other parts of Europe, it is clear that Scottish merchants who 
obtained their Iberian goods from London and Rotterdam did so by contacting other 
Scots already resident in these areas. William Fraser and George Ouchterlony 
organised the shipping of goods to their counterparts based in Scotland, with Fraser’s 
journal giving evidence of a thriving trade in a diverse manner of commodities from 
London. While Andrew Russell’s commercial dealings have already been subject to 
scholarly scrutiny, the vast quantities  of records available regarding this merchant mean 
that it is  still possible to uncover new information about his trade. Russell not only sent 
goods, such as  oranges and lemons, to Scotland, he also kept up correspondence with 
merchants based in Bruges and Lisbon, with Alexander Andrew another example of a 
similar practice. The Newmills textile factory also provides several examples of Scottish 
merchants based in both London and the Dutch Republic trading in Iberian goods. The 
venture is frequently used in historiography, primarily because it is one example for 
which records still exists.243  It must therefore be questioned how many other 
manufactories were established which had links to Iberian commodities as the sheer 
quantity of Spanish wool imported by Newmills, at least, shows its popularity as  a 
commodity in Scotland. While it could be argued that this trade is not relevant, the 
significant volume of Iberian goods making their way to Scotland from these ports 
means that it would have been detrimental not to include them in the scope of this 
thesis. This chapter has shown that it is  necessary to look beyond direct trade in order 
to gain an understanding of Scottish commercial relations with Iberia.
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Chapter Four: Test run for Great Britain? the Early Stuarts and Cromwell
‘Wm Dick is hardlie spoken of for trafficking w[i]t Spane’1
Following the death of Queen Elizabeth, the island of Great Britain experienced a period 
of significant political change. England gained a new king from a foreign dynasty, while 
Scotland had to adapt itself to the prospect of being governed by an absentee monarch. 
Not content with the throne he had coveted for decades, James saw himself as the 
author of a new history for both England and Scotland. He sought to achieve this 
through the creation of a new political entity under the banner of Great Britain. To 
achieve this James sought several constitutional changes to further his ‘perfect union’. 
 While James consulted his parliaments in order make the internal changes 
required to combine his two British kingdoms, his attempts to bring them in line with his 
own agenda proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless, alterations to Stuart foreign policy 
designed to include his new kingdom did not require the permission of his 
parliamentarians and were made immediately. These changes  also involved trade, with 
consuls  and trade treaties being re-scripted to refer to Great Britain rather than simply 
Scotland or England. However, James’s plans were not without opposition as there 
were Scots  who rejected this new form of representation and preferred to remain 
distinctly Scottish particularly where long-held commercial benefits had been enjoyed. 
While the examination of consular records does not provide direct evidence of trade, the 
arguments regarding representation and the sheer number of consuls deployed to the 
Iberian peninsula, especially in Andalusia, proves the commercial connection to have 
been significant. After all if Iberian trade was not important merchants would not have 
raised complaints in regard to who represented them, nor would there have been the 
need for as many consuls who clearly worked on behalf of Scottish merchants. Proof 
also emerges of a small resident community developing in Spain and Portugal through 
documents from Iberian archives. Once again, while some of the information is  not very 
detailed it does provide evidence that Scots lived and worked in the region.  
 The death of James VI in 1625 ushered in yet another new period for ‘Great 
Britain’. With Charles eager to prove himself and defend his  sister, the embattled 
Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, Scotland, by default, became involved in his foreign 
policy decisions. This equated to war with both France and Spain which, although it 
provided new opportunities  for Scots in the form of privateering, also impacted on 
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established trading connections. The Scots, however, just as their English neighbours 
had done during the Anglo-Spanish war, found ways to continue trading. Evidence for 
this  comes through the case of William Dick whose activities reveal that the profit 
Iberian goods  could create made obtaining them worth the risk regardless of royal 
policy. Following the end of the conflicts of the 1620s, the subsequent decade ushered 
in a new period of peace and stability. Once again we find Scottish merchants 
strengthening and building upon their commercial relations with Iberia with hitherto 
unnoticed results. 
 This  stability was not to last, and the 1640s were another turbulent period for 
Scotland. As usual Scottish merchants continued to trade as normally as possible, with 
several examples showing the resilience, or perhaps necessity, of merchants 
maintaining trade abroad despite ongoing turmoil at home. The subsequent decade 
famously resulted in the Cromwellian Occupation over Scotland. As the country had 
been conquered, this decade has often been subject to misinterpretations in regards  to 
the state of the Scottish economy. In comparison to the 1640s, however, the 1650s 
were characterised by a desire to return to normality both by Scottish traders and by 
Cromwell and his regime. This wish was not necessarily fulfilled, with new conflicts 
against Spain and the Dutch Republic disrupting trade for all parts of the British Isles.
 Evidence for actual trade during this period is sporadic and in some cases 
disappointingly scarce. Unlike the latter decades of the seventeenth century, or indeed 
the Anglo-Spanish war of the late sixteenth century where trade between Scotland and 
Spain was recorded for intelligence reasons, documentation for this intervening period 
is  limited. What substantive evidence is available, however, shows that trade did 
continue and was considered normal. Contrary to existing orthodoxies, there is  no 
evidence to support a hypothesis  that trade to Iberia was either uncommon or an 
exceptional undertaking. Further Scottish-Iberian trade was not easily given up. Even 
during the turbulent 1640s  where Scotland was crippled by the cost of supporting the 
Covenanting army combined with civil war and plague, individuals remained determined 
to trade to Iberia and its dominions. Therefore, rather than an examination of the size 
and relative importance of Scottish trade with Iberia, the information provided instead 
shows that, contrary to the historiography, trade with Iberia did exist.
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1.1 The diplomatic relationship post-1603.
Upon the accession of James to the English throne in 1603 there was an immediate 
ceasefire in the Anglo-Spanish war and Spanish ports were opened to English vessels.2 
James believed that the war between Spain and England was Elizabeth’s affair and 
‘irrelevant to a king from Scotland’ and immediately organised discussions for a peace 
treaty.3  This followed in August 1604 and the treaty made careful reference to all of the 
dominions of James, with articles allowing a resumption of trade as it had been before 
the conflict.4  Furthermore, the treaty allowed merchandise from the British Isles  to be 
transported to Spain and its dominions without the payment of a new customs tax and, 
instead, only the usual taxes paid were implemented against merchants  from James’s 
dominions.5 Despite the fact that a formal peace agreement was not agreed upon until 
1604, trade between England and Spain resumed immediately.6 In May 1603, around a 
month after Elizabeth’s death, the Corregidor of Guipuzcoa wrote that, 
the King of Scotland has succeeded to the throne of England and he has 
always been a friend of ours and it is  understood that he desires to continue 
as one.7 
As Pauline Croft has discussed the Treaty of London not only brought the war against 
England to an end, but also offered merchants of James’s dominions better protection 
against the Inquisition than they had previously enjoyed.8 This was as a result of article 
21 of the treaty which stated that subjects of King James should not be ‘molested’ for 
the ‘said cause of conscience’.9  Essentially the article ensured that merchants were 
now able to conduct their business without fear of serious physical harm from the 
Inquisition.10  Another important change occurred in 1607 when a royal decree 
prevented both the Inquisition and customs officials from charging merchants for visiting 
their ships. Having to fund such enterprises themselves both bodies essentially stopped 
searching ships.11
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 The appointment of new consuls following Elizabeth’s death is one indication 
that trade resumed very quickly.  In the same way as conservators, although without the 
same level of authority, consuls  provided support to both short-term merchants  and 
permanent residents. Knowledgeable in local languages, laws and customs, consuls 
also engaged in intelligence gathering for their home countries as shall be shown in 
chapter 6. One of the first merchant consuls to be appointed following the cessation of 
hostilities was Alonso Cortejo, consul for English, Irish and Scottish merchants in 
Cartagena.12 Cortejo was appointed in December 1603, a full eight months before the 
peace treaty was signed. Interestingly, the document was signed by a number of 
individuals with anglicised names, such as William Cooper, George Wood and Thomas 
Wick, adding further proof that an English merchant presence had continued despite the 
conflict.13  As with his diplomatic corps elsewhere, James attempted to ensure that 
consuls  in Iberia would represent all of his kingdoms, thus eliminating the need (and 
costs) for several consuls in one place.14  This was commented on by the Earl of 
Salisbury, who wrote to the Earl of Dunfermline that ‘the king resolves to establish 
consuls  in Spain for the support of merchants  there’.15  He further added that there 
would be an impost on merchandise to pay for it and he thought Scottish merchants 
should contribute as ‘they will share the advantage’.16  With this in mind, Sir Francis 
Cottington arrived in Seville in late 1611 to act as consul for merchants  from the Stuart 
kingdoms.17 Cottington, however, was effectively usurping an Englishman by the name 
of Thomas James, head of a group of Catholic English merchants who were extremely 
protective of their position and had no desire to allow their monopoly to be infiltrated by 
every trader in the Stuart dominions.18 Thomas James then began an active campaign 
to smear Cottington’s  reputation, pointing out his ‘heretical’ religion and indicating that 
the future of English Catholics in Spain could be in doubt. He suggested that Cottington 
would inform the Stuart king of the activities of the Catholic English merchants who only 
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wished to live in peace.19  In August it was finally decided that as King James had no 
authority in Spain and did not know of the mercantile customs, Cottington’s appointment 
would not be confirmed. Instead Seth Wadesworth, a former chaplain to a previous 
ambassador, Charles  Cornwallis, was appointed, apparently as  the choice of the 
merchants from the British Isles.20 In this case the British king’s  attempt to have his own 
candidate appointed as consul failed. Not only was Cottington a Protestant, which 
instantly cast suspicion as to his  true purpose among the Spanish authorities, but he 
was also unwanted by the entrenched merchant community in Seville, who did not wish 
to see their monopoly on Spanish trade encroached.
 The power that Thomas James held over the general ‘British’ merchant 
community was over-bearing. This became apparent after he died and a free-for-all 
ensued in regards to vacant consular positions.21 In December 1617 a Scottish consul, 
independent from either Stuart or Habsburg nomination, was created, in part as a result 
of claims of ill-treatment of Scottish merchants by Thomas James.22  In the letter 
regarding his appointment it is noted that James Kirkcaldy stated that Scotland ‘has 
always had consuls of their own nation in all of Christendom’.23  The document states 
that in Andalusia, however, Scots had to negotiate with the English and with Thomas 
James dead it was hoped that Scottish merchants could have their own consul 
appointed.24 Kirkcaldy was recommended for the post, not only due to his nationality but 
also his  religion and spouse, with it being noted that he was Catholic and married to a 
Spanish woman.25  A further document in July 1620 discussed William Semple’s 
recommendation of Kirkcaldy, with Semple informing the Spanish authorities  that 
Kirkcaldy was both a Catholic and the child of Catholics. Further, Semple pointed out 
that Kirkcaldy had served in Flanders, while again mentioning his marriage to a Spanish 
woman.26 Kirkcaldy served Scottish merchants in the region until at least 1623.27 
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 Kirkcaldy was not the first Scottish consul to be appointed post-1603 with the 
Convention of Royal Burghs appointing a consul in Portugal in 1609. William Crawford 
was assigned in reaction to complaints by skippers regarding the activities of an 
Englishman who was charging customs on Scottish ships arriving at Lisbon.28  The 
Convention stated that Crawford was to advise Scottish merchants on the laws of the 
country and assist them in their affairs.29  This  Englishman was probably Hugh Lee, 
appointed as consul by the English Spanish Company in September 1605.30  Lee may 
well have felt entitled to claim customs from Scottish ships as the Spanish Company’s 
new charter permitted the company to appoint consuls to represent all of James VI & I’s 
kingdoms.31  Despite the Spanish company’s disbanding, Lee received confirmation of 
his appointment by the English Privy Council, who described him as  ‘consull of the 
English nation’.32  Confusingly, the Privy Council commanded ‘every of yow in his 
Majestie’s name to respect him’, thus technically including Scots and Irish merchants 
too.33  The Spanish authorities were similarly confused, with Lee being described as 
consul for the English, Scottish and Irish but also for English merchants only.34  Lee 
served as the English consul in Lisbon until his death and was replaced by John Easton 
in around 1618.35  These appointments show that despite the ideas of James VI & I, 
Scottish merchants in Iberia and the Scottish authorities wished for Scots to be 
represented by Scottish consuls and not those representing Great Britain, a kingdom 
which to them was a concept rather than an actual state. 
 Consuls representing the separate nations of Great Britain, however, were not 
uncommon. Alonso Courtship has already been noted but Andrew Burman, an English 
merchant, was also appointed as consul for the ‘English, Scottish and Irish nations’ in 
Malaga in 1605.36   At the same time as James Kirkcaldy was appointed for Scottish 
merchants in the ‘ports  of Andalucia’, William Barton represented both English and 
Scottish merchants in Puerto de Santa Maria.37  Two further letters from 1618, and an 
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undated document, confirm Barton’s position as consul for both the English and the 
Scottish merchants.38  Although described in July 1620 as the consul for the English 
nation, evidence suggesting Barton’s appointment as a consul for both England and 
Scotland far outweighs evidence to the contrary.39  Consuls did not necessarily 
represent only British kingdoms, as Irishman Robert Comoforte acted on behalf of 
merchants from Scotland, Ireland, Germany and Flanders in La Coruña in the first 
quarter of the seventeenth century.40  Jorge Comoforte replaced his father after his 
death and also represented English merchants from 1638.41  As  La Coruña was the 
location of the largest Irish community in Galicia and the port through which Spanish 
correspondence passed to Ireland, it is perhaps not surprising that this  large community 
also represented its  close neighbours - it simply may not have been possible for 
separate consuls to maintain a living.42  Bartolome Escrete, an Irishman, acted for both 
Irish and Scottish merchants in Puerto de Santa Maria in 1624 and again the Council of 
State noted that he was married to a Spanish woman.43  An undated document, but 
likely to be from around 1620, which details consuls in Lisbon from 1583 makes 
mention of a John Talat, an Englishman, who represented English, Irish and Scottish 
merchants for three years.44
 The advent of dynastic union did cause serious problems, for the historian at 
least, in regards to the countries  that consuls were representing. For example, in 
October 1620 John Easton was appointed by the ‘King of Great Britain’ as consul for 
‘the English nation’ in Lisbon.45 Easton was appointed following the death of Hugh Lee 
and, considering what is  already known as regards the diplomatic corps of James VI 
and his attempt to appoint Frances Cottington in Spain, it seems unlikely that he would 
appoint Easton as merely a representative of English merchants.46  It is  also possible 
that the Iberian authorities merely viewed Scotland as  a now defunct kingdom which 
had been assimilated into its larger neighbour, in much the same way that the Spanish 
Habsburg's hoped Portugal had been. Finally, it could be surmised that the appointment 
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is  entirely correct. Despite calling himself ‘King of Great Britain’ James may have 
intended this appointment to be for English merchants only. Interestingly, unlike Hugh 
Lee there is no mention of John Easton in any of the major primary or archival 
documents in Britain.47 
 As this section has shown it is clear that in the period immediately following the 
Union of the Crowns there was no set policy regarding how a consul was appointed. 
Several different authorities were involved and all of these bodies  named consuls  during 
the first three decades of the seventeenth century. The Convention of Royal Burghs 
thought itself the ultimate authority on trade in Scotland and appointed consuls not only 
in Iberia but in other European kingdoms and in particular controlled the appointment of 
the Scottish conservator at Veere.48  However as can be seen in the case of Francis 
Cottington, James VI also became involved in order to try and extend his idea of ‘Great 
Britain’. As Steve Murdoch has shown Spain was not the Scottish kings only target with 
a 1606 treaty between James VI and Henry IV of France approving the appointment of 
‘Conservators of Commerce’ in both France and Britain.49  Individual companies also 
named consuls, as the example of Hugh Lee appointed by the English Spanish 
Company shows. This  led directly to the Convention of Royal Burgh’s naming their own 
representative, William Crawford, in 1609. 50 Finally the Spanish authorities also named 
consuls, although mostly on the recommendations of merchants, as appeared to be the 
case in regards to Seth Wadesworth and Alonso Cortejo.51  These differing methods of 
appointment, which were not truly resolved until after the Treaty of Union show that 
while King James may have been determined to incorporate his overseas 
representatives, Scottish merchants  were not as keen. In particular the complaints by 
Scottish merchants regarding Thomas James and Hugh Lee show that Scots  wished to 
be ‘Scottish’ and not ‘British’ merchants. Irish merchants also received distinction as is 
shown by Robert Comoforte’s role in La Coruña and Nicholás Vis in San Lucar.52 Much 
like James Kirkcaldy, Viz’s appointment was helped along by a countryman who held 
some sway over the Spanish authorities, in this case Florence Conry, an exiled 
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archbishop, petitioned for Viz’s appointment.53  Further Irish merchants also disliked 
being represented by Hugh Lee and complained about his charging of consular fees to 
their vessels.54 In similarity to their Scottish counterparts, Irish merchants also wished to 
be seen as ‘Irish’ rather than ‘British’. Although the similarities of language and culture 
may have made the appointment of a single consul desirable (and possibly financially 
essential) that did not necessarily mean that merchants from the British Isles wished to 
be called British. In fact during the first two decades after the regal union, it was more 
desirable to remain as separate kingdoms, in terms of commerce if not diplomacy. 
These desires  were not always respected or understood by either the Spanish or 
English authorities  and following the passing of the English Navigation Acts problems 
become even more prevalent as will be examined in the next chapter. 
1.2 Trade Post 1603
The sheer presence of so many consuls representing Scottish merchants in Andalusia 
indicates that a significant trade was occurring between the two areas. As has been 
discussed previously, port records are rare in Scotland prior to the 1660s; however, it is 
still possible to glean some information regarding trade in the 1603-1630 period. For 
example, we know from the last will and testament of James Logan that the Diamond of 
Leith traded to Spain in 1606.55  The following year evidence is provided for the 
presence of wine from the Canary Islands in Scotland in the Register of the Privy 
Council Records when Thomas Inglis, an Edinburgh merchant, complained to the 
Council about the customs due on Canary wine.56 Inglis  requested that Canary wine be 
charged the same customs as French because, 
the canarie wyne is not so goode as the seck and thair is far greatair basaird, 
chargeis, and expenssis  in bringin hame of the canarie wyne nor of the 
seck.57 
  The previously mentioned Alexander McMath is also noted as trading with Spain 
again, this time along with Ninian McMorrane. In September 1611 the pair loaded the 
Grace of God with coal for a journey to Spain.58  McMorrane was not a newcomer to 
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Iberian trade, having imported wine from Iberia the previous year.59 The surviving Leith 
port books show more examples of trade with Iberia, with the Pellagon recorded as 
sailing for Spain in November 1611.60  Trade was not confined to Leith, either, as The 
Margaret, for example, arrived in Dundee from Spain in July 1613 carrying wine and 
salt.61 In January 1614 the Gift of God also returned from Cadiz carrying a cargo of wine 
and figs that was sold to local merchants, with The Fox following with a cargo of salt 
and wine in March.62  The 1620s provide evidence of more examples, with Alexander 
Dounie’s vessel arriving in Leith from an un-named Spanish port in January 1622 and 
David Anderson’s ship from Ostend entering the port in 1623.63  The Grace of God of 
Leith, skippered by David Auchmowtie, returned from Portugal in March of the same 
year, carrying a cargo of salt.64  David Cockburn and Andrew Kerr’s vessels arrived 
shortly after, from unnamed ports in Spain, both carrying cargoes of raisins.65 Evidence 
also exists of Scottish merchants  organising shipments to Iberia, with John Sloan and 
David Cuthbertson chartering a ship to Bilbao in June 1624.66 Unfortunately, from this 
point on what remains of the early port records from Leith become confusing. As has 
been discussed in chapter one, unless explicitly stated as from Spain, the commodity of 
salt is discounted from this thesis due to the fact that this also came from France. An 
example of confusing entries in the early Leith port books occurs in March 1623 when 
Patrick Dounie’s ship is noted as returning from ‘Callie in Spayn’ carrying a cargo of 
salt.67  In an earlier volume, however, there are numerous references to ‘Calleis’, 
occasionally ‘in France’ is added, although, not always.68 Due to the cargo that Patrick 
Dounie was carrying it is impossible to tell where the mistake was made: for example, 
did the clerk mean Cadiz or did he simply write Spain rather than France. With a cargo 
such as salt it is impossible to say with certainty where the ship came from. 
 As with the pre-1603 period, the years  after the dynastic union continued to see 
Scots engaging in the carrier trade despite Anglo-Spanish peace. Indeed, Scots also 
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continued to work in this capacity for other foreign merchants. In 1608 John 
Matherson’s vessel, the Royal of Leith, was commissioned by a Bristol merchant, John 
Shipman for a cargo of salt from Portugal. However, the vessel was then ransacked by 
an English pirate, John Downes, who was subsequently executed for his  crimes.69 
David Robertson, captain of the Bonadventure, was freighted by London merchants to 
bring spices and sugars  to London from Lisbon in the autumn of 1621.70  Robertson 
launched a claim against Andrew Watson and his  crew who had sold their vessel in 
Lisbon and returned to Scotland on the Bonadventure.71 Robertson was due funds from 
Watson to cover the cost of transporting Watson, his crew and their goods.72 Captain 
John Low also brought goods from Lisbon to Amsterdam on behalf of local merchants 
Jaspar Moermans and Simon de Mercado.73 In August 1624, John Brown was freighted 
by merchants  in Londonderry for a journey to Bilbao with a cargo of salmon.74 Once he 
had reached Bilbao, Brown and his vessel was commissioned by Spanish merchants 
for a voyage to the ‘south cap of Spain’. However, along the way Brown, along with the 
support of the crew, stole the goods of the Spanish merchants  and threw the Spaniards 
who were with them overboard.75  Another bizarre example comes from a letter from 
Joseph Mease to Sir M. Stutville in March 1622.76 In it the author notes that a ship had 
arrived in London from Spain with a Scottish master on board. The master of the vessel 
told ‘everyone that directly the huge Spanish fleet, styled the Catholic armada is for 
some parts  of his Majesty’s dominions’.77  It is unclear if this vessel then went on to a 
Scottish port or if it remained in London; however, it does  provide another example of a 
Scottish skipper involved in trade with Spain. While there are only a few examples in 
this  period, when combined with what is known due to records of the Anglo-Spanish war 
period it is  likely that trade continued as normal, though it is frustrating that quantitative 
data can not be produced in the post-1603 period. 
134
69 Murdoch, ‘The Terror of the Seas?’, 150.
70 HCA, AC7/2, 10 April 1628.
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 ONA, Inventary no. 14, act no. 21/56, 4 June 1608.
74 RPCS, XIII, 599. 28 August 1624.
75 Ibid.
76 BL, Harley MS 389, 162-163. Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville, 29 March 1622. Many thanks to Dr 
Adam Marks for this reference.
77 Ibid.
1.3 Early Resident Scots in the reign of James and Charles
During the period under discussion we see the foundations of Scottish networks based 
around a combination of the transient Scots discussed above, and those actually 
resident in Iberian territories. In a manner similar to the traders, their presence is 
revealed only when events did not continue as they should have. After the Anglo-
Spanish war this equated, in some part, to resident-Scots brought in front of both the 
Madrid and Lisbon Inquisitions due to suspicion regarding their faith. While we have 
encountered the Inquisition in terms of their interest in itinerant merchants and skippers, 
their records in the following cases  demonstrate the settled nature of many Scots as 
opposed to their transient nature, even during the Jacobean period. For example, John 
Fender, a tailor, was brought before the Inquisition in Madrid for a profession of faith.78 
In this he admitted that he had previously been a Calvinist but that he had ‘reconciled’ to 
the Catholic faith and as such was granted admission to the Tailors’ Guild in Madrid.79 
Without the conversion to Catholicism it is highly unlikely that Fender would have 
received admission to the guild.  Fender was not the only Scot to be brought in front of 
an inquisition. In 1616 William Strachan, a silversmith in Lisbon but from Aberdeen, was 
called before the Inquisition accused of the serious crime of heresy and was noted as 
being educated in the Calvinist doctrine.80  Luckily for Strachan there was not enough 
evidence to prove the heresy charge and instead he received Catholic instruction.81 In 
other examples, David Ramos, a 29 year old tailor from Dundee, was  called before the 
inquisition in May 1619 accused of Lutheranism; ten years later John Boster a teenager 
also from Dundee, was accused of the same crime.82  Ramos was made to pay a fine 
and sentenced to ‘spiritual penances’, whereas Boster was noted as being instructed in 
the Catholic faith and not believed to be in danger of returning to Protestantism.83 
Interestingly, Ramos was married to a Portuguese woman, Olaia Gomes; however, this 
was not enough to prevent his  punishment, whereas Boster appears  to have been 
treated with a kind-hearted approach, possibly due to his youth.84  William Lithgow, 
famous for his travels around Europe in the early seventeenth century, was also brought 
before the Spanish Inquisition in Cadiz and he noted that a Scot from Dunbar was 
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assisting the Spanish authorities in their investigations.85 Alexander Lay, a cooper, was 
supposedly translating Lithgow’s diaries for the local governor and was paid for the 
task.86 Thus in these cases we get glimpses of a fledgling community of Scots, though 
we do not know how many others there were in whom the Inquisition had no interest. 
Rather we are left with tantalising leads telling us it was possible for Scots  to settle, and 
to a degree, integrate into Iberian society during the 1580-1649 period. 
 In 1619 John Rutherford was given a Carta de Naturaleza from the Casa de 
Contratacion which dealt with all matters regarding trade in the Americas.87 The licence 
allowed Rutherford to reside and trade in the city of Mexico in New Spain while also 
naturalising him as a Spaniard.88  It is possible that Rutherford had purchased his 
naturalisation as this became a popular method for the Crown to attempt to fund its 
involvement in the Thirty Years’ War.89  In his investigation of the sale of letters of 
naturalisation Antonio Dominguez Ortiz has shown that, between 1621 and 1645, 196 
letters  were given to various foreign merchants allowing them to trade with the Indies.90 
This  is compared to the last quarter of the sixteenth century when only 24 individuals 
received privileges; however, with a profit of 400-500 ducats per letter given it is easy to 
see how the Crown could make money during difficult times.91 Perhaps, unsurprisingly, 
Portuguese and Flemish merchants were the recipients of the lions' share of the letters 
both pre- and post-1600, with Genoese merchants also popular. Rutherford is so far the 
only Scot to have been documented, although another individual who may have been at 
least of British descent was Nicholas Grave, who was born in San Lucar.92  As Ortiz 
found, the real numbers of true foreign immigration were actually very low, with most of 
those who obtained letters being born in Spain to foreign parents who had resided there 
for many years.93
 As previously discussed in chapter one, both Regina Grafe and Xabier Lamikiz 
have investigated the presence of an English community in Bilbao. However, not all of 
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those individuals in the community were English, Gavin Dunbar, for example, being 
recorded as  a Scottish merchant in Bilbao in 1625.94 Dunbar had been a merchant in 
Bilbao since at least 1623 and, along with William Parnel, an English merchant, was 
involved in a transaction with Pedro de Berganza consisting of salmon and wax.95 Two 
other Scottish merchants  are revealed in a letter from Charles Cornwallis to the English 
Privy Council in February 1607/8. Cornwallis was the resident Stuart ambassador to 
Madrid from 1603 until 1609 and was  mainly ensuring that the terms of the 1604 Anglo-
Spanish peace treaty were being observed.96 His  correspondence ostensibly concerns 
renumeration due to several London merchants  for ‘corn and other provisions’ that 
would be paid from a royal fund that Cornwallis held in Madrid.97 He continued,
the like I have procured for one James Jorrett, a Scotsman recommended 
hither by his Majesty’s letters. For Tho. Anderson, a Scotsman, in the same 
manner, for so much as was due to him in Lisbon.98 
 While much of the evidence of Scottish trade and Scottish residence in Iberia is 
piecemeal, collectively the sources reveal that Scotland and her merchants  continued to 
have a significant trading relationship with the area after the Anglo-Spanish war. 
Contemporary writers also indicated the trade was more common than port records 
account for. During his visit to Scotland, Taylor, the Water Poet, was  surprised at the 
amount of victuals  Scotland shipped abroad ‘into Spaine, France and other forraine 
parts’, while still having enough for the Scottish people.99 Scots  traded with, had consuls 
in and resided in Iberia, where the like of John Rutherford received a coveted Carta de 
Naturaleza which allowed him access to South American markets.  
2. The End of James and the Folly of Charles
As shown with the Anglo-Spanish war, political events and conflicts between other 
European kingdoms could also shape Scottish trade with Iberia even when Scotland 
was technically not involved in the events. As discussed above, Spain used the selling 
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of letters of naturalisation to fund its activities  in the Thirty Years’ War. Despite orthodox 
histories to the contrary, recent scholarship has established that Scotland and, indeed, 
Britain did play a role in the conflict. In Scotland part of this involvement stemmed from 
the fact that Frederick V of the Palatinate was married to Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of 
James VI, who was widely considered a Scottish princess, even after her removal to 
London as a seven year old girl.100  Thousands of Scots were eager to serve in the 
continental war, and Alexia Grosjean has stated that of the 30,000 British troops that 
served Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War over 25,000 were probably Scots.101 Scots 
also served Elizabeth on the orders, albeit secret, of King James himself. While James 
officially declared the actions of his son-in-law illegal he did organise immediate 
assistance, under the guise of protection for his daughter.102  James used the soldiers 
from the Scots-Dutch brigade, which, as Steve Murdoch has argued, allowed the troops 
to respond swiftly as they were already based on the continent.103  There had been a 
Scottish military presence in the Dutch republic since 1572, when the earliest Scots are 
recorded serving the Prince of Orange in his attempt to wrest the Netherlands from 
Spanish rule.104 By 1573 these Scots  had been formed into an official Scottish regiment 
in the Dutch republic, with two regiments in permanent service by 1603.105  For their 
part, the Spanish Habsburgs were bound by their familial links to the Austrian 
Habsburgs to assist them in their conflicts.106  The participation of troops  from Dutch 
regiments also gave the Spanish an excuse to plan for a resumption of war with the 
Dutch Republic. In 1621 the truce between the Dutch Republic and Habsburg Spain, 
which had been in place since 1609, expired and both decided to renew war rather than 
extend the treaty.107 It had become clear that, regardless of the overwhelming financial 
difficulties that the Spanish Habsburgs were facing, they had to resume war with the 
Dutch Republic in order to protect their dominions in America and Asia, which had come 
under threat.108  Finally, there was of course the religious element, which, while not as 
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clear cut as previously believed, was another reason for the Spanish Habsburg's to 
resume hostilities with the Dutch.109
  When warfare restarted Scottish ship-owners became uneasy that ships they 
had legally purchased from Dutch owners would be captured by Spanish privateers. In 
September 1622 one such skipper, Robert Durie, requested that the Privy Council of 
Scotland provide him with a document showing him to be the owner of the Blessing of 
God, which he had legally bought.110  With Spain and the Dutch Republic at war, both 
sides would issue letters of marque to their skippers allowing them to seize enemy 
shipping, and thus the document was required to protect Durie’s ship from seizure.111 In 
early 1623 the conflict even entered into Scottish harbours when two ships under 
Spanish colours were effectively blockaded by Dutch vessels. This was a tricky situation 
for King James, as he did not wish to show favour to either side in the conflict, but 
neither could he allow Dutch ships  to blockade two of his  kingdom’s largest ports 
(Aberdeen and Leith) and threaten ships under their protection.112  These ships were 
clearly in Scotland to trade and yet were attacked by the Dutch ships, leading to the 
destruction of one of the vessels. This led to a fire-fight between Royal Navy vessels 
and the Dutch ships, causing diplomatic tension between the Stuart dominions and the 
Dutch Republic.113   The conflict between Spain and the Dutch Republic did not involve 
Scotland directly but was  an inconvenience to Scottish traders, since they traded with 
both regions.114  Scottish merchants  and their ships were therefore in danger of being 
seized by privateers from both sides  for trading or carrying what had become defined as 
contraband cargo. 
 The situation became even more inflamed following Prince Charles’s  return from 
Spain and his  failed attempt to secure the hand of the Infanta Maria. Charles returned 
home without a bride to jubilant celebration of his bachelor status and of his untarnished 
Protestant faith, which had been believed to be under threat by marriage to a 
Catholic.115  Recently, there have been several reinvestigations  of the ‘Spanish Match’, 
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including W.B Patterson’s examination of the event in the context of James VI’s  irenical 
policies and his desire to achieve a religiously balanced peace in Europe.116  As Glyn 
Redworth has shown, King James’ attempt to secure a Spanish bride for his son did not 
begin with Charles, as he had undertaken such negotiations for his  first son Prince 
Henry before his untimely death.117  However, when Charles became aware that the 
Spanish had no intention of assisting his sister and her brother-in-law his enthusiasm 
for his wedding to the Infanta diminished and his  dislike of the Spanish grew.118 
Following his return, Charles was now more confident and began lobbying for war with 
Spain, which, due to the situation on the continent involving Charles’s  sister the 
Princess Elizabeth, was  publicly favoured.119  By early 1625 Spain and the Stuart 
dominions effectively were at war, although still not officially.120 By 8 September Charles 
(who was  now king following his father’s death) and the Dutch Republic had agreed to 
the Treaty of Southampton, which was an offensive alliance against Philip IV.121 
However, while the public may have been clamouring for war with Spain, the English 
Parliament was less enthusiastic especially in regards to the funds required.122  As  a 
result, the fleet which was readied to capture and sink Spanish shipping, as well as 
intercept the South American silver fleet, was poorly prepared and supported.123  The 
man who lead them, Viscount Wimbledon, himself reported that the ships were not fit for 
purpose and too old.124 This led to the embarrassing failure of the expedition, while the 
Spanish advisor, the Count de Olivares, seriously considered an invasion of England on 
the scale of the 1588 armada plans.125 
 This  was technically a disaster for trade with Iberia, since the dominions of Philip 
III now became the enemy and, as  such, trade with the area was prohibited. 
Furthermore, in September 1626 Charles made it illegal for any Scottish vessel or any 
sailor, skipper or master to go on any voyage without express  licence from the Privy 
Council.126 In July 1627 Charles proclaimed that admirals, captains and all his subjects 
could equip vessels for the purpose of seizing any vessels, either foreign or domestic, 
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which were taking goods, including war commodities and victuals, to Spain or its 
dominions.127 With this in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that in a letter to the Lord of 
Glenorchy, James Campbell described William Dick as being ‘hardlie spoken of for 
trafficking w[i]t Spane’.128 However, there may be more to this  case than meets the eye. 
The previous February Dick and a William Gray had been appointed by the Privy 
Council to travel to Peterhead, where the ship the Marie of Lubeck was in distress.129 
The ship had beached after being captured by Scottish privateer George Langlands, in 
his vessel the St Peter of Montrose, while returning from a trading voyage to Spain. The 
privateers had been attempting to lead the vessel to Leith when poor weather forced it 
onto the shore.130 Dick and Gray were to secure the ship and its cargo and, if possible, 
ensure its cargo was transported to Leith in order for the perishable goods to be sold 
quickly and thus allow for monies to be distributed to whoever the Admiralty Court 
decided the vessel belonged to.131 Further, they were to be furnished with anything they 
required be it ships, sailors and men. It was also noted that when the decision was 
made regarding the ownership of the vessel the owners would have to reimburse the 
costs of the salvage to Dick and Gray.132 In March, however, the episode became more 
suspicious. The Privy Council was desperately short of funds and required £24,000 in 
order to pay sailors who had served on three royal warships.133 This significant sum was 
to be borrowed from Gray and Dick, who were to be allowed to sell the undamaged 
wine and raisins that were onboard the vessel. The men were instructed to return any 
profit to the Privy Council.134  The value of the cargo was significant, with the wine 
valued at £320 per ton - thus  meaning that the men only had to sell 75 tons in order to 
recoup their loan.135  It is therefore possible that Gray and Dick pocketed any profit they 
had made and hoped not to be discovered, but were found out. 
 This  case shows two attitudes  during the conflict. War with Spain at this  point 
was an emotive issue and some Scottish merchants and ship-owners turned to 
privateering. Unlike the Anglo-Spanish war, the situation in Europe during the 1620s led 
to a marked dislike of the Spanish monarchy and the wider Habsburg family. While 
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certain institutions, such as the Scottish Kirk, could always be relied on to disapprove of 
trade with Catholic Iberia this had, during the Anglo-Spanish war, been largely ignored 
by Scottish traders. However, the plight of Princess Elizabeth and her family in the 
1620s was an inflammatory cause and garnered far more support against the Spanish 
Habsburgs than proclamations by the Scottish Kirk.136  Privateering was both a viable 
and a profitable option for those who wished to assist Elizabeth and it was an 
inexpensive way for a monarch to damage the enemy.137 As Steve Murdoch has pointed 
out, it could be far more profitable to arm a privateer and take prizes than attempt to sail 
with a cargo through a privateer-infested sea.138  Scottish vessels certainly engaged in 
privateering in this period and with considerable success.139 
 Nonetheless, it is  difficult to say with certainty if trade with Iberia ceased during 
this  period. While there was obviously sympathy for Elizabeth and her plight, there was 
also economic necessity. After all, the Privy Council wished to ensure that the goods on 
board the St Marie were sold in Leith - buyers  were clearly willing to purchase Spanish 
goods despite the war against Spain. The king was also not as strict about the 
importation of wine when it came to his own table. In February 1629 it was decided that 
Scottish merchants should import wine (with the exception of French) as the king was 
planning to visit and without it his Scottish subjects would be unable to entertain him 
properly.140  Furthermore Charles I was not only at war with Habsburg Iberia during the 
1625-30 period but also with France (1627-1629). War with both of these areas 
simultaneously would have made obtaining certain goods common to both regions, 
such as Biscay salt and wine, technically illegal. Obtaining salt was also difficult and 
more problematic as  it continued to be vitally important to the Scottish fishing industry. 
However, from 1625-1630 the import of salt from foreign ports remained consistent with 
previous years, if somewhat fluctuating. Considering the general preference for Biscay 
salt, it is unlikely that this product was  not obtained from that area.141  Iberian 
commodities, therefore, may have continued to make their way to Scotland through 
deception or via triangular trade with other areas of Europe. Elsewhere studies have 
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proven that despite being at war with France in the 1690s, Scottish traders continued to 
trade with Bordeaux, therefore, this could also be the case with Iberia.142 
3. Peace and Plenty: The 1630s.
 
Following peace treaties with both France and Spain, in April 1629 and November 1630 
respectively, trade was now able to resume freely, as evidenced by wills  and testaments 
with their mentions of commercial connections. Edinburgh merchants, who had played 
such a dominant role in overseas trade in the early seventeenth century, were also 
trading with Iberia. The testaments  of the Edinburgh merchant Patrick Wood shows a 
prolific merchant whose entire estate was worth more than a £100,000.143  Included in 
his inventory was money invested in a venture to Spain, worth £1,700 with another 
£783 from a venture to the Canary Islands.144  John Fleming’s inventory, recorded in 
1642, also documents Spanish goods, although to the much smaller value of £8.145  In 
the tallying of his estate, Alexander Brown was recorded as owning goods in a Spanish 
venture in 1643.146  Bills of health, given to ships in a time of plague or other diseases, 
also provide evidence of trade with Spain. In March 1632 the Margaret of Queensferry, 
James Dawling master, was provided with such a document as  was the Jonas of Leith, 
John Glass master in October 1635; both intended to sail for Spain.147  In another 
example, goods are recorded as arriving in Edinburgh (presumably after being 
unloaded in Leith) from the Canary Islands, Portugal and Spain between November 
1636 and November 1639.148 Further, Eric Graham has tabulated four vessels arriving 
in Leith from Spain in 1638.149  
 In a more informative case, John Dougal’s  letters  provide another example of a 
Scottish merchant involved in Iberian trade in the 1630s. As has been investigated by 
Siobhan Talbott, John Dougal traded primarily to France and had assistance from Scots, 
such as  John Clerk who resided in Paris.150  France was not the extent of Dougal’s 
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trade, however, as his letters to John Clerk discussed trade with Bilbao and San 
Sebastian. In February 1638 he wrote to Clerk, ‘I have moneyis lying at Rotchell remittit 
out of bilbao and snt Sabastien’.151  Clerk, it appeared, relied on the Scot James Brown 
for his business dealings in Bilbao.152  This is  highly likely to be the same James Brown 
noted as being a Scottish merchant in Bilbao in the late 1630s by Regina Grafe.153 
Another example is  provided by William Gray who, as noted earlier, was involved in the 
salvage of a vessel carrying Spanish goods in 1628. Despite this slightly dubious event 
Gray continued to trade in Iberian goods, primarily wine, although it is unclear from his 
letters  whether he was obtaining this commodity from the source or from another port. 
In January 1635 Gray wrote to the Laird of Glenorchy (Colin Campbell) stating that he 
had got filled ‘twa litill barells  wt malago’, which cost 20 shillings  a pint, as well as a 
‘flakett’ of sack, which was sold for 24 shillings.154 In March of the same year Gray wrote 
again regarding the procurement of Malaga wine, stating that the best Malaga wine of 
late had arrived.155  Further letters to the same recipient were sent in February and 
September 1636, discussing the procurement of both Malaga wine and sack, although 
in February 1636 the sack had undergone a dramatic price cut, costing only 18 shillings 
a pint.156  Gray was not the only one to be sending Iberian goods to Glenorchy, with 
Archibald Campbell writing in March 1634 that he had sent his wife Spanish oranges as 
well discussing the arrival of new sack from Spain.157  This, therefore, shows not only 
that trade in Iberian commodities continued during this time, but also that Iberian goods 
were not merely present in the urban centers in Scotland but also in the Highlands.
 
4. The Covenanters and the Interregnum.
The political and economic turmoil of the 1640s and 1650s has been extensively 
studied by scholars of seventeenth-century Scotland. The Solemn League and 
Covenant, in particular, has been accredited with forcing Scotland into a deep recession 
which marked the country for years. Some historians have observed that decline in 
Scotland during the Cromwellian union was also, in part, due to the events  of the 1640s. 
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Keith Brown observed that Scottish economic collapse was fundamental to the 
conquest of Scotland by Cromwell.158  T.C. Smout concurs, arguing that Scotland was 
too weakened by the events  of the 1640s to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
by Cromwell.159  While T.M Devine, in particular, has noted that the economic situation 
was not as poor as previously thought and that, during the Cromwellian period, Scottish 
trade and the economy actually improved.160 
 By agreeing to assist the Parliamentarians militarily, the Covenanters 
inadvertently created a difficult situation for their own kingdom. Scotland was left 
inadequately protected by the removal of the Covenanting army to England and, due to 
their union, acquired the enemies  of the Parliamentarians. Primarily this meant that 
Scottish ships were in danger from the activities of Irish confederate privateers. In her 
work on the subject, Jane Ohlmeyer points out that, by the end of the decade, the Irish 
Confederate fleet may have been 50 to 60 ships strong and that, by lurking on the east 
coast of the British Isles, it created a menace to all ships irrespective of their 
allegiance.161 More recently, Elaine Murphy has revised that figure, stating that even at 
their height in 1649 there were not more than 40 confederate privateers at sea.162 
Scottish ships  did suffer predation by Confederate privateers, as a report written in 
December 1648 for Aberdeen’s city council records the loss of a valuable ship to Irish 
confederate privateers in June 1644, followed in March 1645 by another which met the 
same fate.163 The Edinburgh Burgh Records record that, in May 1646, the Alexander of 
Brownstones was captured by an Irish frigate and both ship and goods were taken as 
prize.164  Research suggests  that Scottish trade suffered serious damage during this 
period, with the number of ships  entering Aberdeen dropping 35% in the 1643/4 to 
1648/9 period in comparison to the 1620/1-1624/5 period.165  The number of Scottish 
ships entering the Sound was similarly affected, reporting a drop of over 40 percent in 
the years 1644-48 in comparison to the years 1625-29.166
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 Trade journeys still continued to Iberia and its  dominions despite these problems. 
For example, the Unity arrived in Dundee from Cadiz in July 1647.167  Trade also 
continued to Spanish dominions, such as the port of Ostend, in seeming oblivion to the 
internal situation which had prominent statesmen describing Scotland as ‘this miserable 
country overburdened with uncouth taxation’.168 The table below shows ships  arriving in 
Ostend from Scotland, Ireland and England, as  well as ships going from Ostend (ship 
nationality unspecified) to the same countries from 1640-48, 1654 and 1655. 
Date Ships 
from 
Scotland
Ships to 
Scotland
Ships 
from 
Ireland
Ships to 
Ireland
Ships 
from 
England
Ships to 
England. 
1640 4 1 1 0 116 44
1641 27 4 8 2 171 53
1642 23 2 0 0 105 17
1643 8 1 4 2 99 35
1644 (1st 
Jan - 30th 
June) 
projected 
numbers 
for year in 
red.
4/8 2/4 3/6 1/2 33/66 10/20
1645 2 0 3 0 81 42
1646 6 1 2 3 105 53
1647 6 3 3 4 157 112
1648 3 5 6 4 173 67
1654 5 10 2 1 72 58
1655 9 9 1 0 58 52
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between decades is not possible. In 1644 data is only available for the first six months of the year, so in 
order to compensate the numbers have been doubled and are in red. The author recognises that this is a 
crude measurement but it does allow basic analysis. 
It can be seen from the table that, unsurprisingly, English trade to Ostend was far higher 
than Scottish or Irish trade to the port. With the exception of the years 1641 and 1642, a 
few ships a year did make the journey from Scotland to Ostend despite the dire 
economic conditions that the country was labouring under.170  While Scottish numbers 
remained consistently in single figures for most of the 1640s, there were markedly fewer 
English ships in 1643, 1644 and 1645 when Confederate privateers were making their 
mark. The continued visitation of Scottish ships to Ostend, even in such small numbers, 
is  impressive. Confederate privateers, however, were not the only enemy that Scottish 
vessels had to contend with. 
 In May 1641 the James of Kirkcaldy was taken by a Stuart Royalist vessel on its 
way home from Spain. The ship carried a cargo worth over £25,000 Scots, including 
over a thousand bolls of Spanish salt, Portuguese and Spanish coins, French crowns, 
linen and other small items.171 Interestingly, the ship also carried a dozen muskets, with 
powder, musket balls and picks which, while not a great amount of arms, were possibly 
being brought for use by the Covenanting army. If this was the case, this ship would be 
one of many which were sourcing weapons for the army from all over Europe.172 James 
Brown, the skipper, stated to the Scottish Parliament that the ship and its commodities 
were now ‘spoiled, wrecked and gone’, and that despite assurances of restitution by 
Charles I the only restitution he had received was a 100 pistols and a small amount of 
foreign coin.173 He now complained that the loss had led to his own ruin and that of his 
family and requested Parliament’s assistance in gaining full restitution.174 
 The 1640s were clearly a difficult time for Scotland. The expenses of the 
Covenanting army and the subsequent effects of funding the conflict took its toll on the 
Scottish economy. By 1643 public debt was already at over a £1,500,000 Scots.175 
However, as has been shown above, there is evidence of Scottish trade continuing to 
Iberia. Scottish factors also continued to be involved with Scottish traders during this 
147
170 While the reason for the high number of ships calling at Ostend in 1641 and 1642 is unknown it is 
possible that both the Covenanters and the Royalists may have been obtaining munitions. However, there 
is no evidence to either prove or disprove this theory. Many thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for 
discussing this topic. 
171 RPS, A1641/8/124. 12 November 1641. 
172 See, Steve Murdoch, ‘The April Committee, 1640’, 43-68.
173 RPS, A1641/8/124. 12 November 1641.
174 Ibid.
175 Stevenson, ‘The Financing of the Cause of the Covenants’, 99.
time. The presence of Ninian Williamson shows that not only was a Scottish factor 
working on behalf of Scottish merchants in Spain but that those Scottish merchants 
were still trading with Spain in the 1640s.176 Ninian Williamson represented the interests 
of Sir William Dick, James Murray, James Steward, James Jack, Robert Sandilands, 
Andrew Bryson and Andrew Wardlaw.177  Interestingly, Williamson hired a skipper of 
Hamburg to take a cargo of wine and fruit back to Scotland, probably to avoid 
interception by Confederate privateers. However, near Newcastle the vessel was 
stopped, this time by a Parliamentarian ship, which ordered Claud Fecletoune, the 
master, to come aboard.178  Fecletoune, believing the captain of the parliamentary 
vessel to be an enemy, attempted to sail away at which point a brief battle then ensued. 
Fecletoune’s ship was then escorted to either Newcastle or London, and the Scottish 
Parliament agreed with the owners involved that the ship and goods should be 
transported without delay to John Pringle, their factor, in Leith.179  The Scottish 
Parliament decided to support the merchants by writing to the Scottish commissioners 
for the Solemn League and Covenant in London to instruct them to intercede with the 
English Parliament to gain restitution.180  As Steve Murdoch has investigated, this  was 
not the only incident involving over-enthusiastic Parliamentarian captains.181 Despite the 
unfortunate nature of the incident, this example shows that Scottish merchants were still 
trading and utilising ‘neutral’ skippers  in an attempt to by-pass Royalist and Confederate 
privateers. While it was unsuccessful in this instance, it is, when compared to previous 
examples provided in this thesis, almost certain that others will have traded in the same 
manner and been successful. 
  Other Scottish merchants  were also still trading despite the difficulties 
encountered in the 1640s - such as John Dougal senior. In a letter to John Clerk in 
Paris, Dougal’s son, John Dougal junior, who resided in Dieppe, discussed his  father’s 
trade.182  Dougal junior stated that it was  his father’s  intention to freight a boat to Spain 
with salmon and that he had already sent one ship to Bilbao with the same cargo.183 As 
previously noted Dougal’s network also stretched to Iberia and the outbreak of hostilities 
within the three kingdoms did not prevent him from trading. Scots  were also resident in 
the Spanish Netherlands, with William Hamilton living in the city of Bruges from least 
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1643. In that year he brought a civil lawsuit against Adrian Maertens to whom he had 
provided 32 tons of dry herring but for which had not yet been paid.184 In 1650 Hamilton 
had obviously made the decision to remain in the city buying property in Kuipersstraat 
and being described as a burgess of Ostend.185
 Finally, while Scotland was suffering from internal unrest, international political 
developments continued. In 1640 Portugal declared independence from Spain. The 
Portuguese were dissatisfied with their monarchical union with Spain for a number of 
reasons. They perceived Spain to be doing little to assist them in their fight against the 
Dutch, and Portuguese merchants were resented by those of Castile as  invading their 
own empire. Finally, taxation from Philip III caused much discontent.186  Thus, in 
December 1640, while taking advantage of Spain’s own internal and foreign troubles, 
Portugal declared independence, and crowned the Duke of Braganza as King John IV 
of Portugal. Prior to its loss of independence, Portugal had enjoyed good relations with 
England, with various treaties and alliances stretching back to the fourteenth century.187 
King John was quick to enlist English support, or rather ensure English neutrality, in the 
struggle to maintain Portugal’s new status.188  He thus granted generous terms for 
English (and by association Scottish merchants) with the treaty signed in London in 
1642 between ‘Charles, King of Great Britain and John the Fourth, King of Portugal’.189 
The treaty provided for free commerce while allowing for the appointment of consuls to 
support British merchants who were not of the ‘Roman religion’ to reside in Portugal, 
effectively allowing religious freedom.190  While Scotland’s relationship with the 
monarchy was decidedly shaky at this  point, as the army of the Covenant had defeated 
a royalist force for the second time in August 1640, Scottish merchants were likely to 
take advantage of this treaty and the privileges it offered.191
 Cromwellian Scotland has also not enjoyed a favourable review under the 
scrutiny of historians. The Cromwellian Union itself has been described by Keith M. 
Brown as ‘an alien, oppressive police state, detested by all but a tiny minority of 
republicans and sectarians’.192  In their investigations on the city of Dundee, Karen 
Cullen, Christopher Whatley and Mary Young concur, indicating that two years after the 
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Cromwellian Union of 1654 the city was in a desperate position.193  Contemporary 
reports appear to provide the impetus  for this evaluation of the Cromwellian union, as 
when, for example, Robert Baillie wrote, ‘The Country lies very quiet; it is  exceedingly 
poor; trade is naught; the English has all the moneys’. 194 
  However, this analysis  does not provide a fair representation of the state of 
Scotland during the 1650s. Rather than being determined to permanently crush 
Scotland, Cromwell was aware that in order to prevent further uprisings Scotland 
needed to regain its  economic stability and thus he wished to bolster Scottish trade. The 
protection of Scottish shipping is  one example of this, a subject that was taken seriously 
by Oliver Cromwell and his council. In July 1654 Captain Bunn wrote to the Admiralty 
Committee to request two or three ships  for the protection of the north coast of Scotland 
as shipping in that area was under threat from ‘Charles Stuart’s Booters’.195  The 
Admiralty thus reported to the Protectorate Council and on 21 September it was 
decided that forty ships would be provisioned with men and over a thousand guns to 
protect the coasts of the British Isles during the winter months.196  The Protector also 
included Scotland in any treaties made with foreign powers. For example, during the 
tumultuous period of the British Civil Wars, Portugal assisted the cause of the embattled 
Stuart king by providing a safe anchorage to his nephew Prince Rupert. On the 
establishment of the Cromwellian Commonwealth, Portugal suffered with the passing of 
an extremely disadvantageous trade treaty which was signed in July 1654.197  This 
allowed British merchants  access to Brazil for the first time, as well as  a secret clause 
that stopped the raising of customs duties without the advice of two English merchants 
to be chosen by the English consul.198  It is important to note that this treaty did not 
merely cover England, but also ‘the Countries, Territories, Kingdoms, Dominions and 
Principalities under their respective Governments’, thus including Scotland. As this 
shows, Oliver Cromwell and his council were not merely concerned with English 
mercantile matters  and were aware that to ensure Scotland’s security the kingdom 
needed greater prosperity.
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 While Cromwell clearly thought of the kingdoms of England and Scotland as  part 
of one commonwealth, the changed political situation caused some problems for the 
Spanish authorities. For example in a document appointing a judge conservator for 
Tenerife the Spanish authorities are clearly confused as to the political situation in 
Britain.199  This written appointment originally stated ‘por juez conservador de la rey’, 
which was crossed out and replaced with ‘por juez conservador de las nacione Ingles’, 
however, ‘Ingles’ was then crossed out to be replaced with ‘de las nacione B’.200 Despite 
the confusion in regards to the new name of the people of the British Isles, the 
document proves that such an individual was needed for the Canary Islands and was 
impressive in its own right, but was  even more so considering the civil wars. Further, 
James Cunningham’s first recorded employment as a factor can also be traced to this 
turbulent period in Scottish history. Cunningham may have been hundreds of miles 
away from Scotland but Andrew Skene, who requested Cunningham to sell linen on 
Thomas Lumsdell’s  behalf, did live in Aberdeen, a city commonly portrayed, in the main 
by the city council, as totally destroyed during the 1640s and Cromwellian period.201  
However, as a constituent nation of the Commonwealth, in addition to enjoying 
England’s protection Scotland also fell subject to England’s enemies. The outbreak of 
the Anglo-Dutch war in May 1652 created an interesting situation for Scotland. Being 
part of the Commonwealth, Scotland was therefore at war with the Dutch Republic and, 
as such, trade through the Danish sound was blocked to Scottish as  well as English 
vessels in 1653.202  The Sound toll records would appear to corroborate this  as  they 
show that no Scottish ships passed though the Sound that year.203  Nonetheless, 
records for entries into the Swedish ports  of Gothenburg, Lubeck, Antwerp and 
Augsburg show that nine Scottish ships entered these ports in 1653.204  It is also 
probable that Scottish ships merely started using ports  in the Spanish Netherlands, with 
goods making their way south from places such as Middleburg, Rotterdam and Veere. 
As has been shown in chapter three, Scottish merchants did, in the later seventeenth 
century, have commercial connections with the Spanish Netherlands. Further, as shall 
be shown in chapter five, there is  a link between Scotland’s state of conflict with the 
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Dutch Republic and the number of Scots  who became burgesses in the city of Bruges. 
Although there are only two years’ worth of data from Ostend, it is interesting to see that 
the number of ships going from Ostend to Scotland in 1654 and 1655 is double the 
number that made the journey in previous years. While it is possible that this was 
merely a return to normal trading conditions, it is  more likely that Dutch goods, or more 
accurately goods that Scots obtained from Dutch ports, were making their way to 
Scottish ports via the Spanish Netherlands. 
Even more impressive was the report from Thomas Tucker that, during the 
Anglo-Spanish War, Scottish merchants were disguising themselves as Dutch with 
Dutch ships in order to escape capture.205  This was a shrewd move: just as English 
merchants benefitted when the Dutch republic was at war with Spain, so did the Dutch 
become the biggest winners when England was at war with the region.206 Therefore, an 
increase of ‘Dutch‘ merchants in Spain would perhaps not have been surprising, 
although some officials in Spain were likely to be suspicious of the true nationality of 
such individuals. Initially, Cromwell had courted both France and Spain, playing them off 
against each other in an attempt to secure the most advantageous alliance.207 However, 
Cromwell’s personal feelings against Spain, combined with a useable fleet which was 
idle, meant that Spain, or more specifically, its empire, was decided on as the target.208 
The military campaign was not a success, and the attempt to capture San Domingo was 
a total failure. Although Jamaica was brought under Protectorate control, it was not 
heavily defended and at the time was believed to be of little value.209  The mission was 
considered so poor that the two commanders, Captain Robert Venebles and Admiral 
William Penn, were sent to the tower of London upon their return.210  In retaliation the 
Spanish did inflict some damage on British trade with the area during the conflict 
through an auction of English, Irish and Scottish merchants’ goods in San Sebastian 
which raised 168,156 silver reales.211  In San Sebastian the Scottish merchant Andrew 
Gordon (along with other English merchants) had his goods seized to the value of over 
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700 reales.212 Interestingly, Gordon was described as a Scot but later he was listed as 
part of the English merchant community, with the only merchant noted as of a separate 
nationality an Irish merchant.213  This ill-considered conflict aside, the relative domestic 
stability of the 1650s in comparison to the Covenanting parliaments of the 1640s 
allowed the Scottish economy to regain some of what it had lost in the previous decade. 
While the Anglo-Dutch war and the Anglo-Spanish war (which should perhaps be more 
appropriately named to reflect the whole commonwealth’s input) caused problems, 
Scottish merchants, like all other merchants, found a way round the problems. In 
particular, they made use of Spanish Netherlands during the Dutch war and assumed 
different identities in order to continue trading with Spain. 
Conclusion
 
The cessation of war between England and Spain in 1604 did not lead to a return to 
normality for Scottish merchants, who had a new dynastic situation to contend with. 
James VI & I’s insistence on his dominions being referred to as British created 
confusion and strife, such as in the case of Thomas James and Francis  Cottington. In 
his application for appointment as Consul for Scottish merchants, James Kirkcaldy 
made it clear that Scottish merchants  had suffered due to the activities of Thomas 
James and the apparent monopoly and influence he held with the Habsburg authorities. 
Politically ‘Great Britain’ did not exist and, contrary to the ideas of their monarch, both 
Scottish and English merchants were more likely to be represented by consuls who 
acted on behalf of the separate dominions of the British Isles than those who actually 
represented ‘Great Britain’. 
 Evidence also abounds for Scottish trade with Iberia post-1603 and one of the 
greatest indicators of a flourishing trade was the sheer number of consuls representing 
Scottish merchants  in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Scottish skippers 
traded with Iberia from Scotland and also on behalf of merchants from England. Scots 
continued to live in Iberia too, with John Rutherford being granted the right to trade with 
South America. 
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 The advent of war once again made the situation precarious for merchants with 
the renewal of Spanish and Dutch hostilities involving Scottish harbours and Scottish-
owned vessels that were Dutch-built. Scotland soon became involved in war with Spain 
itself as Charles I was eager to defend his sister and repair his pride following his 
attempt to woo the Spanish Infanta Maria. Charles failed disastrously in both of these 
aims; however, Scottish merchants once again took the advantage, turning to 
privateering in righteous indignation at the treatment of their Scottish princess, or 
indeed simply continuing to trade using covert means. 
 While a return to trading was heralded by the 1630s it was not long before 
trading conditions began to deteriorate again with the 1640s proving one of the most 
difficult periods in the seventeenth century for Scotland. Once again, Scottish 
merchants continued to trade, with John Dougal providing the perfect example and 
Ninian Williamson shrewdly using foreign vessels in an attempt to evade privateers. The 
1650s did herald some form of normality as Cromwell was eager to improve Scotland 
economically, recognising that a successful country would be less likely to rebel. 
Conflicts against the Dutch Republic and Spain, however, led to difficulties but, as 
usual, Scottish merchants found ways round them. 
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Chapter Five: Charles II to Carlos II
My love to my loving brother William who i desyer in his nixt to show me qt is the 
best comoditie from ys to Cadiz1
The Restoration of Charles II in 1660 brought a return of normality for Scottish 
merchants and commerce was no longer disturbed by the internal turmoil described in 
the previous chapter. Evidence of trading connections with Iberia during this  period are 
comparatively abundant, in large part due to the survival of port records for the second 
half of the seventeenth century. The port records of the four principal trading cities in 
Scotland - Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith - have been utilised for this thesis.2 
Examination of these records provides evidence not only of trade with Iberia, but also 
the way in which business was conducted. Further information on those who undertook 
these activities becomes apparent, with several merchants heavily involved in Iberian 
trade.  
 Merchants, factors and consuls were also present in Iberia during this period, 
some of whom were themselves Scots while others worked on behalf of Scottish 
merchants. James Cunningham, in particular, provides an informative example of a 
Scot trading and living in Iberia and through his career several Scots  and Britons living 
in Spain are revealed. While it would be foolish to attempt quantification of the Scottish 
community in Iberia during this period, Cunningham’s case study gives an idea as  to 
how Scots lived and worked in the region. As the previous chapter demonstrated the 
Union of Crowns led to some difficulties in regards to the representation of Scottish 
merchants and this persisted into the later seventeenth century, with it becoming 
apparent, especially at consular level, that there was serious confusion in regards to 
representation.   
 Conflict continued to affect Scottish merchants, with the Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-
French wars providing an opportunity, in the form of privateering, as well as disruption 
for those who continued to trade. During the Anglo-Dutch wars, in particular, the 
importance of the neutral Spanish Netherlands becomes clear with Scots  moving south 
while Scottish ships utilised both the cities of Ostend and Bruges to continue trading. As 
the century came to a close the Company of Scotland was formed and the story of its 
disastrous expedition to Darien is well-known by historians. This chapter investigates 
those who invested in the Company, and concludes that despite historiography to the 
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contrary several prosperous Scottish merchants were wary of the promises of the 
enigmatic William Patterson and did not invest in the company. The plight of Captain 
Pinkerton and his  men is also important, particularly the efforts  of Martin Westcombe to 
use confusion regarding England and Scotland as a way to try and free the men.
1.1 Vessels to Scotland from Iberia and its Dominions
For this investigation all vessels travelling to Iberia from Glasgow and Leith have been 
collated into appendices which list (where known) the date, name of the vessel, its 
destination and the name of the skipper.3  However, there are a few things which must 
be noted when analysing the data. Firstly, the E72/15 customs books (second series) 
for Leith show 31 arrivals  from Iberia - exclusively Spain - in the years 1672 to 1691, 
with 17 vessels sailing to Iberia.4  While this averages at just over 1.5 ships per year a 
significant portion of the records do not note where a vessel came from. Thus, there are 
more vessels which, due to their predominately Iberian cargo, can be strongly 
suspected to have sailed from Iberian ports, although this cannot be confirmed. 
Secondly, books are missing; the records from 1676 to 1680 for Leith have not survived, 
although there is evidence to show that trade with Iberia continued during that time. For 
example, in January 1676 an anonymous merchant book records the arrival of the 
Maesay of Pittenweem from Cadiz, mastered by John Aitchison.5 The same source also 
records the arrival of the James of Pittenweem, James Cook master, in February of the 
same year.6  Interestingly, it is noted that, while 89 tons of Spanish wine was entered, 
‘there was found to be in his sd ship 120 tuns of wyne and wye: commodaties which I 
pass for 100 tuns entrie it pd’ - suggesting that the author of the record book may have 
been some form of customs official.7 In April 1677 John Scott recorded a Lisbon voyage 
and paid £60 Scots into the Crown Money box at Trinity House, Leith.8  In September of 
the following year John Aitchison sailed to Spain again, this time on the John of 
Pittenweem.9 In another example, William Dunbar was commissioned as  supercargo by 
the owners of the George of Leith for a voyage to Lisbon, Cadiz or ‘the straits’ in 
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November 1679.10 Thus while the surviving port records  for Leith are of use, one must 
be aware that they are not comprehensive. 
 While Leith was, for most of the seventeenth century, the principal port in 
Scotland, towards the end of the century a shift towards  Glasgow was already in the 
offing. This change would mark the beginning of decline in Leith while Glasgow grew 
from strength to strength thanks to trade from the colonies, especially post-1707.11  In 
relation to commerce with Iberia, Glasgow had a larger share of the trade than Leith. 
The E72/10 and E72/19 customs books (second series) for Glasgow show 47 arrivals 
from Iberia from 1666 to 1696.12 In return, 45 vessels left Glasgow for Iberian ports  or 
Iberian islands, such as the Canaries or Madeira.13 It is wise to note, however, that the 
Glasgow port books are generally more detailed than their east coast counterparts and 
the number of entries which do not list where a vessel is going to or has arrived from is 
negligible in comparison to the Leith records. Again years are missing from these 
records with the years 1674-1679 unaccounted for and the years 1692 -1694 also 
unavailable. 
 Leith was  not the only port on the east coast which played host to trade from 
Spain. Even smaller ports, such as Prestonpans in East Lothian, conducted trade with 
the far away ports  of southern Europe. The Robert of Irvine and the Margaret of Leith 
left for Spain carrying wheat in 1681 and 1683 respectively.14  Dundee, while 
predominantly conducting trade with Holland, recorded a vessel travelling to Cadiz in 
September 1664.15 The vessel, the Charles, was freighted with salmon, cloth and wheat 
by several merchants.16 In May 1669 the Charles of Dundee arrived back in that port 
after a voyage to Spain.17  On 22 December 1671 a vessel left Aberdeen for Bilbao 
loaded with salmon and stockings.18  Interestingly, the vessel had not intended to visit 
Aberdeen and was carrying onions to Bilbao from an unspecified port when it was 
forced into Aberdeen due to bad weather. Unfortunately for the skipper, the vessel was 
157
10 NAS, RH15/91/16. 21 November 1679. 
11 Christopher A. Whatley describes Glasgow as Scotland’s seventeenth century ‘boom town’ which by 
the end of the century had a stable, albeit illegal, trade with the colonies while also being the provider of 
goods to Scots in the North of Ireland. See Christopher A. Whatley, Scots and the Union (Edinburgh, 
2007), 112. 
12 NAS, E72/10, E72/19.
13 Ports visited in the Spanish Netherlands will be examined later in the chapter due to their connection 
with the Anglo-Dutch wars. 
14 NAS, E72/21/1; E72/21/5. Many thanks to Sue Mowat for bringing these references to my attention.
15 Ibid, E72/2/1.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, E72/7/4. 
18 Ibid, E72/1/3.
charged double the customs duty because it was  ‘a stranger’.19  In 1683 the Hope of 
Aberdeen arrived from Spain, carrying a cargo of salt for Robert Blackwood who was 
both the master and the main merchant of the voyage.20 A further three vessels made 
their way from Aberdeen to Bilbao and all three ships were either skippered or freighted 
by members of the Burnet family. Thomas Burnet freighted John Anderson’s vessel in 
September 1684, with Robert freighting the Elphinstone of Aberdeen in March 1686.21 
Finally, William Burnet was a skipper and freighted his own ship for a journey to Bilbao 
in November 1690.22 July 1690 saw the return of the George of Aberdeen from Cadiz, 
carrying a cargo entirely for one merchant, John Johnston.23 While the east coast ports 
of Scotland have long been associated with trade to the Low Countries and the Baltic it 
is  clear that their trade did stretch further afield. Further evidence of the popularity of 
trade with Iberia can also be shown from official documents, such as the ‘Memoriall to 
be exhibite to the honourable Committie of trade in Scotland’.24  In this document 
Scotland’s primary trading destinations are described as (in the order given in the 
source) the Low Countries, France, England, Spain, Norway and the Baltic.25  A more 
detailed description of trade with Spain, in the same proposal, describes the connection 
as important but costly due to the distance and risk involved.26 The document then went 
on to bemoan that trade with France had begun to damage trade with Spain, which 
provided an outlet for Scotland’s commodities.27  The fact that trade with Spain was 
discussed in detail in this document shows that commerce with the area was more 
commonplace than the port records or secondary sources account for.
  Vessels also, unsurprisingly, made their way from Scotland to ports in the 
Spanish Netherlands. As shall be examined later in the chapter, this was  more frequent 
during the Anglo-Dutch conflicts of the seventeenth century, although there is evidence 
of direct trade between Scotland and the Spanish Netherlands at other times. From 
Dundee an unnamed vessel made its way to Ostend carrying Scottish goods in October 
1664.28  In another example, the Hopewell of Dundee undertook the same journey in 
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February 1681, while the Anna of Leith returned from Ostend, carrying Spanish wine, in 
October of the same year.29 In July 1681 two vessels  arrived in Kirkcaldy on the same 
day from Bruges.30 Records from Bruges also show a number of Scottish ships arriving 
at that port.
Jos De Smet, ed., ‘Tables du Commerce et de la Navigation du Port de Bruges 1675-1698 avec  en 
annexe Les Tables de la Navigation du Port d’Ostende 1640-1655’ in Bulletin de la Commission Royal 
d’histoire (Brussels, 1930), 156-199.31
While most of the entries merely state Scotland as a point of origin a few do provide 
more information; in 1676, for example, ships arrived from Aberdeen and Leith. Four 
ships from Kirkcaldy and five ships from Scotland made the journey in 1679. Kirkcaldy 
appeared to have a good trading connection with Bruges, with 18 ships from that port 
arriving in 1682 and a further 18 the following year. In 1686 27 Scottish vessels made 
the journey, with 21 arriving in 1688, and although the number of vessels tailed off 
somewhat in the 1690s perhaps  due to the presence of French privateers.32 However a 
few still deemed the journey profitable enough to sail to the Spanish Netherlands. 
Journeys continued into the 1690s, with Patrick Sym paying £24 Scots into the Crown 
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159
29 Ibid, E72/7/6; E72/15/23.
30 NAS, E72/9/10.
31 Missing years within this table are due to missing data in the original source. Unfortunately for the year 
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Money Book for a voyage to Ostend in October 1696 and James Culbertson following in 
June 1698.33 These journeys  show that a significant number of vessels made their way 
from Scottish ports to those in Iberia and the Spanish Netherlands, proving the trade to 
be more vibrant than previously thought.
1.2 Merchants and Traders
 
Ships from Iberia to both Leith and Glasgow were likely to carry wine, with over half the 
entries showing a cargo consisting predominantly of that commodity.34  Information on 
who purchased wine shows that most individuals who acquired Spanish wine did so on 
a small scale, such as Robert Walwood who procured half a butt in January 1685.35 In 
Glasgow over 60 separate individuals paid for Spanish or Canary Islands wine, some 
buying only half a butt of wine, some over 100 butts  in one purchase.36 Wine was also 
obtained on behalf of others, such as William Kenner who procured 24 butts for James 
Marshall in January 1685.37  Nevertheless, a few individuals did buy considerable 
quantities of Spanish wine, such as the Gibson family. James, Robert and Walter 
Gibson obtained hundreds of butts of Spanish wine in the 1680s and 1690s.38 Walter, 
later a provost of Glasgow, also had his brother James purchase Spanish wine on his 
behalf.39  In Leith, John Marjoriebanks bought Spanish wine from several vessels  that 
arrived during the 1680s, with his brothers James and Edward also purchasing 
significant quantities  of Spanish wine.40  As Siobhan Talbott has already shown, the 
Marjoriebanks were prolific buyers of French wine, as well as of the Spanish variety.41 
Local merchant accounts provide further evidence as to the popularity of Iberian wine. 
The account book of James Lawson, merchant in Anstruther, shows him distributing 
Spanish commodities (in small quantities) to individuals  in Fife with William Robertson, 
a baillie in Crail, receiving a pint of sack in July 1694 and Agnes Barkely also buying the 
drink from Lawson in April 1691.42  Further Lawson sold ‘sack glasses’ to numerous 
individuals, further proving the popularity of the wine.43
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 As discussed in chapter one, import duties on Spanish and Portuguese wines 
were significantly higher than those for French wine, although it is not clear why. Thus, it 
is  perhaps  unsurprising that the imports of French wine significantly outweighed those 
of Iberian origin.44 As shown in chapter three this  could be due, in part, to the superior 
strength of Iberian wines, meaning that they were still ‘luxury wines’ in comparison to 
French wines.45 However, one must also question the origins  of wine stated as coming 
from ‘France’. As discussed in chapter four, Thomas Inglis requested that the Privy 
Council charge his Canary wine under the French wine tariff and not the Spanish.46 
While Inglis  actually asked the authorities, one wonders how many merchants did not 
and merely declared their wine as French when it was actually from Iberia. In her 
investigation of the wine trade between the Dutch Republic and France, Henriette de 
Bruyn Kops stated:
The statements of authenticity regarding a wine’s national provenance, be it 
French, Iberian or Rhenish, are so often in direct opposition to the current 
political situation that they become amusing. When the war against Spain 
caused the Dutch Government to subject Iberian wine to a very high tariff, the 
experts  swore ‘upon their lengthly career in the business and vast 
experience’ that the tested barrels contained French or Rhenish wine. After 
war broke out with France, the barrels were invariably filled with good 
Spanish wine, ‘with not a drop of French wine mixed in’.47
As evidence from chapter two has shown, Scottish merchants  were quite capable of 
passing off English goods  and commodities  as  their own, and it is  possible that this 
practice may have worked in reverse. Triangular trade may have assisted by allowing 
skippers to name their port of origin as French and not divulging that they had also 
travelled to Iberia.  Unfortunately, details of such practices are not left for the historian to 
scrutinise, although, whatever the case, it is  clear that Iberian wine had a market and 
was not merely resorted to when French wine could not be had. In fact, as shall be 
examined later in the chapter, war with France did not result in increased imports of 
Iberian wine. 
  Several skippers were seasoned veterans of the journey to Iberia, such as 
James Rae who is listed in the port books as skipper from 1682 until 1696, skippering 
several vessels  and journeys.48 Rae is  further mentioned in letters from John Dunlop in 
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London to his father, James Dunlop. While it is unclear where Rae was sailing to, it is 
interesting to note that letters from Dunlop concerning Rae were written in September 
1682.49 According to the Glasgow customs records, Rae was on a journey to Cadiz at 
that time, leaving in late August and returning in early November.50  If it is, indeed, the 
same James Rae, this would indicate that he stopped in London, which was not noted 
in the customs records, and also shows an impressive sailing time. James Campbell, 
John Miller and John Anderson were also popular skippers and undertook around a 
dozen journeys between them.51 
  Unsurprisingly, disagreements did arise, such as the one involving James 
Simpson’s journey to Spain in August 1686. In February of the following year Sir James 
Dick petitioned Simpson and two merchants of Edinburgh, William Menzies and Edward 
Brown.52 On Dick’s behalf another merchant, Thomas Logie, had sent in Simpson’s ship 
the Albany of Leith goods amounting to £810 10 shillings Scots. It appears that Menzies 
and Brown were supercargos on this vessel as they had been instructed to sell the 
goods in Spain and ordered to buy six butts of Spanish wine.53  However, when the 
vessel arrived in Leith one of the butts  was  found to be spoiled with sea water and Dick 
attempted to gain compensation. Simpson argued that the wine had been spoiled by 
bilge water in a storm, but, after sending a representative to taste the wine and, 
following discussions with other skippers, the Dean of Guild Court ruled that Simpson’s 
explanation was highly improbable. John Marjoriebanks was similarly affected, with one 
of his five barrels  unfit for consumption in exactly the same circumstances as James 
Dick’s cargo and on the same vessel.54  Simpson was ordered to pay £185 Scots 
compensation to both James Dick and John Marjoriebanks.55  While the ruling of the 
Guild Court does not make it explicitly clear, they obviously believed that Simpson had 
sold the wine and then attempted to cover up the theft by stating that the weather was 
to blame for ruining the drink. Unfortunately for Simpson, the delivery of the other 
barrels in pristine condition made his explanation highly unlikely. 
 Analysis  of those who bought goods from Iberia and those who sent commodities  
to Iberian ports shows that it was far more common to buy Iberian goods than to send 
items there. In Glasgow over 130 individuals bought goods from Iberia in comparison to 
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the 67 who sent cargoes to Iberia. In Leith only 15 individuals sent goods to Spain, with 
over 60 buying goods from vessels arriving from Spain.56 As noted in chapter three, the 
vast majority of those who bought Iberian goods did so in quantities that would be 
deemed for household use rather than for re-sale. For example, David Campbell who 
purchased only half a butt of sack in December 1682.57 However, there were several 
prolific buyers  in Glasgow, such as the previously discussed Gibson family who were 
not only interested in Spanish wine, but also purchased indigo and sugar from the 
Walter of Glasgow which arrived in September 1682.58  Walter Gibson also shipped 
goods on board the Nightengale of Renfrew in June 1681, which was scheduled to sail 
for Spain.59  A year later the James of Wairwater was preparing to sail to the Canary 
Islands and Walter Gibson again provided a significant part of the cargo.60  As well as 
the Gibson family, George Lockhart was a prolific buyer of Iberian goods and 
contributed cargo to a vessel traveling to Madeira in the 1690s.61  Thomas Weir is 
another Glaswegian example, buying large quantities of wine and salt from vessels 
arriving from Cadiz as well as sending cargo to the Canaries, Madeira and Bilbao.62 
Skippers were also involved as  exemplified by John Anderson. He was both a merchant 
and skipper sailing to and from Iberia.63  While these merchants were successful the 
petition of John Gilhagie to the Scottish Parliament shows how easy it was for even a 
prosperous merchant to have financial difficulties. According to his own deposition to 
Parliament Gilhagie had been involved in several ventures to the Canary Islands and 
Madeira.64 Following the loss of one of his ships while returning from France with wine, 
in conjunction with a serious fire in Glasgow which destroyed 20,000 merks worth of 
both property and stock, Gilhagie was left in serious  financial difficulties. This was 
made worse by the diminishing profits  of his coal works.65  Gilhagie claimed that 
creditors were preventing his  attempts to reestablish his business and he requested that 
parliament protect him from the debtors so that he could rebuild his businesses.66
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 To date only a few merchants in Leith have been found to have made noteworthy 
purchases, such as Henry Bothwell and William Menzies.67 Charles Charters  is another 
example and he sent significant quantities of Scottish commodities to Iberia in 
December 1672 and August 1684.68  Charters also distributed his cargo in order to 
lessen the risk. In the same month in which he sent salmon to Lisbon he also sent the 
same cargo to St. Malo - ensuring not only that all his cargo was not one ship but also 
that it was going to separate markets.69 The previously discussed John Marjoriebanks 
also sent cargoes to Spain, sending a large cargo of Scottish goods in May 1683 in the 
Alexander of Leith.70 Two months later he loaded a similar cargo aboard the Crown of 
Burntisland.71  A small Scottish vessel, or even a few Scottish vessels in convoy, would 
be easy prey for a large North African corsair fleet. By spreading his  cargo across  two 
vessels which left two months apart Marjoriebanks was significantly lowering the risk of 
losing all the money he had invested. 
 A final example is provided by Thomas Sommerville, who sent a significant cargo 
of Scottish goods to Cadiz on the William and John of Leith in July 1683 and sent wheat 
in August 1686.72  It appears  that, in the case of the William and John, Sommerville 
made the charter party on behalf of Charles Charters, with Sommerville bringing the 
case before the Admiralty Court as he was due over £300 from Charters for the freight. 
Sommerville was also due money from William Dunbar for the same journey, with the 
ship returning to Scotland in November 1683.73  In another case brought before the 
Admiralty Court in June 1686 Sommerville was again the pursuer, this  time regarding a 
ship of Andrew Malloch. In this  case James Home, a merchant of Edinburgh, had 
freighted Malloch’s vessel in 1680, with Sommerville providing cargo for the vessel, the 
profits  from which were to be used to buy wine at Cadiz. However, Malloch did not sail 
in the company of other vessels (which, interestingly, were going to Brazil) and, instead, 
dropped anchor off the west coast of England. He remained there for 30 weeks during 
which time sea water got into the cargo and spoiled it.74  In August 1688 Somerville 
brought more grievances to the Admiralty Court, this time concerning debts due for 
Spanish goods, mostly wine. Despite the attempts  of some of the debtors  to refute the 
charges, all were ordered to pay what they owed to Sommerville including two 
164
67 Ibid, E72/15. 
68 Ibid, E72/15/11, E72/15/28. 
69 Ibid, E72/15/11. 
70 Ibid, E72/15/26. 
71 Ibid.
72 NAS, E72/15/26, E72/15/37.
73 NAS, AC7/6, 25 March 1684. Both Charters and Dunbar were ordered to make payment in this case.
74 HCA, AC7/7, 1 June 1686. 
individuals who may have been his relations, Alexander and Robert Sommerville.75 
Thomas also bought Iberian goods, both from vessels returning directly from Iberia and 
from vessels coming from London.76 From this  evidence it is  apparent that Sommerville 
was a factor based in Scotland who conducted trade and obtained goods for several 
individuals. 
 While far less popular than seagoing trade with London, the Dutch Republic and 
the Baltic, trade with Iberia did provide another outlet for Scottish primary goods  such 
as coal, meal, fish, butter and some manufactories, such as stockings and candles. In 
return Scottish merchants obtained the essential commodity of salt, although, most 
other goods from Iberia were luxuries. It has been argued that Scotland’s trade to Iberia 
was insignificant due to the low number of ships which made the journey; however, this 
must be placed into context with the commodities involved.77 It is  true that the number 
of vessels  was small in comparison to vessels arriving from the Low Countries and 
London. However, the goods obtained from Iberia were, for the most part, high value 
luxury items. Scotland did not strictly need Iberian goods in order to sustain itself and in 
times of hardship, commodities  such as wine and oranges could be given up. Iberia was 
not in such an advantageous position and needed the basic commodities that Scotland 
and other countries provided. Trade to Iberia was therefore very much in Scotland’s 
favour - despite its lack of vessels.  
2. Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-French Wars
The Anglo-Dutch wars have been the topic of much serious  scholarly investigation, with 
English protectionist policies generally seen as the instigator of the conflicts.78  As 
discussed in chapter three, the Treaty of Münster, in which Habsburg Spain finally 
recognised the independence of the Dutch Republic, had a detrimental effect on English 
trade. Prior to this event English merchants had held a monopoly over Spanish trade in 
comparison to other European countries.79  With the re-entrance of the Dutch into the 
Spanish market, however, this  dominance was challenged and, indeed, badly 
damaged.80 In a petition to Cromwell, masters of London vessels said of the Dutch: 
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the Dutch eat us out of our trade at home and abroad; they refuse to sell us a 
hogshead of water to refresh us at sea and call us ‘English dogs’ (which doth 
much grieve our English spirits).81  
The English authorities naturally retaliated, primarily with protectionist trade legislation 
in the form of the Navigation Acts. Originally, Cromwell wished for a union between the 
two republics, however, the Dutch saw this as an attempt at political domination.82 
Instead, the first Navigation Act was passed, banning non-English ships from carrying 
goods from the plantations to England, with the later 1660 act further specifying that 
three-quarters of the crew on ships involved in colonial trade had to be English.83
 The second and third Anglo-Dutch Wars  (1665-67 and 1672-74) have been, 
largely, due to the mere names of the conflicts, assumed to be exclusively English 
affairs. However, as a fellow kingdom of the Stuart monarchy, Scotland was also 
involved and technically at war with the Dutch Republic. Recently, investigation has 
been undertaken to investigate Scotland’s role in these conflicts, the most in-depth work 
has been carried out by Steve Murdoch. His study has shown that Scots were heavily 
involved in the Anglo-Dutch wars, with privateering a common role for Scots to 
undertake.84 As previously discussed, turning to privateering during a time of war was a 
lucrative way to avoid the perils  of trying to trade during conflict.85  Nonetheless, the 
Dutch republic was a vitally important trading partner of Scotland and by utilising third-
party ships and ports in the Spanish Netherlands trade could still be conducted with this 
important market.
 The port records of Leith provide illuminating information for both the second and 
third Anglo-Dutch wars. During both wars the share of trade that began to arrive from 
the ports  of Bruges and Ostend increased tenfold. For example, in April 1666 Jacob 
Dames’s vessel arrived from Bruges, in convoy with another vessel, the St John of 
Bruges, Adrian Leven master, with both carrying cargoes of Spanish wine.86  Over the 
summer of 1666 three un-named vessels arrived from unspecified ports carrying 
cargoes of Spanish wine, showing that, despite the threat from Dutch privateers, trade 
involving Spanish commodities was continuing.87  A similar pattern can be shown for the 
third Anglo-Dutch war, with ports in the Spanish Netherlands replacing their northern 
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counterparts  for the duration of the conflict. There are dozens of examples, with 
Spanish wine making its way from Ostend to Leith in August 1673 as well as Castile 
soap.88  Aberdeen also showed an increase in the arrivals from ports in the Spanish 
Netherlands during the conflict.89 
 Another common way round trading embargoes was to use neutral shipping. 
Further, merchants would carry numerous flags and sets of documentation in order to 
try and fool privateers.90  Scottish merchants were no different and during the Anglo-
Dutch wars they used neutral ships in order to continue their trade in Iberian goods. 
During the second Anglo-Dutch war a ship of Bruges brought figs and raisins to Leith in 
December 1665, with St John of Ostend bringing Spanish wine into Leith in May 1667.91 
The Anna of Bruges skippered by Francis Delopas arrived in Leith in January 1673, 
carrying a cargo of dried fruit.92  Henry Wilkie, a merchant of Edinburgh gives a more 
detailed example of how such voyages were carried out. From December 1666 to 
February 1667 the St John of Congolfe was freighted by David Bryson and Alexander 
Simpson, with salmon, herring and Irish butter, for a journey to Bilbao.93  The ship was 
then to sail to Bordeaux, loading 140 tons of French wine before returning to Scotland.94 
However, on the return journey the ship sailed into the Thames to escape ‘the enimie’ 
and Henry Wilkie asked for permission to sell the goods in London due to their 
perishable nature.95 On 19 June 1667 Wilkie was granted a warrant to sell the French 
goods in any English port, although the situation portrayed was a little different from the 
one on the petition.96  Wilkie was described as a merchant of Spain rather than a 
merchant of Edinburgh and the ship, it appears, had not made it to Spain. Instead, it 
had been seized by a French man-of-war and had not been released until after Easter, 
forcing the vessel to exchange the salmon for French goods.97  Despite the differing 
stories, Wilkie was permitted to sell his goods. 
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 Scots did not merely trade to different areas or use different ships; several 
merchants actually moved to different regions while the conflict raged. Following the 
Treaty of Münster, free trade resumed between the Dutch Republic and the Spanish 
Netherlands.98  Of the 21 Scots who were registered as citizens of Bruges  during the 
timespan of this project, 16 of them registered during various Anglo-Dutch conflicts.99 
The city accounts add to this number, with nine further Scottish individuals recognised 
as citizens.100  For example, Joseph Marjoriebanks, registered as a citizen in January 
1666.101  As shown earlier in this chapter, the Marjoriebanks family were significant 
buyers and sellers of Iberian goods in the later seventeenth century, and Joseph may 
well have been part of this familial network. It appears highly unlikely that Marjoriebanks 
would have travelled from Scotland to the Spanish Netherlands during the second 
Anglo-Dutch war and is more probable that he was based at one of the larger Scottish 
communities in the Dutch Republic and moved south when the war began to effect 
trade. When compared with another Scot, Patrick Suty this certainly appears to be the 
case. Suty was noted as being in Bruges in November 1665, with his  previous 
residence given as Veere in the Dutch Republic.102  In another example, merchant 
James Steuart who was documented in the city accounts in November 1666, indicated 
that although he was from Edinburgh he had arrived in Bruges from Amsterdam.103 The 
trend of Scots seeking citizenship in Bruges continued during the third Anglo-Dutch war, 
with the skipper Robert Gray from Leith arriving in early 1673.104 
 Scots carried on their trade as  normal while they were in Bruges, leading to the 
usual round of arguments. In 1666 local merchant Segher vande Walle pursued 
Thomas Hamilton. Hamilton was brought barrels of wine by Walle from his vessel the 
St. Elizabeth, skippered by Baldwin Houdegoedt, but had neglected to pay for them.105 
Therefore, Walle brought the case to the civil court in order to seek permission to sell 
the wine.106  John Mitchel, merchant from Ratho near Edinburgh, arrived in Bruges in 
1673 and was noted in the city accounts in April.107  At some point in 1673 he had a 
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disagreement with another Scot, James Hamilton, over a disputed sum of 323 guilders. 
In this disagreement he submitted a document from his own accounts as evidence, 
dated 1669 at Rotterdam, proving that Mitchell had come to Bruges from the Dutch 
Republic.108  The debt was said to be due to several unpaid bills of exchange and in 
August 1672 Mitchell confiscated goods  and money from Hamilton to the value of the 
money due. These had been placed with Frans de Muelenaere, probably Francis de 
Muilinares.109 Relocating to ports in the Spanish Netherlands during war with the Dutch 
Republic was a sound business choice for Scottish merchants. Due to the free trade 
between both those regions and the neutrality of the Spanish Netherlands, merchants 
could continue their trading practices. The number of Scots who became citizens  during 
the conflict in comparison to the total number of Scots shows that it was  a popular 
practice and, in at least two cases, it is certain that the men, while Scottish, had arrived 
from the Dutch Republic. While this chapter has shown that there were a few Scots in 
the Spanish Netherlands, this community dramatically expanded during periods of 
conflict with the Dutch Republic. In his  study of British merchants during the second 
Anglo-Dutch war, Andrew Little has concurred, stating that the Spanish Netherlands 
were ‘a natural conduit through which the trade of the combatants flowed or was 
diverted during wartime’.110
 The Dutch Republic was not the only region that Scotland was at war with during 
the later part of the seventeenth century. The Anglo-French war of 1689-1697 also 
affected Scottish trade with Iberia. In similarity to the Anglo-Dutch wars, this conflict has 
been investigated from a Scottish maritime perspective; however, trade elements have 
also been researched. Steve Murdoch and Siobhan Talbott have both examined 
Scottish trade with France during these conflicts, concluding that, for the most part, 
trade continued with this  area.111  However, it was not only Scottish trade with France 
that was affected by these conflicts; trade with Iberia was also disrupted. 
 As shown from appendices one and two, vessels travelling to Iberia would 
occasionally leave in convoy but return home as fast as possible to gain the best price 
at market for their goods. However, during the conflict with France, from 1689 to 1697, 
gaining the best market was simply too dangerous due to the activities of privateers and 
was deemed not worth the risk. French vessels were spotted near Aberdeen, the 
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Hebrides, Orkney, the Isle of Skye and Stranraer.112  Scottish vessels trading to Iberia 
were caught up in hostilities, as when the Concord of Glasgow sailing from Lisbon to 
Amsterdam was captured by a French man-of-war in February 1688; it is, therefore, 
unsurprising that skippers wished to lessen the risk of capture by sailing together.113 For 
example, in January 1696 the John and James of Leith, skippered by Edward Burd, and 
the Thomas of Glasgow, skippered by John Kerr, arrived in Glasgow from Bilbao and 
San Sebastian respectively.114  On 4 March the Margaret, Adventure and Angel, all of 
Glasgow, came in on the same day from San Sebastian, skippered by James Rae, 
Alexander Stewart and Charles Ramsay.115 In May, the St John and Concord, again of 
Glasgow, also arrived from Bilbao and San Sebastian.116 July 1693 saw another arrival 
from northern Spain to Leith, with John Brown entering his  payment in the Crown 
Money Book.117 In July 1695 Michael Hor and co., resident in Bilbao, prepared the Saint 
Dorothy for a journey from San Sebastian to Scotland.118  Once again neutral vessels 
were used to carry out journeys that were dangerous for Scottish merchants. In May 
1691 the Mary of Ostend, skippered by James Holbrand, arrived from Bilbao carrying 
Iberian goods.119  While defensive measures, such as convoys and the use of neutral 
ships, may have provided some protection they would not have dissuaded a French 
privateering fleet from attacking. This provides an indication of how important the 
continuation of trade was for Scottish merchants and in turn the Scottish economy. 
 The arrival of these vessels from predominantly northern Spanish ports and their 
cargoes gives some suspicion as to where the goods were actually coming from. During 
periods of war with France it is arguable that imports of Spanish wine and other Spanish 
goods decreased, with Scottish merchants ceasing to visit Andalusian ports  and instead 
journeying to San Sebastian or Bilbao to load cargoes of brandy.120  For example, in 
March 1696 the Adventure of Glasgow sailed from San Sebastian to Glasgow carrying 
a cargo that included over 100 barrels of brandy.121 There were in fact 15 vessels which 
arrived in Glasgow from northern Spanish ports (Bilbao and San Sebastian) whose 
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cargoes can be confidently argued as having come from France.122  This is in 
comparison to the 11 vessels whose cargoes were Iberian or from Iberian dominions in 
the same period.123 Several vessels  also sailed into Leith with French goods during the 
wartime period. For example, in April 1691 an unnamed ship came into Leith from 
Bilbao carrying brandy; a month later another arrival from Bilbao brought 99 tons of 
French wine.124  T.C Smout has  stated that, ‘it was only in wartime that Spanish wines 
became the more important beverage’.125  However, from the evidence above it can 
actually be shown that the opposite was true: the popularity of French wine as an 
everyday table wine meant that during periods of wartime merchants obtained French 
wine at ports in northern Spain. As  the case of Glasgow shows, more ships carried 
French goods  from Iberian ports than actually carried Iberian goods. For the import of 
Spanish goods it was actually better that Scotland was at peace with France. 
3. The Later Resident Community: 1650-1707
We have so far seen that there were a number of merchants and skippers involved in 
Iberian trade. Moreover, we can see where these goods were headed, not only to the 
burghs, but also to unexpected hinterlands, the like of Glenorchy in Argyll. Further, it 
had also been indicated above that there were settled Scots within Iberian territories, 
both artisans, merchants, factors and consuls. To obtain Iberian goods, the Scots 
needed facilitators such as these, and we have far more information on those in the 
later period under review than on those in the confusing period of Elizabeth and James. 
One of the most prominent Scottish merchants and consuls in Spain was James 
Cunningham, based in Cadiz. He is  first described as factor to the Earl of Mar and his 
son John Lord Erskine in June 1650, in a document regarding lands in Blairlogie.126 In 
1653 the Aberdeen Council letters named him as  a factor in Cadiz who, along with S. 
Calynholt, undertook to send to Andrew Skene, an Aberdonian merchant acting on 
behalf of Thomas Lumsdell, bills  of exchange for a cargo of linen.127  A decade later 
Cunningham was still residing in Spain and wrote to the Scottish Privy Council 
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requesting a birth-brieve for the Spanish authorities, presumably in order to prove his 
good standing and possibly beginning the process of gaining naturalisation.128  Three 
years later he entered into a bet with one John Bain over the outcome of the second 
Anglo-Dutch War.129  The bet was for the sum of 200 pesos, a reasonable sum of 
money, and perhaps why the bet was  officially recorded.130  Little over a month later, 
along with several other British merchants, he was named on a certificate regarding a 
vessel which was planning on sailing to the West Indies.131  While it is unclear whether 
these merchants  were involved in the voyage itself, it appears that they were assisting 
in the procurement of new masts. This is  possibly because the man ordered to buy the 
masts, Don Pedro Colarte, would have been purchasing them in Amsterdam from 
Daniel Smout, possibly from the British Isles.132 Smout was to freight a vessel solely for 
the purpose of bringing the masts to Spain, with the British merchants witnessing the 
agreement.133  Another Scot identifiable from this  letter is John Duncan, who also signs 
a similar letter dated the previous day.134  Duncan and another co-signatory, John 
Frederick, were merchants and passed military information about the Spanish armada 
to the Stuart authorities. In September 1672, A. Duncan wrote Williamson stating, 
In obedience to yor commands I have inquired concering ye Spanish Armada 
& find yt our house in Sevilla Jon Ffredricks & Jon Duncan writes  Sir Jon 
Ffredricks  & Mr Herne of ye 23rd Augt.135 
Duncan and Frederick had also reported intelligence gained from Cadiz regarding the 
activities of a French vessel, from which in turn he had obtained reports that an armada 
was provisioning in Lagos bay (Portugal).136  John Duncan was, according to his will, 
born in Invergowrie, to William Duncan and Margaret Ogvily, and described himself as 
resident of the city of Seville. Much like William Fraser, Duncan wanted his  estate 
distributed to his  family back in Britain in the event of his  death. His cousin, James 
Duncan, based in London, was to be the recipient of 3,000 pesos, with another cousin 
who lived in Scotland, Alexander Duncan, also provided for.137  Duncan’s  original will 
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was written in Spanish, indicative of a residence of some duration and the clauses in 
the testament show that Duncan was in a position to provide for his relations  following 
his death, suggesting a degree of success in his activities. 
 In 1681 Cunningham had a disagreement with two English merchants, William 
Nutt and Samuel Sowton. They procured naval supplies for Royal shipyards and traded 
any surplus into Spain.138  Trading directly with Cunningham to begin with, they then 
began trading with Edward Ford once Cunningham was ‘made a gentleman of 
Spain’.139  Presumably Cunningham was  elevated to the Spanish nobility, who were not 
allowed to engage in trade until 1682.140  Ford, who was  likely to be the same Edward 
Ford who signed the certificate for the procurement of masts  in Amsterdam in 
September 1666, obviously traded on Cunningham’s behalf.141  When Ford died Nutt 
and Sowton claimed that Cunningham had not settled an account with them and 
appealed for King Charles II’s assistance.142  They requested that if the first attempts 
were unsuccessful a letter be sent to the Court of Spain ‘for the recovery of the same, 
and the taking off of Cuningham’s protections, that the petitioners may be enabled to 
prosecute their right there by law’.143  Cunningham also gained a letter of naturalisation 
which allowed him to trade with the Spanish Empire in 1684. Cunningham paid 200 
doubles to procure the letter, and it is unclear which requirement for naturalisation 
Cunningham had not been able to fill.144 He did, by the 1680s appear to have a place of 
residence and met the requirement of living in Spain for 20 years. It is possible, 
however, that his  real estate was not worth the required 4,000 ducats or that he had not 
married a local woman.145 Cunningham was obviously no longer a mere merchant. 
 Nonetheless, like many of the Spanish nobility, Cunningham was in need of 
funds. In December 1687 he wrote to Sir James Dick (a former Lord Provost of 
Edinburgh) to notify him that he had received a Royal patent appointing him consul ‘for 
the most ancient Kingdom of Scotland in all the dominions of Spain’.146  He also stated 
that he had been given permission to recover all profits that the English consul had 
made in Cadiz or elsewhere. He added that he did not intend to make use of this money 
himself, instead asking his countrymen at home that they may consider granting him an 
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allowance to help him maintain his title of baronet and the lifestyle expected of a 
consul.147 He asked that Dick use his influence at the meeting with the Lord Provost of 
Edinburgh and his  magistrates and stated that he would be greatly obliged to him and 
would assist Dick and any of his relations for whom it was  in his power to do so.148  So, 
while he had been appointed by King Charles  II and had been given the right to charge 
Scottish vessels and recover monies from English consuls, he preferred to be given a 
salary, possibly in realisation that he would be unlikely to recover funds from English 
consuls, or that the number of Scottish ships would not provide a sufficient income. 
Cunningham’s assertion of his royal appointment as Scottish consul for Spain was 
confirmed by both the Scottish Privy Council and the Convention of Royal Burghs in 
July 1687 and 1688 respectively.149  He also, despite his consular status, continued to 
trade and acted on behalf of George Macartney of Belfast on occasion.150  Cunningham 
did appear to have a prosperous  lifestyle in Cadiz as a letter from John Dunlop to his 
father, James Dunlop of Glenkirk indicates. In discussing his brother William’s 
impending journey to Cadiz, John wrote that he had a letter from his brother to a James 
Hamilton which was to be directed to a Mr Murie, who would be ‘found at James 
Cunningham’s house in Cadiz’.151  Cunningham therefore had the facilities  to provide 
accommodation to other merchants, suggesting a residence reasonable for his position.
 While Cunningham was a prominent Scottish consul and merchant, he was not 
alone in Cadiz. James Baillie provides another example of a Scotsman present in Cadiz 
acting as a factor. As Steve Murdoch has discussed, factors were individuals who 
represented single merchants, groups of merchants, towns or entire kingdoms and were 
appointed to conduct trade on behalf of their employers. Due to their familiarity with 
local language, laws and customs, factors were well-placed to obtain the best deal for 
those they represented.152  It appears that Baillie left Scotland for Cadiz in September 
1676, with a commission from Hector MacKenzie.153  In the commission MacKenzie 
consigned to Baillie a cargo of cloth, including over 160 yards of Yorkshire cloth.154  In 
return Baillie was to send ten butts of wine and trusted his  business ‘taken by me in 
your ship and the prudent management where of I leave in your care’.155 In July 1678 
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Baillie was involved in an Admiralty Court case regarding a shipment of wine he had 
organised.156  A year earlier Baillie had shipped 10 butts of sack on the Crown of 
Burntisland, skippered by Thomas Dewar, for the Edinburgh merchant John Falconer.157 
Baillie was to assist the case by attesting, on oath, as to whether the butts  were half 
butts or full butts, with Cunningham passing the information on to the court.158  A 
commission dated from 1680 placed Baillie back in Scotland where he requested a 
William Davidson, who was sailing to Cadiz on the Dolphin, to sell a cargo of wheat on 
his behalf.159  In return Davidson was to purchase wine for Baillie, with Baillie anxious 
that the wine should be of good quality.160  In September 1691 a case heard in the 
Admiralty Court brought to light another factor in Spain, a Mr Williment.161 An analysis of 
those involved in the case in comparison to the Leith wine books makes it almost 
certain that the ship was the Joseph Maria of Ostend, mastered by Jacob Girbrante.162 
Williment had freighted the vessel with a cargo of wine; however, two merchants of 
Edinburgh then disagreed over 10 butts  of wine. William Dunbar claimed that William 
Lamb had not paid for his  share of the cargo, with Lamb counter-claiming that he had 
paid for the wine, including the customs duty, but that the wine had not been 
released.163 The judgements of the Admiralty Court in these cases do not reveal a clear 
winner with both judgements siding with the pursuer. On 11 August it was ruled that 
Lamb had been badly treated by Dunbar, who had allegedly refused to release the 
wine, and he was ordered to release the wine or pay him the value of the cargo.164 
However, a month later, in the case of Dunbar versus Lamb, Dunbar argued that Lamb 
had not paid the £332 7 shillings and 4 pence that was due and the court ruled that the 
defendant must pay what was owed. Further, Lamb was ordered pay to £40 expenses 
to Dunbar.165 
 Evidence of other mercantile Scots resident in Spain comes to light through 
documents which discuss  Cunningham’s business  dealings. For example, John Bain is 
mentioned and, although no further information was given regarding this individual, it 
can be presumed that Bain was, at the very least, from the British Isles.166  Another 
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individual present in records concerning James Cunningham is John Rendon, who in 
1667 was  obligated to pay Cunningham 204 pesos.167  In a letter from John Watson a 
merchant in Edinburgh to Thomas Macnamara there is evidence of another Scottish 
merchant in Spain, this time in San Sebastian. Watson advises Macnamara to make 
use of Thomas Burd a merchant in the region.168  The register of the citizens of Bruges 
provides more incidences, with David Tod, a skipper of Kirkcaldy, recorded as  a citizen 
in October 1690.169 While the Spanish Netherlands may have been eclipsed historically 
by their more successful northern neighbours, there was clearly a trading connection 
between Scotland and that region. 
 Another example is provided by Francis  De Muilinares  in Bruges. As discussed in 
chapter one, he provided Bruges lace to Alexander Brand, with Brand petitioning the 
Privy Council for permission to sell the lace as he had ordered it prior to the ban on 
foreign textiles.170  Chapter three also showed that Muilinares had a commercial 
relationship with Andrew Russell.171  In 1670 Muilinares bought Scottish wool from a 
merchant in Bruges named Brian Reeve.172 It is unclear whether Reeve was a Scot, but 
he was certainly dealing in Scottish goods, with a case coming before the civil courts as 
Reeve was due money from the other merchant in the scheme, Jan de Vos.173 Reeve 
had therefore confiscated the goods of de Vos until the £81 had been paid.174  In June 
1686 it was Muilinares who was being pursued for non-payment by George Clerk, an 
Edinburgh merchant, who brought his case before the Admiralty Court. Clerk stated that 
Muilinares owed him the sum of over 4,200 guilders  but that he had only received just 
under 2,500.175 Muilinares was ordered to pay the amount due, as well as  damages.176 
As this brief case study shows, it made little difference whether a factor was Scottish, 
what mattered was the expectation of trust. These commercial networks facilitated by 
mutual trust were the predominant method employed by Scottish merchants  to conduct 
trade either as individuals or in small groups. 
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4. The Problem Regarding Representation
While it is  clear that James Cunningham represented Scottish merchants in Spain, this 
was not always as clear cut in regards to other consuls. As discussed in the previous 
chapter there were numerous bodies  which could and indeed did appoint consuls in 
Iberia. Further Scottish merchants  themselves, along with their Irish counterparts, had 
no desire to be described as British. This led to some uncertainty as to whom consuls 
actually represented and this  incertitude continued into the 1650’s with the Habsburg 
authorities struggling to decide which nation was represented by a new Judge 
Conservator. Despite the Restoration this confusion remained, with numerous consuls 
appointed without clarity regarding who they were representing. This confusion 
originated at the very top of policy making; for example, the first Cedula signed on 19 
March 1645 stated the following: 
For as  much as on the part of you Richard Anthony, Consul of the English 
nation, by you, and in the name of vassals of the King of Great Britain.177
This  first Cedula granted the merchant community certain concessions for the sum of 
2500 ducats, of which 1,000 was to be paid immediately to the Spanish Crown, with the 
rest to be paid the following month.178  In return the merchants were granted several 
privileges, one of the most important being that customs officers could not search 
merchants houses  after goods had been registered, therefore preventing them from 
searching for undeclared goods.179 The other was the provision of a Judge Conservator 
for Andalusia, who would ensure the Cedula was adhered to, as well as deal with 
judicial affairs.180  While this  first Cedula appears  to apply to the subjects of the King of 
Great Britain, the second, passed in June of the same year, only made reference to 
‘subjects  of the Kingdom of England which reside and trade in Andalusia’.181  The 
situation changed again when Philip IV signed a third Cedula in November which 
stated:
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Forasmuch as by my Letter and Decree of the 19th March, of this present 
year, I did grant to you, the subjects of the King of Great Britain, who reside 
in Andaluzia.182
 
As Stein and Stein have discussed, these Cedulas were agreed due to direct pressure 
from the ‘English’ merchant community in Andalusia and were regarded by Marques de 
Mancera, secretary of the Consejo de Estado, as less  of an international treaty and 
more a private one between the merchants  of Andalusia and the Consejo.183 
Nevertheless, they further argue that their importance should not be discounted as they 
provided evidence as to how
the English merchant community forged a network of privilege within which to 
operate in order to protect imports from England and to participate legally 
(and illegally, too) in Lower Andalusia’s colonial trade.184
However, while Stein and Stein discuss the ‘English’ merchant community in their work, 
it is clear that this was not necessarily who these Cedulas represented. The first and the 
third Cedula both make reference to the subjects of the King of Great Britain, thus 
including Scottish merchants too.185 
 While the authors  of the 1645 Cedulas were obviously confused as to the 
political status quo in Britain, the authors of the 1667 Treaty of Madrid were clear as to 
whom their treaty represented stating:
First, it is agreed and concluded, that from this  day forward there shall be, 
between the Two Crowns of Great Britain and Spain, a general, good, 
sincere, true, firm and perfect Amity, Confederation and Peace.186
The treaty also recognised the confusion of the Cedulas by conferring the privileges 
granted in 1645 to all merchants who were subjects of the King of Great Britain.187 
Further, the treaty allowed for the presence of British consuls, ‘for the help and 
protection of the subjects of Great Britain’.188  This treaty makes it implicitly clear that 
merchants from the dominions of Great Britain would be conferred any privileges which 
may previously have been believed to be for English merchants only. Consuls would 
also represent all merchants serving the King of Great Britain. With this in mind, James 
Cunningham’s position as Scottish consul should technically not have existed. 
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 Despite this numerous  consuls were appointed in the late seventeenth century 
where it is  unclear which nation, or nations, those consuls  represented. As  appendix 
three shows, 18 individuals  were appointed with the most common variation being that 
they were appointed ‘by the King of Great Britain for the English nation’.189 It appears 
that this confusion was also shared by those appointed. For example, Alexander 
Stanhope, who was noted as being the ‘British’ minister at Madrid from 1689 until 1699 
apparently struggled to make the Spanish see the difference between the British 
kingdoms.190  In a letter to his son, James Stanhope, written at Madrid in July 1699 
Stanhope discussed the Darien affair, writing ‘it is  impossible to make these people 
understand the difference between the English and Scotch’.191  Stanhope did go on to 
say that the Spanish appeared to have no problem with making such distinctions when 
he complained about the conduct of individuals in Aragon or Biscay as  he would be 
answered by Spanish ministers  that the king was only the King of Castile.192 However, 
in a letter to Mr Blathwayte at the end of August in the same year Stanhope talked 
about ‘our Scots’, suggesting some form of familiarity, or more crudely, ownership.193 
 While during the Anglo-Spanish war and into the early seventeenth century Scots 
were determined to maintain and appeared relatively successful in asserting a separate 
identity, this  may have been eroded as the century wore on. It is interesting to note that, 
while there was a separate category for Irish merchants in San Sebastian, Andrew 
Gordon was counted among the English merchants and appeared only to emphasise 
his Scottish identity when it became clear that his  goods would be seized due to 
Cromwell‘s  actions in the Caribbean.194  As can be seen from James Cunningham’s 
case, although he was the Scottish consul he was also involved in the broader British 
community. There may have been a religious element to this, both from an internal and 
external point for view. For example, the Spanish authorities may have considered the 
English and Scottish community to be one and the same as  they were both from the 
same island and of (from the Spanish point of view) the same religion. Similarly, 
internally shared Protestantism and a shared monarchy may have led English and 
Scottish merchants to stick together. While this is  only a theory and has yet to be 
179
189 AGS, Estado Legajo 4191, Estado 4192. Both of these consulado records in the archive use this 
phrase on numerous occasions. 
190 Lord Mahon, ed, Spain Under Charles the Second: or Extracts from the Correspondence of the Hon. 
Alexander Stanhope, British Minister at Madrid, 1690-1699 (London, 1844), 1. Spanish sources 
document Stanhope as Judge Conservator at Seville as well as ambassador extraordinary. See AGS, 
Estado Lejago 4191. March 1695. 
191 Ibid, 176. Alexander Stanhope to James Stanhope, 8 July 1699. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid, 187. Alexander Stanhope to Mr Blathwayte. 27 August 1699. 
194 AGS, Contaduria del Suedo, serie II, Legajo 158. February 1656. 
conclusively proven, it may provide a credible reason as to why the Spanish authorities 
found it so difficult to understand whom consuls were representing. 
5. Darien
While a concerted effort has been made to show that the ‘Darien Disaster’ was not the 
be all and end all of Scottish commercial relationships with Spanish and Portuguese 
territories, it would be detrimental to this project to ignore the enterprise completely. 
The events of the venture itself are well-known; it was a Scottish attempt to set up a 
trading colony on the isthmus of Panama (preceding the Panama canal by two hundred 
years) which failed dismally, with great loss of both life and up to a quarter of Scotland’s 
liquid capital.195 The failure of the scheme itself has  been widely interpreted as the main 
reason for the formation of the British state: the loss  of capital, the ‘necessity’ of the 
colonial market for Scottish economic success and financial repayment by England in 
the Treaty of Union is  generally seen as fundamental to Scotland’s economic need for 
union with its  neighbour. T.M Devine has argued that the scheme caused political as 
well as economic unrest which led the land-owning classes in Scotland to believe that 
‘Scotland’s miseries were all rooted in the Regal Union of 1603’.196  Much blame was 
laid at the feet of the monarchy itself, and King William caused anger amongst Scots for 
refusing to support the scheme, his reasoning being that he could not incite 
disagreement with Spain.197 This lack of support and public resentment has been cited 
as the reason behind the nasty Worcester affair in which the Captain of an English East 
India vessel and two of his crew were hanged on charges of piracy.198  Whatley has 
described the incident as fuelling the Scottish population’s desire for some form of 
revenge on England for her attitude to Darien.199 The economic impacts have also been 
cited, with the financial loss to Scotland being described as between one-quarter and 
one-sixth of the kingdom’s liquid capital, although an exact measurement is not 
available.200 Michael Lynch writes:
The role of economic issues in the debate over the Union of 1706-7 is a 
highly contentious subject, but there can be little doubt that it was the 
aftermath of the Darien collapse, exacerbated by other loosely related 
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economic issues, which brought about a political crisis in the last two years of 
William’s reign and put Union back on the political agenda.201
 However, care must be taken when discussing Scottish support for the Darien 
scheme, which was described as containing the hopes  and dreams of the ‘Scottish 
people’ in 1695.202  Several prominent Scottish merchants were conspicuous in their 
absence from the list of subscribers. James Foulis provides one example. Foulis was 
heavily involved in the early stages  of the Company of Scotland, which initially wished 
to raise half of its  total subscription from London. As Watt has shown these early stages 
of the Company showed it to be a ‘London company... and was run by London Scots 
and English merchants’.203  This period in the Company's history was a resounding 
success. Foulis, acting as the treasurer at this time, managed to secure the full 
subscription of £300,000 sterling within around ten days of the books being opened on 
6 November 1695.204  However, the activities of the Company soon attracted unwanted 
attention - mainly from the English East India Company, which was seriously alarmed at 
the idea of a competitor and interloper upon their monopoly.205  On 11 November 1695 
they banned any member of the company from having anything to do with the Company 
of Scotland.206  Following petitions from both the English East India Company and the 
Levant Company, the English House of Lords issued an address discussing the threat 
that the Company of Scotland posed to both English East India trade and the American 
plantation trade.207 Surprisingly, the East India and Levant companies were not the only 
individuals concerned about the Company of Scotland. In January 1695 Edward 
Randolph, a collector of customs for New York, wrote about Scottish transgressions 
regarding trade to the colonies.208 He went on to state that he feared that the Company 
of Scotland would establish a ‘staple’ for trading European and Colonial commodities 
which would be ‘so great a mischief to England’.209 These alarmist developments led to 
a mass desertion of the English subscribers with Foulis  stating in July that he had 
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returned all the money he had received.210 The Company was then forced to remove its 
base of operations to Scotland and any ideas of English support vanished. 
 Interestingly, the Scottish London merchants who had been the backbone of the 
Company while it was based in London also appear to have withdrawn all support 
completely. James Foulis is not listed in the first court of directors nor are any of the 
other Scots who had previously been involved in the venture, the only exception was 
William Patterson himself.211 Of the London-based Scottish promoters of the Company, 
all are conspicuously absent by the time the Scottish subscription lists  were opened.212 
None of these individuals made an appearance on the Scottish lists  nor did they seem 
to take any further part in the Company’s business.213  As  far as can be ascertained, 
Foulis’s only other involvement in the Company was to send correspondence, which 
included copies of letters sent from New York in October 1699 written by George Moffat 
(supercargo on the vessel the Caledonia) which confirmed the rumour that the 
settlement had been abandoned.214 Hugh Fraser’s  (another London backer) only other 
involvement in the scheme was to act as a debt collector for the Company after a young 
merchant, James Smyth, embezzled Company funds given to him by Patterson.215 
Fraser also provided the funds for Captain Pinkerton and his crew to return to Scotland 
and was reimbursed £5 from the Company funds.216  The fact that these men did not 
continue with the scheme once it lost English backing shows an excellent degree of 
understanding, on their part, of the necessity of, if not English support, at least English 
neutrality towards the scheme. When it became clear that the king, the English 
Parliament and English trading companies were actively hostile to the project, the 
merchants appear to have wanted nothing more to do with it. A lack of confidence in, or 
perhaps a more realistic opinion of, the enigmatic William Patterson was also held by 
one of the London Scots, David Nairn, who in a letter to the Earl of Leven wrote, 
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‘My Lord I am far from being against the India trade but I must be free to tell 
your lordship that I think Mr Patterson talks too much and peoples 
expectations are raised too great’.217 
These men were fully aware of the power of the English East India Company and knew 
that, without English support, subscribing to the Company of Scotland was too risky and 
they were not prepared to invest money in such a venture. 
 Several Scottish-based merchants  were not so cautious, including a number of 
merchants who had previously purchased Iberian goods. James Balfour is perhaps the 
best example. Balfour was heavily involved in the Company, being on the board of 
directors as  well as investing £1,000 sterling in the venture.218  George Lockhart of 
Glasgow similarly put forward the hefty sum of £1,000 sterling as did Charles Charters. 
John Marjoriebanks and James Baillie also contributed to the Company.219  While it is 
clear that a number of Scottish merchants involved in Iberian trade did pledge 
significant amounts of money to the venture, merchants  did not form the largest social 
group of investors. It was the nobility who made up the majority, comprising 48.6 
percent of the subscription, while merchants from Edinburgh and Glasgow alone made 
up a little less than half that percentage, 22.3 percent and merchants from other royal 
burghs contributed 4.9 percent.220  These figures are telling: while the nobility certainly 
had the funds to invest, so did merchants and it is  surprising that their contribution did 
not constitute a higher percentage. William Patterson was undoubtedly a very 
persuasive man and managed to get some of the country’s  most successful merchants 
to pledge money to the Company of Scotland. But many Scots were conspicuous by 
their absence, suggesting that for all the patriotism involved they were not willing to take 
the risk on such a venture. For example, Walter Gibson was not present on the 
subscription lists, nor was fellow Glasgow merchant Thomas Weir. Thomas Sommerville 
of Edinburgh was not listed, nor were Henry Bothwell and William Menzies. 
 While those who subscribed in Scotland had to deal with the loss of their 
investments upon the scheme’s failure, Captain Pinkerton and the crew of the Dolphin 
nearly lost their lives as a result of the Darien expedition. At the beginning of February 
1699 Pinkerton was instructed, along with Captain John Malloch, to sail the Dolphin to 
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the Dutch-held entrepôt of Curaçao as well as  the island of St Thomas to trade.221 
However, at the beginning of March another man, Captain Pilkington, returned from 
Cartagena to report that Pinkerton and the crew had been taken prisoner in that city.222 
Further details are found in a statement from Captain Pinkerton, which was made after 
his release. In this he stated that on 5 February the ship struck a rock and that, despite 
the best efforts of the crew, the vessel began to sink and so they ran the vessel ashore 
at Cartagena.223  The Treaty of Madrid did give British ships the right to seek shelter in 
Iberian-held ports, if required, and thus Pinkerton and his  crew probably felt they would 
be safe at Cartagena - or perhaps they did not have a choice.224 
 Interestingly, this story does not quite tally with the one received in the Darien 
colony itself. In a letter from one of the colonists, George Douglas, to the laird of 
Strathendry Douglas stated that Pinkerton and his crew may have been able to leave 
Cartagena safely but had been betrayed by the lieutenant of a French ship.225  This is 
likely to be an example of propaganda - the governors  at the colony were trying to make 
the capture sound a more honourable affair. Whatever the true story, the reaction in the 
colony was one of anger, and it was decided that Captain Pilkington should be 
dispatched without delay to Cartagena to demand the release of the prisoners and state 
that if this request was refused letters of reprisal would immediately be given to 
Pilkington and Captain Sands.226 However, at the end of March the messenger returned 
with a steadfast refusal from the Governor of Cartagena.227 Indeed, the prisoners were 
transferred to Havana and then to Cadiz in September 1699.228  Two of the prisoners, 
George Cowan and Andrew Livingston, appear to have escaped Spanish custody 
during this transfer, with Cowan actually wishing to return to Darien and Livingstone 
presented with four gallons of the Company’s brandy.229  After petitions from Pinkerton’s 
wife, the Company finally decided to write to King William in order to help secure the 
release of the sailors. Unfortunately for the imprisoned men, the directors were 
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chancing their arm, asking not only for assistance with the release of the prisoners  but 
also the use of three royal navy vessels.230 Even worse, the Company decided to send 
Lord Basil Hamilton, brother to the Duke of Hamilton, whom William suspected of 
disloyalty.231  In a letter to Lord Carmichael the Duke of Hamilton strongly refuted the 
claims, stating that he had been misrepresented to the king and that ‘my brother Basil’s 
journey was far from being his  choice but what the company most peremptorily put 
upon him’.232  William did indeed refuse to see Lord Basil, although he did read and 
respond to the petition.233 William ignored the Company completely and wrote directly to 
the Scottish Privy Council stating that he would ask Carlos II to release the prisoners.234
 The plight of the men was, by this point, well-known and invoked the interest of 
Martin Westcombe. The first mention of Westcombe as consul in Cadiz is in a letter 
from the consul in Lisbon, Thomas Maynard, to Westcombe in Cadiz in December 
1664.235  Westcombe had an astonishingly long career and is recorded as consul in 
Cadiz until at least 1715.236  After the 1707 Treaty of Union it is  certain that Westcombe 
represented all British merchants; however, as previously discussed, prior to 1707 this 
was not always clear. Despite this, it is apparent who Westcombe believed he was 
representing. In a memorial to the Marquess of Navarre Westcombe argued strongly on 
behalf of Pinkerton and his crew, despite the previous English hostility to the Company 
of Scotland.237  In this document Westcombe described himself as ‘consul and agent 
general of his majesty of Great Britain’ and further stated that Pinkerton and company 
were the ‘subjects of his majesty of Great Britain’.238  While admitting that the men had 
sailed from Nova Caledonia, Westcombe stated that, ‘the said English were not found in 
the exercise of anything that was prohibited and were only sailing to the parts of the 
dominions of the King of Great Britain’.239 Westcombe’s attempt to describe the men as 
English and under the protection of the King of Great Britain is  interesting. King William 
famously made his  feeling towards the Company of Scotland, and that country in 
general, very clear. Westcombe was obviously trying to make the Spanish authorities 
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believe that King William cared about the fate of these men. Westcombe’s attempt, 
however, was unsuccessful and in a letter to Lord Basil Hamilton Pinkerton wrote that 
he and the other prisoners had received poor treatment and that consular assistance 
was not improving matters for them.240  The letter also discusses Pinkerton and the 
crew’s understandable apprehension at how events could unfold.241  Pinkerton’s 
questioning by the authorities at Seville asked how he (an experienced sailor) could not 
be aware of the fact that Darien belonged to the King of Spain.242 Pinkerton replied that 
he had never traded there previously so was unaware what belonged to the King of 
Spain and that the native Americans at Darien told the arriving Scots that they had 
never been conquered by any European nation.243  Pinkerton’s explanations  were all in 
vain, however, as in late June Pinkerton, Benjamin Spencer, John Malloch and James 
Graham were sentenced to death for the crime of piracy, with David Wilson being 
exempt from the penalty because of his young age.244  On 21 June Westcombe wrote 
again, this time to Edward Villiers, the Earl of Jersey, a prominent minister in the English 
Privy Council and Secretary for State for the Southern Department to plead for 
assistance in the case.245  Westcombe asked Jersey to ‘acquaint his majty with it, and 
procure his gracious order in their behalf’.246 In July James Ogilvy, the Earl of Seafield 
and a noted opponent to the Darien venture, wrote to the king directly reminding him of 
his letter to the Privy Council in January and making William aware that the men were 
now under sentence of death.247 On the same day Seafield wrote to William Carstares, 
a prominent courtier who was also appointed King William’s chaplain while he was 
Prince of Orange and following the Glorious Revolution had immense influence and 
power in Scotland on the king’s behalf.248  Seafield asked for Carstares’ assistance 
stating, 
I would not have written to his Majesty this night, but that the accounts from 
Spain do bear, that Captain Pinkerton, and those of his crew, are sentenced to 
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die and, if they suffer death it will very much increase the ferment in Scotland, 
as you well know.249
The King finally wrote on 22 July and the letter obviously arrived in time as Pinkerton 
and the rest of the prisoners were freed around 20 September 1700 and returned to 
Scotland.250 As Christopher Storrs has  argued, while Spain as a world power may have 
been in decline in comparison to its  position in the sixteenth century, it was still more 
than capable of defending its territories against interlopers.251 Had the Scottish scheme 
enjoyed English support the outcome may have been very different - but, the concerns 
of the East India Company and William’s desire not to antagonise his Spanish 
counterpart, meant that vital English support was not forthcoming. The case of 
Pinkerton and his crew, however, shows that the Scots were not fully abandoned: Martin 
Westcombe, in particular, attempted to assist, invoking the name of Great Britain and 
even attempting to describe Pinkerton and co. as English to try to secure their release. 
His actions were such that, following the return of the prisoners to Scotland, the 
Company decided to write a letter of thanks to Westcombe for his efforts.252 Even those 
who had steadfastly refused to support the Company of Scotland, such as the Earl of 
Seafield and William Carstares, provided assistance in this  case by recognising that if 
the men were executed Scottish dissent with the crown would only grow. 
Conclusion.
 
This  examination of Scottish trade with Iberia in the late seventeenth century has 
proven beyond doubt that Scotland and her merchants participated fully in Iberian trade. 
The dangers from North African corsairs  did not deter a small but significant group of 
merchants from obtaining Iberian goods directly from the source. Precautions were 
taken - for example, John Marjoriebanks split his cargo across two vessels which 
departed at different times or the prevalence of skippers travelling together on their 
journeys to Iberia. The opportunity to conduct trade in profitable commodities, which 
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were popular with a burgeoning gentry class, was enough of an incentive for some 
merchants and skippers to take the risks involved in trading to southern Europe.  
 While Scotland may have been a more stable country at the end of the 
seventeenth century than it had been in the 1640s and 1650s, other conflicts did occur 
which affected Scottish merchants. The Anglo-Dutch wars, which due to their very title 
have ignored Scottish contributions, did influence the shipping and trade of Scottish 
traders. Nonetheless, as in previous conflicts, Scottish merchants were equal to the 
task, sailing to and living in the ports of the Spanish Netherlands in order to continue 
trading. During the French war the further precautions of convoys and the use of neutral 
shipping was undertaken. As Steve Murdoch has shown, remarkably few Scottish ships 
were taken prize during this conflict, showing that these methods were successful, 
although French affinity with the Scots was likely to be an important factor.253
 These Scottish merchants were supported by an existing merchant community in 
Iberia, particularly in Cadiz and the surrounding Andalusian coastline and Lisbon. 
Factors and consuls were present, providing local knowledge, assistance and, in the 
case of James Cunningham, a place to stay. Cunningham was certainly not alone, with 
a handful of Scottish factors as well as the wider British community also present, which 
judging from the mixture of Scottish and English signatures on documents in the Iberian 
archives suggests a degree of integration despite the political independence of both 
countries. The efforts of Martin Westcombe in relation to the Darien affair also show a 
sense of integration, despite the confusion that some of his colleagues, the Spanish, 
and even the Stuart authorities, probably felt in regards to his position. The Darien 
expedition and, indeed, the Spanish reaction to it, also showed that while Spain was not 
the power it had been it was still an important European kingdom, a point it would 
continue to emphasise in the following century. 
  While the Darien event is different from the rest of this chapter, it would 
have been impossible not to mention it within the scope of this  thesis. In analysing the 
Scottish London merchants involved in early parts of the venture it can be safely said 
that experienced merchants with a detailed knowledge of English trade knew that 
without English neutrality or support the scheme would collapse. Thus they refused to 
get involved financially once it became clear that the English authorities were hostile to 
the idea. The actions of Martin Westcombe, in his  efforts to have Pinkerton and the 
crew of the Dolphin freed, however, show an attempt to hoodwink the Spanish 
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authorities with the use of terms that technically did not have legal weight until 1707. 
Even King William himself was  aware that to allow the men to die without appearing to 
intervene in any way would only further turn opinion against him in Scotland, which, with 
the continued Jacobite threat was dangerous.
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Chapter Six: The War of Spanish Succession to the Siege of Gibraltar. 
‘the imports into this place consists chiefly in dryed cod fish from Scotland, 
Newfoundland & New England’1
The end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth brought 
significant uncertainty to Europe in the form of the Spanish succession crisis. Following 
the death of Carlos II in 1700, the whole of Europe was anxious to resolve the problem 
of the vacant monarchy with the choice of the Bourbon Philip V plunging Europe into a 
conflict which was not resolved until 1713. After the disaster that was the Darien 
expedition Scotland had its  own problems with the English government threatening to 
pass the Alien Act if negotiations for a political union were not undertaken. Evidence for 
trade to Iberia during this  period is confined to a few scattered sources  with the Crown 
Money book of Leith demonstrating that, despite the rise of Glasgow as a trading 
entrepôt, Leith was still a hub of European trade with traffic to Iberia and its  dominions 
greater than has been previously understood. The market for Iberian goods such as 
wine and citrus fruits  also provides evidence as to the popularity of the trade, with the 
Duchess of Hamilton providing one of many examples. Voyages did not always  go to 
plan, however, and records of disagreements show how the War of Spanish Succession 
affected commerce. This resulted in many Scots resorting to the employment of devious 
methods to continue trading. Taken together the information collated here shows that, in 
spite of the conflict, trade with Iberia once more continued to be popular.
 The official end of hostilities technically came with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. 
Nonetheless, tensions remained, with Spain humiliated by a treaty which saw it lose 
most of its European territories. The loss of Gibraltar, which was essentially part of the 
Spanish mainland, was particularly hard to bear for the new Bourbon monarchy and 
soured political relations between Britain and Spain. This tension led to another brief 
spat in 1718 which culminated in the disastrous Jacobite invasion of 1719 which came 
with the backing of the new Spanish monarch and ended in catastrophe for Spanish 
troops at Glenshiel. During this time British ships were arrested in Spanish ports with 
several Scottish individuals reporting the seizure of their goods. Once again sporadic 
evidence shows that trade did continue through the connivance of third parties with a 
Dutch-French factor, Juan van Duffle, acting for Scottish merchants  and organising 
trade on their behalf. In particular, John Steuart’s letters to Van Duffle reveal the extent 
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to which Steuart trusted Van Duffle to provide up-to-date information. In another case 
study, the career of Mark Pringle is examined in closer detail. Pringle’s career, 
specifically, his role prior to being appointed as official consul, requires  this focussed 
attention as the problems he encountered are less to do with the surrounding tensions 
between Britain and Spain but rather jealously in the British merchant community. 
Further Pringle provides an excellent example of how a merchant consul dealt with 
matters such as merchant disputes in conjunction with maintaining his own trade. 
 Finally, the chapter examines the events leading up to the siege of Gibraltar in 
1727. Primarily, it investigates the diplomatic build-up to the event, involving David 
Dunbar, the consul of San Sebastian, in his dual role of consul and informant. The 
chapter concludes with an examination of British trade during this  incident and 
compares the diplomatic tensions with the actual effect upon merchants  trading with 
Iberia at the time. In particular Edward Burd’s  journal provides evidence not only of the 
desire of merchants to continue trading but also of a significant trade in Scottish fish to 
Barcelona. In combination these case studies reveal the continued importance of 
Scottish-Iberian trade both before and after the British treaty of Union. 
1. The Spanish War of Succession
While it was not clear until the 1690s that Carlos II of Spain would die without issue, his 
almost constant state of ill health meant that as early as  the late 1660s European 
leaders were making clandestine agreements as to how Spain would be ruled after his 
death.2  Several secret partition agreements  were rendered invalid either by changing 
conditions or the untimely death of those whom the Spanish crown was settled upon.3 
Of course, the Habsburg authorities in Spain themselves were the most anxious as to 
what would befall the country following the king’s  death. Carlos  II and his council did not 
wish Spain and its  dominions  to be partitioned and looked for a candidate who they 
believed could secure Spain and its territories.4 Philip, the Duke of Anjou and grandson 
of Louis  XIV, was named as King of Spain in Carlos’s will and was welcomed by the 
Spanish people.5  While other European powers were unimpressed with this settlement, 
it was not until after Louis XIV had invaded the Spanish Netherlands and declared 
(contrary to Carlos’s  will) that Philip may still be King of France that a ‘grand alliance’ 
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was formed in opposition to Philip.6  This alliance consisted of the Stuart monarchy, the 
authorities of the Dutch Republic, the Austrian Emperor and the Portuguese Crown, 
each of whom had different reasons  for entering the conflict. The Stuart monarchy and 
the Dutch Republic both wanted to extend their trading influence in the Mediterranean 
and the Americas. Described by Henry Kamen as a global war, the conflict continued 
until the Treaty of Utrecht brought peace in April 1713.7 
 Of course the destiny of Spain was not the only concern of the Stuart monarchy, 
with the fate of its own kingdoms also being debated. Traditional historiography of the 
Treaty of Union has emphasised the necessity of this event for Scottish economic 
growth. T.C. Smout, for example, stated that, while the Unionists were naive as to what 
the Union would achieve, their understanding of the commercial situation (and the 
importance of English trade to that) was essentially correct.8  Rosalind Mitchison 
concurred, stating that Scotland’s major trade was with England and that, due to the 
‘bondage’ with England’s foreign trade policy, Scotland had to give up its  overseas 
connections.9  Christopher Whatley takes a more revisionist approach stating that 
Scotland’s economy was not as backward as has been argued, although, he agrees 
that, in comparison to England, Scotland was considerably behind.10 However, there is 
another angle to consider. Christopher Storrs has argued that the two events  (the Treaty 
of Union and the War of Spanish Succession) should not be seen in isolation. He 
asserts  that the very method of English and Scottish incorporation was directly affected 
by the events  on the continent.11 The English and Scots, he states, were fearful of Louis 
XIV and wished to avoid French-style absolutism.12  The early eighteenth century, 
therefore, was a period of serious uncertainty for both Scotland and Spain. 
 Once again, these difficult times did not stop trade from continuing and, while 
documentation similar to the customs and excise records does not exist for the late 
1690s and early eighteenth century, there is no lack of evidence of trade with Iberia for 
this  period. In April 1701 the Robert of Glasgow, master Hugh Campbell, arrived home 
from Cadiz carrying Spanish wine.13  Wine on board this vessel was the subject of a 
bond by William Bogell to Archibald Mure and James Houston (both customs officials) 
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for the sum of £426 a shilling and sixpence Scots, the customs payment due for 11 butts 
and a quarter cask of sack. Interestingly, the document was not registered until 29 
January 1718.14 The Crown Money Book of Leith also provides evidence of numerous 
journeys between Scotland and Iberia during the war, with 27 journeys recorded.15 
Unsurprisingly, 12 of the voyages were undertaken to northern Spanish ports  and, 
considering the composition of cargoes from these ports  during the Nine Years’ War it is 
most likely these vessels brought French wine to Scotland. Journeys were also 
undertaken to Cadiz, the Canaries and Lisbon with several entries only noting 
destination at a national level.16 The Dundee register also provides evidence post-1700 
with several Scottish ships journeying to Portugal.17  For example, in April 1709 the 
Margaret of Dundee, skippered by Robert Rankin arrived carrying ‘merchant goods’, 
followed by an unnamed ship, skippered by John Kincaid from the same port carrying 
salt in July 1711.18 Christopher Whatley has used these sources to show that the Treaty 
of Union fostered an increased trade with Iberia.19 However, caution is  required when 
attempting to understand long term trading patterns. For example, the Dundee shipping 
register used by Whatley only encompasses a 13 year period from 1700-1713 which 
makes long-term analysis  difficult. Further, in the case of the Crown Money Book for 
Leith, as previously noted, data regarding destination was not always recorded: while 
some years show a disposition to note the port visited, other years  do not and merely 
discuss money paid for ‘a voyage’. Therefore, while these sources are excellent for 
showing that trade with Iberia continued, they are not necessarily helpful in trying to 
establish long-term trading patterns and care should be taken when utilising them. 
    The prevalence of Iberian goods among the household accounts of the 
gentry also show their popularity and obtainability in this period. In January 1704 
Elizabeth the Duchess of Hamilton wrote to her husband, who from the context of the 
letter was  presumably in Edinburgh. She requested that he obtain Canary wine, 
oranges and lemons and instructed him to ask Captain Bruce, ‘for he knows who has 
those’.20 In a similar letter the Earl of Mar wrote to his wife, Margaret, informing her that 
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he had obtained oranges and lemons for her in Edinburgh but that ‘there is  not a lobster 
nor partain in toune’.21  Spanish sack, indigo and figs all feature in Charles Stewart’s 
account of goods supplied to the Breadalbane family in February 1705.22 Robert Milne’s 
record of money due to him by the Earl of Southesk is much the same, noting a variety 
of household items, including Spanish salt and oranges.23 
 Scots also continued to reside in Spain with a deed registered at Leith in 1702 
documenting the affairs of an Archibald Blackadder, resident in Cadiz.24  Whether this is 
any relation to the Balthasar Blackadder who was also in Cadiz in 1707 is, as yet, 
unclear. In August 1707 a letter of payment was recorded between Balthasar 
Blackadder and Antonio Garcia & co.25  Blackadder, from Tulliallan, is noted as the 
legitimate son of James Blackadder and Elena Smart. In a letter from John Dunlop to 
his father in 1683 a Mr Blackadder is  mentioned as living in Cadiz with his servant 
James Weir, who was Dunlop’s contact in Iberia.26  This individual could be Archibald, 
Balthasar, or someone else entirely.
 As always, disagreements provide further evidence of trade or intended trade 
with Iberia. In 1708 Charles Mitchell hired a crew for a voyage from Inverness to Lisbon. 
Due to poor weather, however, the ship was forced into Greenock and the crew 
deserted.27 Two of men involved, Alexander Hutton and James Violence, were vouched 
for by relations, with James’s  father, Ludovick, stating that his son would return to the 
vessel and William Hutton, a merchant burgess of Edinburgh, promising that Alexander 
would pay his  expenses.28  Inverness and its surrounding area was the Scottish port 
involved in another case regarding a journey to Lisbon in 1709, with John Roy, a 
merchant of Forres, pursuing the master of the Three Brothers of Leith, Charles 
Mitchell.29  Due to poor weather the ship had been forced to seek shelter in Autumn 
1708, with the refitting that was then required causing arguments  over expenses to 
erupt between the merchants involved and the skipper over expenses.30
 The Spanish War of Succession itself also caused problems, with Robert Gray’s 
vessel providing an instance of this. As discussed in chapter three, Gray obtained 
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insurance at Rotterdam for his ship’s onward journey to Lisbon from Benjamin Dubois.31 
Gray was sailing as part of a convoy from Rotterdam to Lisbon but that did not prevent 
his ship being taken by two French privateers before he reached Lisbon.32  A more 
complex example, while not resulting in the loss of a vessel, does provide information 
as to the difficulties involved in trading during wartime. In 1708 James Smith entered 
into a charter party with Robert Stewart and James Brebner and undertook a voyage 
from Fraserburgh to Bilbao.33  The journey was undertaken successfully, with the 
disagreements beginning upon the vessel’s return. Smith pursued Stewart and Brebner, 
arguing that they had not paid all the freight charges, namely the costs  of a Spanish 
crew who were brought onto the vessel at Bilbao.34  Smith argued that Brebner had 
attempted to obtain a French pass for the ship in order that it could complete its  journey 
in safety. However, as this could not be obtained, Smith claimed that the factor he dealt 
with in Bilbao advised getting a Spanish pass (necessitating a Spanish crew) to ensure 
the safety of the homeward voyage.35  Brebner counter argued that the charter party 
stated that Smith should have a sufficient crew. Further, the defendants pointed out that 
as the crew already onboard the vessel managed to ensure its safe arrival at Bilbao 
they should have been able to sail it back to Scotland.36  While this voyage was 
completed successfully, it does indicate the level of precaution that was undertaken and 
also the ability of merchants to find ways round the problems caused by war. 
 As Steve Murdoch has investigated, the French authorities granted passes to 
Scots and Irishmen in France, allowing them to trade despite the conflict.37 This enabled 
France to obtain necessary produce, as well as  attempt to deepen divisions between 
the Stuart kingdoms.38  Siobhan Talbott concurs, and also points out that Queen Anne 
gained a reputation for issuing passes allowing Scottish merchants  to trade with 
France.39  The gaining of a French pass (or indeed a Spanish pass), therefore, was a 
common way to continue trading during the War of Spanish Succession. Why Brebner 
could not obtain the French pass is  uncertain but Smith (and possibly the factor at 
Bilbao) obviously deemed some form of protection necessary for the home journey. 
Whether the success of the homeward journey was due to the Spanish pass  is 
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debatable; as Murdoch has shown, very few Scottish vessels  were taken by the French 
during the conflict, with over a hundred ships entering Bordeaux with French passes 
between 1707 and 1712.40 This does not include neutral vessels undertaking trade on 
behalf of Scots  or Scottish vessels disguising themselves  as neutral.41 The continuing 
affinity between the Scots and the French (as well as economic necessity) clearly 
allowed trade to France and, due to the new familial connections in Philip V, Spain to 
continue. 
 Despite both the conflict and Scotland’s own tensions with England in the early 
years of the eighteenth century, Iberian goods continued to make their way to Scotland. 
Indeed, for the gentry class  they appeared to be normal commodities and were widely 
available.  Although the case of Robert Gray shows the ill effects conflict could have on 
trade, this was far outweighed by the continuation of normal trade. A perfect example of 
this  is  given by William Fraser. Despite the political insecurity between Scotland and 
England, Fraser remained in London, continuing to trade to Iberia and sending supplies 
to the Newmills textile factory in Haddington.42  His views on Scotland’s new political 
arrangement are also clear. Writing to his cousin Robert Fraser, an advocate in 
Edinburgh, he wrote ‘you have been too long a lieut. generall of the noes as to the 
Union to expect any share in the equivalent here now’.
2. An Uneasy Peace? 1713-1726
While the war of Spanish succession was concluded by the Treaty of Utrecht, tensions 
continued to simmer between the new country of Great Britain and Spain. Spain had 
been stripped of large parts of its foreign territories, with Austria gaining the Spanish 
Italian territories, the Spanish Netherlands no longer in Spanish control, and the islands 
of Gibraltar and Minorca declared British territories. Kamen has described the loss  of 
these territories as beneficial to the Spanish economy, Spain was finally able to 
concentrate solely on itself.43  Perhaps unsurprisingly the new Bourbon monarchy did 
not consider the loss  in the same light. In particular, Philip IV’s second wife, Elizabeth 
Farnese of Italy, was single-minded in her desire to provide an inheritance for her 
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sons.44  Indeed, Charles Russell, the British consul of Cadiz wrote to the British 
authorities stating
The Treaty of Utrecht was in the opinion of most, more a cessation of hostility 
between Great Britain and Spain than a reconciliation of the motives that 
occasioned the late war.45
Further, Russell went on to discuss the effects of the War of Succession on trade stating 
that Andalusia and Castile had been reduced to dire poverty through the raising of 
soldiers and that merchant numbers had almost halved.46  By the winter of 1717 
tensions were at breaking point again, with Elizabeth’s advisor Cardinal Alberoni 
(another Italian) sending a fleet to recapture Sicily under the Marquis of Leda.47  The 
British government responded by sending a fleet under Admiral Bing and in August 
1718 the British fleet destroyed the Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro, which led to the 
Spanish authorities arresting all British ships and goods in Spain.48 For example, in an 
attempt to gain recompense several merchants of the port of Bidesford (in Devon) listed 
their losses at the hands of the Spanish in the autumn of 1718. The list consists of five 
vessels, all carrying cargoes of Newfoundland fish and ranging in value (ship and 
goods) from £1250 - £2700.49  The most valuable, the Neptune of Bidesford, was a new 
ship on her first voyage when it was seized in La Coruña in late September 1718.50 This 
led to a declaration of war by Britain and France in December 1718, compounded by 
the Spanish recognition of James Francis Edward as King of Britain.51  John Cross, 
British consul of Tenerife, also had his goods seized and wrote that if it were not for the 
timely intervention of the Bishop of the Canaries, the authorities  would have seized his 
clothes and bedding too.52 Cross also claimed that one of his own ships  was taken at 
sea in late 1718- early 1719, the Queen Anne, skippered by Thomas Gibbs.53  Other 
Scottish vessels were also seized such as the Providence, skippered by David Hawkins 
and owned by David Gordon. The ship was arrested while at Cadiz with recompense 
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valued at over £1,900 sterling. 54  Peter Fraser’s ship the Princess was detained at 
Bilbao in December of the same year with the value recorded as nearly £600 sterling.55 
In further retaliation, the Jacobite Duke of Ormond left Spain with a fleet of six ships and 
6,000 men to land in Scotland in the hope of instigating a rebellion against the 
Hanoverian George I.56  The expedition was  an abject failure and Britain and France 
responded by sending a French army led by the Duke of Berwick to invade northern 
Spain.57  Peace was  declared in 1720; nevertheless, tensions remained high: the 
Spanish had no desire to accept Gibraltar’s  new ownership and the British public 
became so attached to the peninsula that giving it up was not an option.58  
 The actions of factors representing British merchants, however, show that, while 
this  period was one of tension, merchants tried to continue as normal, with factors not 
necessarily having to be Scottish in order to represent Scottish merchants. One 
prominent example was Juan Van Duffle, a factor based in Bilbao, who organised trade 
for Scottish merchants. Van Duffle was the son of Anthony Van Duffle from Rotterdam 
and Mary Dubrocq from Bayonne in France and provided a birthbrieve in order to settle 
in Bilbao in May 1708.59  Having his hometown as Bayonne may have been useful to 
Van Duffle when he was  applying for citizenship in Bilbao as the province of Vizcaya 
and the French province of Labourd (now modern day Pyrénées-Atlantiques) made 
agreements in both 1653 and 1694 which lessened restrictions on Franco-Spanish 
trade due to war.60 John Steuart was one of the Scottish merchants who dealt with Van 
Duffle and his letters to Van Duffle show a complex trade network. In May 1712 Steuart 
wrote regarding a ship of Inverness, The Alexander, which had carried a cargo of fish to 
Bilbao, of which the proceeds had been sent to a Mr Robert Gordon of Bordeaux for the 
‘company’ account.61  As research by Steve Murdoch has shown, Gordon was  a 
prominent merchant and Jacobite sympathiser in France and assisted many Jacobite 
exiles.62  Steuart wrote that The Alexander had arrived back in Inverness, with an 
Archibald Dunbar disclosing to Steuart that a man called Archer (whom Steuart believed 
to be Van Duffle’s partner) had requested orders regarding the proceeds of a packet of 
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fish.63 According to records at the archives in Bilbao this Archer could refer to one of two 
gentlemen. The first was Michael Archer who provided a birthbrieve in 1731 and had 
married a Mary Geraldino in Bilbao in 1716.64  The second, John Archer, was also 
named in records of the Archivo Foral de Bizkala; unfortunately there is, as  yet, no 
indication as to which man Steuart was discussing.65  Whichever Archer was  involved, 
Steuart wrote to Van Duffle that he wanted the money to be sent to Alexander Andrew.66 
He also asked that in the future any money was to be sent to either London or 
Rotterdam (likely to George Outcherlony and Alexander Andrew) and not to Robert 
Gordon.67 Steuart finally requested information regarding the market for fish in Bilbao in 
the year 1712 as there was a surplus of fish in Scotland that year.68 Steuart continued 
other trade for some years, corresponding with both George Outcherlony in London and 
Alexander Andrew in Rotterdam and did not contact Van Duffle again until April 1721. 
He again enquired after the state of the market in Bilbao. He further wrote that he had 
received Van Duffle’s  letter of August 1720 in which he advised not to send any fish or 
salmon to Bilbao as it would not sell.69 In June 1721 Steuart once more requested the 
state of the market at Bilbao in regards to fish and Baltic goods.70 Considering the other 
occasions where Steuart discussed sending goods to Bilbao, it is highly likely that their 
correspondence was a regular one. For example, in March 1721 Steuart wrote to 
George Urquhart of Cromarty suggesting that he send his cod-fish and salmon to Bilbao 
where the salmon ‘might pass for new fish’.71 
 Steuart was not the only Scot with whom Van Duffle dealt; in October 1714 
another group of merchants from Inverness, Dumoor and Company, sent 
correspondence to Bilbao. In this letter the power of recommendation is very much in 
evidence, with it being noted that Van Duffle was being contacted due to the 
recommendation by Thomas Robertson of Inverness.72  Dumoor and Co. were to send 
over 400 barrels  of fish (cod and salmon) in the vessel The Alexander, with it being 
requested that Duffle load the vessel with 30-35 tons of Portuguese salt before it sailed 
199
63 Mackay, The Letter Book, 18-9. 12 May 1712
64 AFB, Bilbao Antigua, 0397/001/003. 1731. 
65 Ibid, 0082/002/003/010. 1730.
66 Mackay, The Letter Book, 18-9. 12 May 1712. 
67 Ibid, It is not clear why Steuart did not want money to be remitted to Gordon. It was not due to Gordon’s 
Jacobite sentiments as Steuart was also sympathetic to the Jacobite cause. It may therefore have been a 
purely practical agreement.
68 Ibid, 18-9. 12 May 1712.
69 Ibid, 146-7. 7 April 1721.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, 141-2. 17 March 1721. 
72 NAS, GD23/6/26. Dumoor & Co. to Juan Van Duffle, 18 October 1714.
to St Martines in France.73 The merchants also requested that, when the vessel arrived 
in Bilbao, Van Duffle contact Robert Gordon of Bordeaux so that he could have the 
cargo to be collected in St Martines ready for loading.74  The letter shows just how 
complicated business transactions could be: as well as  requesting that Duffle load the 
salt and inform Gordon that the vessel had arrived, Duffle was also instructed to pay the 
master.75 However, if this was not possible then a bill was to be sent to Amsterdam and 
London.76 Van Duffle was an experienced trader as the records held at Archivo Foral de 
Bizkala show. Much like the Scottish High Court of Admiralty, the surviving documents in 
this  Spanish archive regarding trade dealings predominantly concern disputes. From 
this  it can be seen that Van Duffle had trading relations with Spanish, French and 
English merchants.77  Van Duffle clearly had contact with several Scottish merchants, 
not all of them based in Scotland. Robert Gordon traded from Bordeaux while, as 
shown in chapter three, Van Duffle probably corresponded with Alexander Andrew in 
Rotterdam. 
 Trade disagreements also continued to occur. In 1718 James Graham, merchant 
of Anstruther, pursued Philip Brown, the master of the John of Anstruther, for non-
fulfilment of a charter party.78 Brown had entered into a charter party in November 1715 
with Graham and was chartered to sail to Bruges with coal, reload with any 
merchandise he thought convenient and then sail to Sebútal and collect a cargo of salt 
before sailing to a safe port in the Forth of Firth. Graham stated that Brown was  guilty of 
failing to ply the voyage which had been agreed in the charter party and, further, that 
Brown had not paid any of the proceeds. Brown argued that he had sailed to Wemyss to 
collect the cargo of coals  and had waited for instructions from Graham, which never 
came. He then sailed to Anstruther to pick up the rest of his cargo but had to put into the 
harbour at Elie. While there, Brown claimed that the ship was seized by Captain 
O’Brian, commander of a Royal Navy vessel. Brown alleged that O’Brian took the 
vessel and the crew to Leith as  he suspected them of being part of the ‘rebellion’, 
presumably the 1715 Jacobite rebellion. He then claimed he was not released until 
February 1716 and, ergo, it was not his fault that he could not execute his voyage in the 
correct time and, therefore, ‘the pursuer only has himself to blame and he ought to 
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make up the damage the defender sustained in that matter’. Brown further attempted to 
bolster his defence by including a letter from William Poyntz, ‘consul general for his 
majesty of Great Britain in this kingdom and dominions of Portugal’, in June 1716. 
Poyntz stated that Brown had told him that there were no orders left for him at Bruges 
or Lisbon and that Brown,
declared in my presence that, he did protest, against the said James 
Graham, for all costs, losses and damage that he hath sustain, or may 
happen to sustain, for the said Grahams not performing the tenure of his 
charter party.79 
Graham responded to these claims by arguing that he was unconcerned about the 
treatment that Brown received from Captain O’Brian as  Brown was not supposed to sail 
to Elie. He further argued that the charter party made clear what Brown’s instructions 
were, which negated the need for any further instructions, and that ‘the protest at Lisbon 
cannot be regarded because St Ubes & not Lisbon was the port of discharge fixed by 
charter party’.80 The High Court of Admiralty agreed with Graham and ordered Brown to 
pay Graham £4500 Scots as well as £50 costs.
 A voyage from Cadiz to Leith was the subject of another disagreement when 
James Barclay, master of Leith, pursued Robert Wightman, a merchant of Edinburgh.81 
Barclay was master of the Mary of London, which had sailed to Cadiz and brought to 
Scotland a cargo of Iberian goods.82 Barclay was due payment for a third of the cargo 
by Robert Wightman, dean of the guild of Edinburgh, amounting to the sum of over 
£400 sterling.83  In this case Robert Wightman was ordered to appear before the 
Admiralty Court.
 A Portuguese case study is provided by Edward and John Main. Although the 
nationality of the Main family cannot be identified with certainty it is highly likely that 
they were Scottish. A letter from Edward Main to William Stirling of Herbertshire (near 
modern day Denny) discusses the purchase of lands in Powhouse.84 In the letter Main 
discusses the sale of Stirling’s  lands to his brother William on his  behalf and thanks 
Stirling for ‘giving me ye preference of said sale to other than had an equal view with 
me’, suggesting some prior personal connection.85  As discussed in chapter three 
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Edward Main was in Lisbon by 1723 at the very latest, acting as  Lisbon factor on behalf 
of James Murray with Robert Trail the skipper charged with disposing Murray’s cargo of 
coal with Main.86  In 1730 a dispute between Richard Brown, master of the Joseph of 
Berwick, and John Baird, a merchant of Leith, also involved Edward and John Main.87 
The Main’s were to receive cargo of coal from Newcastle/Limekilns on Baird’s  behalf.88 
The Main’s  continued acting as factors during the 1740s with two further cases 
highlighting their continued activities.89 
2.1 Mark Pringle 
An informative case study of this period, and the typical activities of a British consul, is 
encapsulated in the example of Mark Pringle. Pringle was a British consul in Andalusia 
albeit his appointment did not arise without some problems. Charles Russell, the 
previous consul, died very suddenly, it appears, on 8 August 1721 and within days there 
was a clamouring both for his post and for his  replacement.90  On 12 August Thomas 
Bradyll wrote to John Carteret, second Earl of Granville and the new secretary for the 
southern affairs.91  While appearing to show sympathy and concern upon Russell’s 
death, the letter’s primary aim was to attempt to get Carteret to appoint Bradley as his 
replacement.92 In fact, Bradley even alluded to a previous attempt to take-over Russell’s 
position, writing
I humbly beg yor Ldship will be pleas’d to give me leave to renew the 
pretensions I made to that consulship in the late Mr Secretary Craiggs time 
and to suspend the grant of it to any else until my arrivall.93 
 A day earlier twenty members of the British merchant community at Cadiz signed a 
document requesting that Mark Pringle be appointed as interim consul. Pringle was 
described as a ‘proper person & well qualified.... who has resided in this country several 
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years’.94 This request, however, was dismissed by the Judge Conservator of ‘England’, 
Manuel Torres.95  In a consultation held in Madrid on the matter two members of the 
‘English’ merchant community in Cadiz, Thomas Butler and Daniel Bernard (whose 
signatures appear on the request from the British merchant community), stated that the 
removal of Mark Pringle from the post of interim consul was  to the detriment of 
merchants, who described Pringle as being ‘the only man of intelligence and confidence 
in San Lucar’.96 The Spanish authorities disagreed with Torres  and pointed out that in 
other cases where the consul had died or suffered an accident an interim had been 
appointed prior to official royal appointment from Britain.97 Thus Pringle could stay in the 
position until an appointment was  made, which occurred when David Foulis was named 
consul, presumably in the spring of 1722.98 At this point Pringle was not present in the 
official British records of Spanish consuls.99 
 Pringle was not entirely cast aside upon the appointment of Foulis, as  Foulis’s 
letters  to Lord Carteret show. From his arrival in Spain and indeed, on the journey to 
Spain Foulis  battled with ill health, spending ten days in quarantine onboard the ship 
before being allowed on land and having spent at least a week in Cadiz before feeling 
well enough to travel to San Lucar.100 By February of the following year Foulis appeared 
no better, writing that he was unable to travel to Seville due to his health which ‘has 
reduced me to so weak a condition that I am not yet able to stir abroad’.101  He stated 
that once he was well enough to travel he would journey to Seville and appoint 
someone there to act in his  stead.102  In late spring of 1724 Foulis  was so ill that he 
requested, and was granted, permission to travel to Montpellier for his health, leaving 
Mark Pringle in charge.103  Foulis did not return until December 1724 despite having 
stated in his letter that he would return by the end of September when the year’s busiest 
trade began.104  If Foulis  was as unwell as he claimed to be, and was sincere in his 
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description of Mark Pringle as ‘truly zealous in his majesty’s service and the trade of his 
subjects’, then May to December 1724 was probably not the only time Pringle was 
asked to step in for Foulis.105 Interestingly, David Foulis  was the son of James Foulis, a 
prominent Scottish merchant based in London, implying that the world of international 
trade was probably familiar to him.106 As Steve Murdoch has examined at length, simply 
being Scottish may have been enough to recommend Pringle to Foulis.107 While there is 
no evidence of it in this case, the Scottish merchant community was, in other parts of 
Europe, tight-knit and it is  acknowledged that ‘Scots  would help and entertain Scots 
simply for the sake of their nationality’.108  With such a small ‘British’ merchant 
community in Iberia, and an even smaller Scottish contingent, it would be surprising if 
Pringle and Foulis’s shared nationality was not a bond between them and did not assist 
Pringle in some way. 
  In October 1727 there was a consultation approving Pringle as the British consul 
in Seville and San Lucar following the death of David Foulis, with the Spanish Council 
recognising the original patent dispatched by King George on 31 October 1726.109 
Interestingly, the document notes that in the reign of Carlos II there had been two 
consuls  and that a Mr Thomas Rumbol had acted as consul in San Lucar, however, the 
Council decreed that the area should only be served by one consul.110 A letter written in 
November 1726, from Sir John Clerk to Father Clerk in Spain, already recommended 
Pringle as ‘one of our consuls  in Spain’, suggesting the appointment had been 
confirmed.111 In December 1727, however, Pringle was having problems convincing the 
Spanish of his appointment as another man, Daniel O’Brien, was trying to collect 
consular fees, arguing that they had been charged incorrectly to Mark Pringle, who had 
been acting as consul without approval.112 Pringle himself alluded to the difficulties  in a 
letter to Thomas Pelham Holles, the Duke of Newcastle, in July 1727 stating that, when 
he was presented at Madrid by William Stanhope, ‘the court was deaf to all the 
204
105 Ibid. David Foulis to John Carteret, 7 May 1724.
106 NAS, RH15/14/37/6. David Foulis signed numerous documents on his father’s behalf in London in the 
late seventeenth century. The signatures of these documents and those from his time as consul are 
remarkably similar. 
107 Murdoch, Network North, 77-82. 
108 Ibid, 78. 
109 AHN, Estado 641, Exp. 18, 07 July 1727 
110 Ibid. 
111 NAS, GD18/5351. Sir John Clerk to Father Clerk, 17 November 1726. Father Clerk is likely to be 
Father William Clerk who was the Confessor to King of Spain (It is unknown whether this was Philip or his 
son Louis - who was king for a short while before his untimely death from smallpox - following Louis’s 
death Philip took the throne again). See The Scots Magazine, 1739-1803 5 (Edinburgh, 1743), 428. Many 
thanks to David Dobson for this information.
112 AHN, Estado 641, Exp. 26,10 December 1727.
memorialls [patents showing his  position] presented’.113 This went on into 1728, with a 
consultation on the measures to be carried out against both Pringle and O’Brien for the 
return of consular fees  they had charged.114  A further letter in July 1730 regards a 
consultation on the fine and seizure carried out against Pringle, who had been 
appointed without the proper documentation.115 This took place on 14 September 1730 
with Mark Pringle recorded as being due money from the Spanish authorities due to the 
sale of his effects which was ordered by the Governor of San Lucar.116  However, from 
the British point of view, Mark Pringle was the royally appointed consul of the British 
nation in San Lucar and is listed in the British state papers as being so.117  Thus the 
episode caused anger in Britain, with the Duke of Newcastle writing to Walpole 
regarding the issue. Newcastle wrote
you will have seen by them with what violence the King of Spain’s officer at 
San Lucar have proceeded against Mr Pringle his Majesty’s consul there, I 
shall have the Kings Orders to write in very strong terms to Mr Keene upon 
this subject.118 
Confusingly, throughout this  period of uncertainty, Pringle was described in other official 
Spanish documentation as being a consul for the British nation.119 For his part, Pringle 
continued his consular duties, writing to Newcastle in March 1730 and discussing 
passes which ships  required for the Mediterranean due to the actions of North African 
corsairs.120 
 Surviving documentation involving Pringle gives a good insight into the duties 
and activities  of a consul during this  time. In 1732 a dispute between a skipper and a 
supercargo shows the assistance that Pringle gave individual merchants. In October 
1731 John Carmichael had entered into a charter party with skipper Robert Dawling.121 
Dawling was to sail to Rotterdam and then on to San Lucar under Carmichael’s 
instruction; however, when the ship arrived in Rotterdam and while in the house of a Mr 
Andrew (probably Alexander Andrew) an altercation arose and Dawling allegedly 
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threatened to depart with the ship and leave Carmichael to fend for himself.122  Dawling 
then disappeared with the vessel but was found by Carmichael as he had been 
detained after having sailed to Briel.123 Despite Dawling’s behaviour Carmichael knew 
he was in danger of losing the market and, after writing to James Paterson, the trustee 
for the owners of the ship, to inform him of the situation, the ship set sail for Spain with 
Dawling still at the helm. Paterson replied and gave Carmichael permission to transfer 
control of the vessel to the mate, Thomas Kay. Thus Carmichel called upon Pringle’s 
assistance to deal with Dawling. Dawling was given the opportunity to be relieved of his 
post, with the wages he was due, and passage on a ship sailing to England the 
following day.124  He would be paid full wages until the vessel landed and have a 
declaration from Pringle dated 26 March (presumably to ensure he would be paid).125 
This  offer was refused by Dawling; perhaps he realised the damage that such an 
incident could cause to his reputation, combined with the likelihood that he would not 
receive his wages. Whatever the reason, Dawling boarded the vessel and attempted to 
assume command, which ended with Carmichael putting him ashore.126  The Admiralty 
Court ruled in Carmichael’s favour with Dawling ordered to pay over £300 Sterling both 
for damages and legal costs  - although considering his behaviour he was lucky not to 
be charged with piracy.127 
 In addition to his role as consul, Pringle continued to remain active in trade, 
sometimes blurring the consular and merchant’s role. In November 1738 Robert 
Mackenzie was chartered by George Sandilands and William Knox in Bordeaux (on 
behalf of John Grant, a merchant in Edinburgh) to sail to San Lucar and ‘receive a full 
cargo of such goods as Mark Pringle Esq. should think proper to load’ before sailing to 
Leith.128 When Mackenzie arrived in San Lucar, Pringle instructed him to sail from there 
to ‘la Puebla’. Mackenzie therefore claimed the cost of this  extra part of the journey as 
well as a third of the port charge.129 Interestingly, a bill of lading written by Mark Pringle 
in January 1739 did not indicate this extra part of the voyage, only recording that 
Mackenzie was to sail from Bonanza to Leith.130  The bill of lading also recorded the 
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cargo that was loaded on to the vessel: ‘two hundred chests of sour oranges, twenty 
chests  of china oranges: twenty chests of lemmons & ten barrells figgs & six jarrs 
olives’.131  According to the Spanish State Papers, Pringle was still acting as consul as 
late as December 1752, marking an impressively long career.132  A lawsuit between 
Pringle’s second wife and sons against his  son by his first marriage shows that Pringle 
returned from Spain in 1755 and retired to London.133 It also documents that he bought 
the estate of Crichton in Midlothian in 1737; however, upon his death in June 1761 the 
estate had debts of over £7,500 sterling.134 As is common, there was some confusion 
regarding the nation that Pringle represented, with it being listed in separate documents 
that he represented the English, Scottish and British nations. It is clear from this 
assessment of Pringle’s activities  that a consul’s role was very varied: as well as 
assisting merchants locally, he dealt with disputes, such as the one between 
Carmichael and Dawling, passed military information back to Britain and continued to 
trade himself. Further, despite the tensions of the period Pringle and other merchants 
carried on their business as best they could. 
3. The Gibraltar Crisis: Diplomats and Merchants. 
The political tensions regarding the state of Gibraltar, which had so dogged British-
Spanish relations  post-1713, eventually resulted in conflict over the rock in the first 
months of 1727.  The loss of territories which were essentially on the Spanish mainland 
was more than a thorn in the side of the Spanish Crown, it was an insult. Historically, 
the 1727 attack against Gibraltar has been portrayed as dismally ineffective and 
presented as a footnote in the wider history of British-Spanish relations. Much of the 
historiography regarding the incident is outdated, and the subject of British foreign 
policy in the late 1720s, in general, requires  serious scholarship, as  has been pointed 
out by Jeremy Black.135  Coverage of the 1727 siege is limited to a handful of 
publications which are disappointingly frugal in their description of the events. John 
Drinkwater published a history of several Gibraltar sieges in 1785; however, his only 
note regarding the 1727 siege was that a failure by the Spanish to cut off links  to the 
sea meant that Gibraltar was still able to receive supplies.136  In 1935 Arthur 
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McCandless Wilson wrote only that the siege was ‘badly conducted... and the casualties 
of the British resulted principally from the explosion of their own guns’.137 Jeremy Black 
similarly stated only that ‘both sides sought to intimidate the other and many feared war, 
though actual hostilities were restricted to an unsuccessful Spanish siege at Gibraltar in 
1727’.138  While general political histories of the period do not give the event much 
attention, local histories of Gibraltar are more forthcoming. 
 Having lost almost the entirety of his  navy at Cape Passaro, Philip V of Spain 
asked his military advisors if Gibraltar could be recaptured without naval support. His 
most experienced military commanders made it clear that without naval support any 
attack would fail as it would be impossible to stop the British settlement from gaining 
supplies.139  Unfortunately for Philip, the young Count of Las Torres advised that a 
ground assault would be all that was needed and, despite a lack of military experience 
he was appointed in command.140  Perhaps  unsurprisingly, the siege was unsuccessful, 
with the British never lacking for supplies and Torres’s force finding it impossible to 
break through the fortress’s defences.141  Indeed, despite digging for almost 17 weeks, 
Spanish forces failed to expand a cave (which they planned to use as a mine) by more 
than a few meters - the limestone rock providing one of the best defences for the 
British.142  However, the British did have problems, mainly in a lack of men to complete 
repairs.143  By 23 June, though, an Irish colonel serving with the Spanish approached 
under a flag of truce, and a cessation to hostilities was agreed in the following days.144 
 The purpose of this section is to investigate the effect of this siege upon 
diplomacy and trade. Initially, the activities of David Dunbar in the prelude to event are 
examined and, in particular, Dunbar’s secondary role as an informer for the British 
government. The effect of this conflict upon trade is then considered, with particular 
reference to the Christian and its supercargo Edward Burd. This provides a stark 
comparison between how the diplomats considered the tensions with Spain and the 
reactions of merchants. 
 The case of David Dunbar is a prominent example of the rising tension between 
Britain and Spain in 1726. Dunbar was the British consul in San Sebastian and sent 
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numerous letters to important statesmen, such as the British ambassador to Spain 
William Stanhope, Henry Pelham Thomas, Duke of Newcastle and Secretary of State, 
and Robert Walpole. Dunbar’s letters  provided important information regarding the 
military capabilities of Spain and became more detailed as 1726 wore on, to the 
consul’s great personal disadvantage. In April 1726, for example, Dunbar wrote about 
the fortifications of the town of San Sebastian, stating 
the town is lately fortified with high & strong walls, and newly crowded wth 
soldiers there being 3 battalions.... the troops here are kept to strict duty & 
every single person examined by the sentry. I find that all are very 
apprehensive of war.145
The following month, in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Dunbar provided a more 
detailed description, which also included a report of a shipyard where a ship of 80 guns 
had been launched in January but still required masts and rigging.146 According to this 
communication two other vessels of 36 guns were ready to sail, two of 70 guns were 
preparing to launch, with two of 40 guns being built.147  Being so close to the French 
border, a traditional point of strife for Spain, troops were common in the area, and 
Dunbar commented ‘there are many horse & foot in this province as make up fifteen 
thousand men, sent hither to prevent any invasion from France’.148 In early May Dunbar 
was given instructions by ‘the English ambassador at Madrid’ regarding a Frenchman, 
Count Lambilly, who left Madrid on the first of the month in very suspicious 
circumstances.149  The request, presumably from William Stanhope, instructed Dunbar 
to attempt to discover the whereabouts  of the man, whom it was believed would try and 
board a ship to Holland.150  He was believed to have been sent by the Spanish court 
with a secret commission and had been given ‘a great sum of money in gold’.151 
Naturally, Dunbar was expected to ensure that his enquiries did not attract the attention 
of the Spanish authorities.152 
 In spite of this secrecy, the Spanish were already suspicious of Dunbar’s true 
reason for being in San Sebastian. He wrote at the end of May that the masters of three 
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English vessels told him that they had been ordered by the mayor of the town not to pay 
Dunbar his  duties.153  The merchants went on to say that as Dunbar had made no 
demand of ‘consulage on the vessels I found here it was thought I did not come on that 
account’.154  Dunbar told the masters  to pay him what he was due and that if they 
refused he would complain to the Secretary of State.155  This did not prevent Dunbar 
from continuing his more covert duties and, following the arrest of the Duke of Ripperda 
at William Stanhope’s house in Madrid in late May, he pursued these tasks with even 
more zeal.  
 After the bizarre triumph of the Treaty of Vienna, Ripperda’s career came to a 
sudden end when it transpired that he had not only made promises he was not 
permitted to make but had also managed to defraud the Spanish monarchy. He sought 
refuge in Stanhope’s  residence and, in an attempt to gain the British ambassador’s 
support, supplied sensitive information. However, Walpole could not protect him and 
Ripperda was taken from the ambassador’s house and sent to the castle of Segovia.156 
In conjunction, Dunbar reported to the Duke of Newcastle from San Sebastian on 31 
May that an express sent by Stanhope was intercepted at Vitoria and taken back to 
Madrid.157  On 4 June Dunbar wrote to Horatio Walpole concerning the steps he was 
taking in order to verify the report. He wrote that he had sent his servant to Vitoria, 
carrying letters  to merchants in order to disguise the real reason for the journey, which 
was to ascertain whether the story of Ripperda’s arrest was true. Further, once the 
servant had returned, Dunbar planned to go to Bayonne in order to warn any 
messenger carrying an express from Britain and secure any messages to Madrid.158 
According to his own letter Dunbar must have left for Bayonne on 4 June and, as well 
as his intentions to warn any messengers, he met with Benjamin Keene, who had been 
appointed consul-general at Madrid in 1724.159 
 By 18 June Dunbar back was in San Sebastian and stated that the town 
authorities were unhappy with his  presence due to his training as an engineer and 
involvement in the siege of San Sebastian in the regiment of the Duke of Berwick.160 By 
late June and early July the benevolent quality with which Dunbar had previously 
discussed the Spanish military preparations was replaced with a more aggressive tone. 
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On 2 July Dunbar referred to Spanish troops as ‘rats’ and remarked that one ‘English’ 
regiment would beat four or five Spanish ones.161  A few days later Dunbar assisted the 
British messenger, Mr Storer, in disguising his documents. Dunbar made him a bundle 
of blank letters, appropriately wrapped and sealed. If Mr Storer was stopped on the way 
to Madrid it was then hoped that handing over this  fake bundle would give him time to 
dispose of or destroy the real one.162  Ten days later Dunbar was again in France, this 
time sending Horatio Walpole a detailed report that he had received from his servant. 
While his  servant believed there were 20,000 Spanish troops ready for action, Dunbar 
offered his opinion that there was a smaller number, perhaps only as many as 
10-12,000. Nevertheless, Dunbar did write that the previously mentioned warships were 
ready to sail and only awaited a convoy from Cadiz before Dunbar believed they would 
sail to England.163  Finally, Dunbar discussed his own position, stating that the Spanish 
were suspicious of his  activities  believing that he was a colonel in a regiment and 
remarking that, after he had left for Bayonne, the town mayor had requested to see him. 
Dunbar’s opinion of the Spanish reached a new low, and his closing remark stated: ‘the 
Spaniards are a base treacherous, cowardly people if they have any jealously of a man 
they dispatch him from behind a bush’.164 
 Despite his assertions that he would not return to Spain, Dunbar was clearly 
ordered to by the British government and by 30 July he had dispatched a letter to 
Walpole stating that, upon his  return to the San Sebastian, two men came to his 
lodgings late at night and told him that he was to come immediately as the town’s mayor 
wanted to see him. Dunbar replied that it was late and that he would call upon the 
mayor in the morning but the men insisted.165 Upon meeting the mayor Dunbar was told 
that Philip V desired him to go to Salamanca. Dunbar sensed that the Spanish 
authorities wanted him away from where he could observe their military preparations 
and tried to refuse. He argued that while the King of Spain could order him to be 
removed from the country he could not order where he went in the country and that the 
British authorities would not be happy at this treatment of him. Finally, Dunbar agreed to 
go, but on the proviso that he was provided with a written order to do so. 
Understandably, the mayor was reluctant to provide such an order, arguing that his 
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verbal command was sufficient.166  Dunbar received the passport the following day, 
however, he still had no written order and complained that the passport offered gave 
him no distinction as a gentleman. It was then replied that he could have whatever titles 
he desired but that he would not receive written orders to leave. Dunbar stood his 
ground, though, and eventually received the written order to leave, which he could 
produce if questioned by his colleagues about his removal from San Sebastian.167 
 Dunbar did initially go to Salamanca and William Stanhope wrote to the Duke of 
Newcastle on 18 September that he had presented a memorial to Philip V regarding 
Dunbar’s situation.168  Dunbar had clearly not spent long in Salamanca as he was in 
Madrid by this  point and wrote to Walpole regarding court gossip.169  Dunbar stayed at 
Madrid until December, with Stanhope writing to Newcastle in October that his  memorial 
regarding Dunbar’s  situation had not received any answer.170  In early December, and 
having acquired intelligence regarding the Spanish plans  to attack Gibraltar, Stanhope 
commissioned Dunbar to take the information to Malaga and board a vessel for 
Gibraltar, carrying letters  addressed to the governor of Gibraltar, Richard Kane, and to 
Admiral Edward Hopson.171  According to Nicholas Holloway, the British consul for 
Malaga, Dunbar arrived on 14 December and stayed there for four days  until he could 
get passage on a ship returning to Britain, the Grape.172  He boarded the vessel that 
evening and the ship departed. However, due to the calm weather it did not get far from 
the shore before the governor of Malaga gave chase with two small boats filled with 
armed men. Dunbar was then brought ashore by force and imprisoned, with Holloway 
not allowed to see him. 
 When Holloway protested at Dunbar’s treatment he was told that Dunbar had 
been arrested as  he had been concealed in Holloway’s house and had not sought an 
audience with the governor to obtain permission to leave.173  Holloway replied that 
permission to leave had never been required before and that he looked upon the matter 
as an ‘act of hostility’. The governor responded that he was only accountable to Philip V 
and that the British and Spanish were ‘en visperado guerra’.174  The order to arrest 
Dunbar appeared to come directly from the Spanish king, with an undated document 
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requesting the governor of Malaga to arrest and detain Dunbar.175  The news reached 
Stanhope, who wrote to the Duke of Newcastle that he had met with the Marque de la 
Paz, detailing the violations that he believed had occurred.176  Stanhope stated that an 
ambassador’s passport had been violated as  well his  letters seized, and, further, a 
British vessel under British colours on the open seas had been boarded by an armed 
force.177  Despite this, the Marques de la Paz would not accept any memorial from 
Stanhope, regardless of Stanhope’s insistence that his refusal to accept the memorial 
and the acts involving Dunbar essentially amounted to a declaration of war.178  By 6 
January Stanhope had still not received any answer or obtained ‘any satisfaction for the 
outrage or affront put on him [Dunbar]’.179  For the Spanish part, the Marques de la Paz 
wrote that Dunbar was  being kept in the Mayor’s house, which was described as better 
accommodation than the town’s prison.180  Despite Stanhope’s  complaints, Dunbar 
remained imprisoned and the Marques de la Paz stated that he was under orders  not to 
discuss the matter.181 Meanwhile, reports  from Nicholas Holloway indicated that Dunbar 
was not receiving the treatment appropriate to a man of his status. Dunbar was not 
permitted to see anyone and his treatment was said to be severe.182  The political 
situation was, at this point, extremely strained and on 11 March 1727 William Stanhope 
left Madrid for Bayonne.183  Diplomatic efforts to free Dunbar had come to a standstill, 
with the political situation between the two countries now on a war footing. 
 Dunbar was, however, released just a few days before William Stanhope left 
Madrid. It is  unclear why he was released; the Spanish authorities  may have decided 
that as they were moving their military forces into position around Gibraltar there was no 
need for secrecy and thus Dunbar posed no threat. On 7 March Dunbar wrote to 
Charles Delafaye stating that he had been released after 88 days in close confinement. 
He went on to say that he had been ordered to leave Spain but was to go via the 
‘frontiers of France’.184 On 19 March he reached Madrid and despite being under orders 
to leave the country, he still found the time to bring himself up to date with the gossip of 
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the court.185 He also wrote that he had been provided with a new passport but had been 
forbidden to return to San Sebastian; by May, at the latest, Dunbar was back on British 
soil.186 
 Dunbar’s lengthy escapade shows the dual roles which a consul could be 
expected to perform. Primarily, Dunbar’s job was to provide support to British merchants 
and, through his  extensive correspondence, we can see that he did carry out his 
consular duties in this regard. However, as 1726 wore on and tensions between Britain 
and Spain continued to rise, Dunbar’s role shifted from consul to spy. He provided ever 
more detailed descriptions of the mobilization of Spanish troops, artillery and ships. 
How much of the information he provided was already public knowledge is not clear; 
however, the Spanish authorities clearly thought him dangerous. They ordered him to 
leave the coast and, when it became apparent he was carrying letters for the governor 
of Gibraltar, went to the trouble of chasing his  vessel and arresting him - although the 
letters  were not recovered. Dunbar was not alone in passing on information to the 
British authorities: Nicholas Holloway also discussed the encampment of around 6,000 
soldiers near Gibraltar and reported that it was believed that a council of war would be 
held in the coming days.187  In February the consul of La Coruña, John Parker, wrote to 
the Duke of Newcastle: ‘I shall zealously observe what your Grace Commands me and 
take the proparest methods to get information of all that passes in any part of the 
country’.188  Mark Pringle also contributed, writing to John Norris  in Lisbon that the 
Spanish fleet was ‘abominably manned’; this  letter was sent to the Duke of Newcastle in 
April 1727.189  Even once the immediate situation had been calmed, information still 
periodically made its way from consuls in Spain to the British authorities. In July 1735 
Pringle stated that he would follow instructions given by John Norris in Lisbon, which 
requested that he pass on information which ‘may be for his majesties service’.190  He 
wrote that several regiments had passed through San Lucar on their way to the border 
with Portugal.191  Clearly, consular duties  were varied and not merely confined to the 
protection of merchants, with consuls  providing a flow of information for the British 
authorities.
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  At a diplomatic level the build-up of tension in 1726 was considered 
incredibly dangerous; however, as  Edward Burd’s journal shows, merchants considered 
the event to be more of an inconvenience. As mentioned in previous chapters, Edward 
Burd was a prolific skipper and trader who had been involved in Iberian trade for some 
time. This was probably why Burd was appointed as supercargo by William Carmichael, 
James Newlands, Robert Dundas, William Hutton, Walter Scott, Robert Smith (all 
merchants of Edinburgh or Leith) and Robert Robertson (a merchant of Glasgow).192 
Burd had been chartered to sail from Leith to Newfoundland and on to Barcelona in the 
ship the Christian, which was owned by William Hutton and his brother Alexander, who 
was also the ship’s  skipper.193  The Christian took an impressive array of goods to 
Newfoundland, with linen, men’s  and women’s shoes, hats, stockings, buttons, capes, 
spoons and barley all part of the cargo.194  Much like the emerging American colonies 
and the Iberian islands, Newfoundland was dependent on such imports having, at this 
point, no manufactures of its own. While the journey, in general, was close to a disaster, 
due to a slow vessel, poor selling prices and damaged cargo, that there is a Spanish 
element to it, especially in 1727, is of interest.195  On Tuesday 15 November 1726 Burd 
made note of the port of Gibraltar recording, unsurprisingly, that there was a squadron 
of warships present, however he also recorded that there were ‘above 30 sail of 
merchantmen’.196  Despite the threat of war, merchants were obviously continuing their 
business and Burd wrote that,
I thought it best to make use of it [a fair wind] & to proceed for Barcelona, 
seeing at this  time there was noe Declaration of Warr, & that the Governour 
had said he believed wee would be verry safe to offer for a mercate in any 
Port of Spaine.197
Before leaving Gibraltar Burd wrote to Mark Pringle, who was one of the factors 
involved in the journey. In this letter Burd stated, that, due to a lack of orders from 
Pringle (which were expected to be at Gibraltar), he had decided to sail for Barcelona 
and that on the return to the south of the country he expected to receive from Pringle 40 
butts of Spanish wine and fruit.198 It was not until 5 December that the Christian made it 
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to Barcelona.199 Burd then went ashore with a letter from the shareholders addressed to 
a Mr William French, which asked for assistance with selling the cargo of fish, 
purchasing cork and remitting the rest of the proceeds of the fish to Pringle in San 
Lucar.200  As  appears  to be the norm, Burd was given lee-way and allowed to use his 
best judgement and, thus, entered into a discussion with Mr French on 24 December as 
to whether it was best to send the money to Mark Pringle or to send it with Burd and the 
ship.201  Burd, taking the advice of French, decided to remit the money to Pringle and 
$4500 were sent; however, the cork was proving impossible to obtain and thus Burd 
had agreed to take wine to Gibraltar on behalf of a Richard Neiland.202  He also took 
wine to Cadiz for William Windar, the British consul in Barcelona, and several other 
individuals, which detained the ship in Barcelona for far longer than was intended.203 
Thankfully, for the historian, while this was bad for the ship’s  shareholders, it allowed 
Burd to make observations of the port of Barcelona.  
 In his journal Burd wrote that ‘the imports  into this place consists chiefly in dryed 
cod fish from Scotland, Newfoundland & New England & c’.204  Burd went on to write 
that 
Scots fish never fails  to sell here..more than any fish that come to this place, 
The reason they give for it is this; that the Scots fish allways  stand the 
summer better than any other.205
He also documented the factors in Barcelona, and recorded that Windar & Ferrand 
along with Dutch Consul dealt with the majority of the trade from England.206  Gregory 
French was described as receiving trade from Ireland and some Scottish trade, and 
Burd wrote that he was better than the other factors as he was ‘a denizon of Barcelona, 
& of the popish religion’.207  Of the fourteen ships that Burd recorded six were carrying 
Scots fish, with the names of the merchants involved also recorded in some cases. 
Robert McLeish’s ship was first to arrive, followed by another vessel carrying Scottish 
fish. More ships anchored at Barcelona bearing Scottish fish on board, John McLeish’s 
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was one of them and George Ouchterlony’s another. While the first known account of 
Ouchterlony is his venture with John Steuart, it is probable that he had traded with 
Barcelona prior to this, mainly as he knew who Steuart should contact at Barcelona to 
assist with the sale. The information that Burd provided is interesting for two main 
reasons. Firstly, it shows that Scottish vessels did indisputably have a significant trade 
with ports in Spain. Six vessels  out of fourteen (not including the Christian) are 
indicative of a serious trade and not merely an opportunistic venture. Secondly, it also 
shows that despite the rising political tensions and the military preparations of the 
Spanish authorities against Gibraltar, trade was continuing as normal. Moreover, 
although scholarly work regarding the incident is, as previously discussed, scarce, the 
evidence relating to trade suggests that Spain was not concerned with war with Britain 
per se but merely wanted Gibraltar back. 
 When the Christian eventually made it to Gibraltar on the morning of 14 February 
the Spanish had already begun their artillery attack. It is interesting to note that Burd 
originally thought the firing from the battalion on Gibraltar to be some form of 
celebration.208 He also wrote that there were a great number of merchant ships present 
as well as the eight British warships. On this visit there was a letter waiting from Mark 
Pringle discussing how Burd was to proceed, with the current hostilities being discussed 
as more of an inconvenience than a serious threat to trade.209  Pringle suggested that 
Burd contact Richard Holroid in order to ascertain the true state of affairs as the 
information he was receiving was conflicting.210 Pringle advised against coming to Cadiz 
but stated that if Burd was determined then he was to enquire after Pringle at the house 
of Bowman & Eyre, who would direct him.211  In his  letter to Hutton and the other 
partners Burd also appeared unconcerned by the state of affairs,
The warr broke out here upon Saturday last, at which time the fort here 
began to fire upon the Enemy who are 20,000 strong lying incamped round 
this  place. I desired Mr Pringle to procure us a pass if possible; but he says 
none are granted as yet, soe that now nothing remained for the ship to do, 
but to goe for Bourdeaux.212 
As Olaf Owe Janzen has pointed out, Burd treated the whole event as a holiday, writing 
in his journal on 19 February that he had walked around the fortifications, which gave 
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him an excellent view of the Spanish encampment.213  Burd did also have business 
matters to attend to and realising that the current situation would not allow his ship to 
sail to Cadiz, he instructed Pringle to remit the money he had received from Barcelona 
to Claud Johnson in London for the account of William Hutton & co.214  Another letter 
was also dispatched to Gregory French which acquainted him with the situation at 
Gibraltar and stated that he believed Pringle had remitted $4500 back to London, which 
Burd believed, was too much and he wondered whether Mr French had sent more than 
he was meant to.215  The capture and imprisonment of Edward Hill in Malaga received 
mention too; this was blamed on the current situation, but again there was no great 
alarm expressed and Burd quickly moved on to discuss business matters.216 While Burd 
appeared to be highly unconcerned at the unfolding events Alexander Hutton, master of 
the Christian and brother to one of the shareholders, was not so content. On 27 
February the men quarrelled, with Hutton stating that he wished to leave and sail for 
Leith, avoiding the Channel and sailing round the top of Scotland.217 When Burd replied 
that it would be ‘inconvenient’, Hutton apparently told him to ‘mind his own business’.218 
Burd advised him that if he was determined to go he should take goods and passengers 
to Lisbon and then load fruit, salt and wine there before going home, but Hutton was 
determined to go directly to Leith.219  Poor weather prevented Hutton from leaving 
immediately and gave him time to rethink his decision and, on 1 March, a number of 
merchant ships were able to leave Gibraltar under convoy, with more following a few 
days later.220 Finally, on 14 March the Christian left Gibraltar in convoy, with an unknown 
number of British ships, sailing to Bordeaux. Burd and the ship parted company, Hutton 
and the Christian sailed on to St. Martine-de-Ré and Burd meandered back to Britain 
via Paris.221
218
213 Janzen, ‘A Scottish Sack Ship’, 11; NAS, RH9/14/102, 19 February 1727. 
214 Ibid. Copy of a letter from Edward Burd to Mark Pringle, 20 February 1727.
215 Ibid. Copy of a letter from Edward Burd to Gregory French, 25 February 1727. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. 27 February 1727. 
218 Ibid. While it was a relatively common way of avoiding problems in the Channel sailing round the top 
of Scotland was not without its own difficulties. For a start, it added considerable time to the journey, and 
secondly, the sailing conditions could be very dangerous especially at that time of year. The word 
apparently is used in this sentence because it must be remembered that this is Burd’s journal and is 
probably a little biased. 
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid. 1 March 1727, 3 March 1727. 
221 Ibid. 14 March 1727; Janzen, ‘A Scottish Sack Ship’, 11. 
 While the voyage itself was not a commercial success, Burd’s accounts are 
useful for gauging the mood of merchants during this period of conflict.222  In stark 
contrast to the tensions of the diplomatic build-up and the cataclysmic impact upon 
trade that was implied by the consuls and diplomats, merchants appeared to view the 
whole episode as a mere annoyance. In his letter to Claud Johnson, the London link of 
the chain back to the partners in Leith, Burd wrote ‘this  rupture with Spain has proved a 
great disappointment to us’.223  Burd continued to organise trade while in Gibraltar and 
conducted a correspondence with his British factors, who in the case of William Windar 
and Mark Pringle had, it appeared, been ordered to leave Spain. In correspondence to 
the Duke of Newcastle in July 1727 Pringle wrote that he was was ‘horribly seized with 
gout...when the order came from court for all his Britannick Majesty protestant subjects 
to retire out of the country’.224  This episode of gout is not mentioned in any of the 
correspondence to Burd, nor does  it appear that William Windar left Spain, or for that 
matter Nicholas Holloway or John Parker.225 Through Burd’s journal it can be seen that 
Pringle and Windar were still maintaining their trade links despite the state of conflict. 
This  lends more credence to the theory that Spain was more interested in regaining 
Gibraltar than actual war with Britain and, while Britain defended and retained Gibraltar 
it also did not appear to desire all-out conflict with Spain. This does not mean that the 
event did not have importance, the sheer volume of consular letters discussing the 
rising tensions in 1726 shows that, no matter the outcome of the actual military conflict, 
the incident was of the utmost significant. Had the siege expanded into all-out war 
between Britain and Spain, previous conflicts show there would have been a more 
serious effect upon trade. 
Conclusion
 
The eighteenth century began with instability for both Scotland and Spain. Following the 
death of Carlos II, Spain was plunged into uncertainty as the European powers fought 
over who would be allowed to control that country and its wealthy dominions. In 
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Scotland the succession crisis and the threat of the Alien Act resulted in negotiations 
which would end the kingdom’s independence. Despite the problems of both the War of 
Spanish Succession and the tensions between Scotland and England, Scottish trade to 
Iberia continued at the same pace as it had done throughout the 1690s.  
 Technically the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 should have brought peace to Europe. 
However, the peace was far too humiliating for Spain to accept it and, along with the 
ambitions of Elizabeth Farnese, tensions remained. In 1718 war began again between 
Britain and Spain, with losses for British merchants. Mark Pringle’s  career began during 
this  period of strife, and his appointment did not initially progress as it should have. 
Pringle’s story provides evidence as to path the career of a consul could take and the 
support he provided to merchants  during this time. Pringle also continued to trade 
himself, even during the 1727 conflict and defied an order to leave the country. 
 Losing Gibraltar was a particularly hard defeat for the Spanish Crown and, in late 
1726, plans were made to regain the territories. The actions of David Dunbar reveal the 
efforts that were made by both sides to gain and hide information from each other. 
While dealing with merchant matters, Dunbar was also an informant for the British 
government and a messenger for important communications. This was at personal cost 
to himself and, as  he was not alone in providing information, it must be surmised that all 
consuls  faced a certain level of danger within their employments. The actual siege itself 
was something of a damp squib and experienced traders and consuls maintained their 
business almost as normal. Mark Pringle and other consuls  ignored orders to leave the 
country, with Pringle citing ill-health as his reason for being unable to leave. He may 
well have been suffering from gout; however, it didn’t appear to stop him trading as 
normal. 
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Conclusion
One must question the reasons as to why this  type of study has not been attempted 
previously. Given the size and political importance of Iberia, particularly from 1580 to 
1640, its continued neglect within the topic of Scottish diaspora studies  leaves an 
awkward gap in the subject.  From the Scottish side of things, part of the problem stems 
from the usual issues regarding the difficulties in differentiating between the various 
kingdoms of the British Isles. Never was this more apparent than in late sixteenth 
century: where merchants decided where they came from depending on where they 
were at a given time. Scottish merchants did endeavour to ensure that they were 
recognised as subjects of a separate kingdom. The appointment of William Orde was an 
attempt to show the Spanish authorities that although existing on the same island 
England and Scotland were separate countries. Scottish traders, however, did not 
necessarily help themselves in this situation by acting on behalf of and carrying goods 
for their English counterparts. Even one of the most obviously Scottish individuals in 
Spain, James Cunningham, has  been described as English in Spanish historiography.1 
This  is not a purely Scottish problem, with Maria Begoña Villar García lamenting the 
difficulties in extracting Irish individuals from a community that the Spanish crown 
mostly labelled as ‘English’.2 Further, García argues that Irish individuals  in Spain would 
utilise their nationality and, perhaps more importantly, their religion, but would not be 
afraid to seek the protection of English statesmen in Spain under the guise of the Stuart 
and Hanoverian monarchies when necessary.3 The Scots were not alone, therefore, in 
bewildering the Spanish authorities and using this confusion to their advantage when 
required. Later in the century the problems became even more acute, especially after 
the Cromwellian union between England and Scotland in 1654. As the records show, 
several consuls were appointed post-1660 where it is simply unclear whom the 
individuals were intended to represent. 
 While there was certainly a desire by Scots pre-1630 to be recognised as a 
distinct merchant community, this lessened as the century progressed. The relatively 
small size of the merchant community in Iberia (in comparison to Scottish/British trading 
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communities in northern Europe) meant that British merchants  tended to band together. 
In the earlier phases this  facilitated the duplicitous actions of some traders where 
Englishmen pretended to be Scots  and Scots pretended the goods they were carrying 
were Scottish. In the later period the more genuinely integrated British community blurs 
the lines between English and Scottish merchants making it more difficult to distinguish 
between nationalities and their relative share of commerce to the British isles. 
 Such confusion, coupled with a lack of official records  of Scottish-Iberian trade 
has also made it easier for scholars in previous decades to disregard the subject as 
unworthy of investigation. T.C. Smout, in his ground-breaking 1963 publication Scottish 
Trade on the Eve of Union, presumably did not have the time or resources to look 
beyond the surface and therefore concluded that ‘Iberia was  probably the only area 
where there were no Scots’.4  In fact, Smout’s attempt to examine Scotland’s trade with 
all of Europe has spawned dozens of thesis, books, articles  and papers devoted to 
studies of a number of separate countries, kingdoms and regions of Europe. Scholars 
today have access to resources, search engines and online documentation that could 
not have been dreamt of in the 1960s. With archival trips now lasting days instead of 
months due to digital imaging, it is amazing that Smout’s  investigation was as detailed 
as it was.
 Nevertheless, if one looks beyond port records, dozens of examples of trade with 
Iberia come to light, along with information on the merchants  who participated in that 
trade and resided in the Peninsula. The work of Eric Graham and Sue Mowat in 
indexing all the High Court of Admiralty records in particular, provides a wealth of 
collated information that would not have been available twenty years ago. This resource 
has also led to an understanding of the importance of triangular trade with regard to 
Scotland’s commercial relationship with Iberia. Other online resources, such as 
Medieval and Early Modern Sources Online, have made searching for individuals in 
dozens of publications  immeasurably faster than previously, with keyword searches 
providing an array of information that would have formerly required months of tedious 
research. This does present some new problems for scholars, however, as it leads to an 
abundance of material so vast that one of the main challenges of this thesis has been 
deciding what to omit. 
 The religious element has further confused the issue, with a general assumption 
being that those Scottish merchants in Iberia were either run-away Catholics or 
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Jacobites.5  The globalised nature of Habsburg Catholicism, combined with the 
perceived brutality of the Inquisition, has lead to a certain assumption that Scottish 
merchants who did move to Iberia were totally naturalised and immersed into Iberian 
culture, without a backward glance. Alison Games, in particular, has discussed the 
apparent cruelty of the Inquisition towards  English merchants in Lisbon in the period 
from 1584 to 1600, seemingly disregarding the fact that for most of this period England 
was at war with Philip II’s dominions, which included Portugal. Further, she discussed a 
man who was sentenced to death for criticising ‘the sexual behaviour of Catholic priests 
to a friar’.6 Quite apart from the fact that the man should never have been in Lisbon due 
to the conflict, the naïveté of the individual in question is beyond belief. This type of 
discussion in regards to Iberia is  not indicative of how the vast majority of merchants 
behaved and shows an unacceptable level of partiality. It completely ignores the 
pragmatism of British merchants in relation to trade. As has already been shown 
elsewhere in regards to French conflicts and in this thesis, British merchants cared far 
more about maintaining a good profit margin than unrealistic ideals regarding religion. If 
they did disagree with the religious practices of the Peninsula most were not stupid 
enough to openly proclaim such views.
 The evidence provided in this thesis shows that Scotland had a strong and active 
trading relationship with Iberia. Even more importantly, from a Scottish perspective, the 
balance of trade was entirely in Scotland’s favour. Despite, or because of, the wealth 
from the New World, Iberia was no longer able to sustain itself, relying on imports  of 
basic foodstuffs from all over northern Europe.7  In return, Scotland received high cost, 
low quantity items; importantly, these were not items that Scots needed for survival on a 
day-to-day basis. While Scotland has often been described as a poor and backward 
country in the early modern period, in this example, at least, it is  clear that the Scots 
had the economic high ground. 
 Scots drank Iberian wine, ate Iberian fruits and, in the early seventeenth century 
at least, smoked tobacco from the Iberian dominions. The overwhelming evidence from 
household accounts  and personal letters alone shows that Iberian commodities were 
not unheard of but common among the gentry classes. Lemons, figs, olives, olive oil, 
oranges, raisins and wine were all regularly referred to as household goods and, in the 
case of the Duchess of Hamilton, Canary wine was her preferred tipple.8  Despite the 
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risks presented by sailing to southern Europe, Scottish vessels made their way to Iberia 
in significant numbers: by the end of the seventeenth century Glasgow, in particular, 
had a thriving trade with the region. Leith and the ports of the east coast of Scotland 
also sporadically sent vessels to Spain, with the islands  of the Canaries  and Madeira 
proving increasingly popular in triangular trade involving the colonies. While this lack of 
vessels has led to an assumption that the trade was not important, this was not the 
case. The high value, luxury nature of the commodities  that Scotland was receiving from 
Iberia meant that few ships were needed. The very fact that Scots  could trade to Iberia 
when they wished to and did not need to shows the value of the trade in economic 
terms for Scotland. 
  While Scots  did not have communities in Iberia akin to their counterparts in 
Stockholm, Rotterdam or those in Poland-Lithuania, numbers of Scots were resident in 
Iberia and facilitated trade on behalf of their colleagues based in Scotland. It is  very 
difficult to put a precise figure on the number of Scots  in Iberia at any one time. Due to a 
lack of information there are several individuals, such as John Rendon, for whom it is 
clear where they were (in Rendon’s case, Cadiz) but not what activities  they were 
engaging in. According to his brother’s letters, William Dunlop travelled to Spain twice in 
the 1680s, and through this guests such as Mr Murie are understood to be at James 
Cunningham’s house. Dunlop and Murie were presumably in Spain for trading 
purposes, but, so far it has not been possible to confirm this. In this light the Scottish 
community in Iberia is  probably more akin to the Scottish community in the Elbe-Weser 
region of Germany than its equivalent in Rotterdam or Gothenburg. Nevertheless, 
considering what was understood previously, the evidence certainly shows the presence 
of a far more important merchant community in Iberia than has formally been believed. 
 This  thesis certainly does not claim to be the be all and end of investigation into 
Scottish trade with the Iberian world in the early modern period. Andalusia alone could 
actually be investigated in a project of a similar scale. Scottish connections with other 
areas, London especially, also need to be completed before entrepôt trade can be fully 
understood. William Fraser, George Outcherlony, James Foulis and William Home are 
probably only the tip of the iceberg in regards to Scottish traders in London who dealt in 
Iberian goods. The lack of indexing at municipal archives  in Iberia, for example Cadiz, 
Mallorca and the Inquisition records at Aquivo do Torre Tombo in Lisbon means that it is 
highly likely there is much more information available - but due to the constraints of time 
it was  simply not possible to search through all the material. Evidence for trade 
post-1730 also abounds, with the archives in Seville showing letters  of naturalisation 
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giving permission for Scots to proceed to South America in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. There are several mentions of Scots in secondary literature for the 
eighteenth century. For example, in her investigation on the British and Irish community 
in Cadiz in the last decades of the eighteenth century María del Carmen Lario has 
noted 15 Scots, five with the surname Gordon, suggesting some form of family 
network.9 José Antonio Salas Auséns has estimated that between 1764 and 1773 there 
were 79 merchants of English and Scottish origin in Spain.10  While Auséns  has not 
differentiated between the two groups, which could have been labeled ‘Britons’, his work 
provides further evidence and could provide another starting point for a stand-alone 
investigation of Scots in Iberia post 1730. Other articles in the same edited collection 
also make reference to Scots in the later part of the eighteenth century, such as  Manuel 
Hernández González’s work on foreign merchants trading from the Canary Islands  to 
the Americas.11 While the constraints of time and space have meant that it has not been 
possible for this thesis to investigate beyond the first decades of the eighteenth century 
there is certainly scope to do so and on a larger scale than this project. 
 Finally, a major theme in this  thesis has  been conflict. It is  clear that, whether 
Scotland was  involved or not, the wars of its  closest neighbours and Iberia affected 
Scottish trade with the Peninsula. Scottish merchants were taken for Englishmen and 
had their goods and vessels seized during the Anglo-Spanish war of the late sixteenth 
century. Dutch-Spanish conflicts spilled into Scottish harbours during the 1620s, with 
the internal upheavals  of the 1640s and 1650s causing problems for all Scottish trade 
and not merely trade to Iberia. However, these incidents also show an admirable 
resilience. During one Anglo-Spanish (1584-1603) war, in particular, Scottish merchants 
exploited every advantage given to them by the conflict. A complicated and extensive 
network of Scots trading on behalf of English merchants emerges, and with the example 
of William Hunter, at least, it is clear that James VI was fully aware of the situation. The 
Habsburg authorities, for their part, also knew of this and while some Scots were 
deprived of their goods  and ships, Spanish economic necessity allowed the practice to 
continue. The Anglo-Dutch wars showed further ingenuity by Scottish merchants who 
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appeared to merely move their base of operations to the Spanish Netherlands while the 
conflicts raged. Finally, the British-Spanish spat in 1726-7, while inducing an almost 
hysterical reaction diplomatically, was regarded as  a nuisance by British merchants who 
clearly just wished for the powers that be to leave them alone to trade in peace. It 
appeared that no matter the situation or conflict, the attitude of Scottish merchants was 
clear: ‘keep calm and carry on’. 
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Appendices
Appendix I
Trade to/from Iberian Peninsula and Islands from Glasgow
• This  appendix notes all entries in the E72/10 and E72/19 Exchequer Records of the 
National Archives of Scotland
• Due to the constraints of space only the principal cargoes are recorded. 
• For ships leaving Glasgow the last date recorded is utilised. That is  to say, that a 
vessel may be recorded several times during the time of its  loading but in order to try 
and give an accurate departure date the last recorded date is  used. Conversely with 
ships arriving to Glasgow the first date is utilised in this table. 
• Any errors are my own. 
Date Name of 
Vessel
From To Cargo Master E72
22 May 1666
27 Sep 1666
15 Oct 1666
24 Dec 1666
11 Feb 1667
6 Dec 1669
3 May 1670
10 Aug 1670
18 Dec 1671
18 Oct 1672
27 Nov 1680
2 Feb 1681
23 Feb 1681
8 Apr 1681
13 Apr 1681
Providence of 
Glasgow 
Spain Glasgow wine, 
raisins, figs
unknown 10/1
Providence of 
Glasgow 
Glasgow Spain tallow, 
salmon, 
butter
John Scott 10/1
St Francis of 
Bruges
Glasgow Bilbao Herring unknown 10/1
Bruges vessel Glasgow Bilbao Herring unknown 10/1
Providence of 
Glasgow 
Cadiz Glasgow Wine. John Scott 10/1
Elizabeth of 
Leith
Spain Glasgow Salmon Edward Burd 10/2
Providence of 
Glasgow 
Cadiz Glasgow Wine John 
Anderson
10/2
Providence of 
Glasgow 
Glasgow Cadiz Candles John 
Anderson
10/2
John of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow Wine John Miller 10/3
Providence of 
Glasgow 
Glasgow Cadiz cloth, 
candles, 
salmon
John 
Anderson
10/3
Speedwell of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Spain Candles, 
tallow
John 
Woodside
19/2
Robert of 
Irvine
Spain Glasgow Wine Robert Alison 19/1
Unicorn of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Spain Butter, linen Archibald 
Murphy
19/2
Walter Spain Glasgow Wine, 
raisins, 
olives
George Lyon 19/1
John of 
Glasgow
Spain Glasgow wine, 
raisins, 
oranges, 
lemons, 
olives
Alexander 
Watson
19/1
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Date Name of 
Vessel
From To Cargo Master E72
4 Jun 1681
15 Jun 1681
21 Jun 1681
2 Aug 1681
3 Sep 1681
12 Sep 1681
4 Jan 1682
9 Jan 1682
10 Jan 1682
8 Aug 1682
25 Aug 1682
26 Oct 1682
8 Nov 1682
12 Dec 1682
12 Dec 1682
14 Aug 1683
Old Hope of 
Glasgow
Spain Glasgow wine John Lerkie 19/1
Nightingale of 
Renfrew
Glasgow Spain Beef, Butter, 
Candles, 
linen cloth, 
stockings
George Lyon 19/2
Isobel of 
Renfrew
Glasgow Spain Stockings, 
fine linen, 
candle, 
wheat, 
tallow, 
stockings
William 
Glabraith
19/2
Speedwell of 
Glasgow
Spain Glasgow Salt, Olive 
Oil, olives, 
dry 
confections
John 
Woodside
19/3
Robert of 
Irvine
Spain Glasgow Wine. Robert Alison 19/1
Pelican of 
Glasgow
Spain Glasgow wine, 
cochineal, 
olives
William Craig 19/3
Nightingale of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow Wine, 
oranges, 
lemons, 
cochineal
George Lyon 19/4
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Spain Glasgow wine, salt, 
figs, raisins, 
cochineal, 
oranges, 
lemons, oil
William 
Galbraith
19/5
Andrew of 
Belfast
Spain Glasgow Wine, figs, 
raisins
unknown 19/5
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz candles, 
stockings, 
linen cloth.
George Lyon 19/6
Janet of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz linen cloth, 
stockings, 
candles, 
beef, butter
James Rae 19/6
Nightingale of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz butter, linen 
cloth, 
candles
James 
Wilson
19/6
Janet of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, salt, 
raisins
James Rae 19/8
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, 
oranges, 
lemons, oil, 
figs
George Lyon 19/8
Janet of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, figs, 
raisins, oil,
John Miller 19/8
Janet of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz candles, 
stockings, 
butter
John Miller 19/8
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27 Aug 1683
31 Oct 1683
3 Jan 1684
7 Apr 1684
6 Aug 1684
24 Nov 1684
30 Jan 1685
12 Aug 1685
28 Aug 1685
1 Oct 1685
7 Dec 1685
9 Jan 1686
Charles of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz linen cloth, 
candles, 
stockings, 
butter, tallow
William 
Anderson
19/8
Success of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz cloth, shoes, 
stockings, 
plaiding 
hose, 
gloves, 
tobacco 
pipes, grind 
stones
unknown 19/8
Janet of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow raisins, figs, 
wine,
John Miller 19/9
Charles of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, raisins William 
Anderson
19/9
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz linen, 
stockings, 
butter, 
candles
James 
Campbell
19/9
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, 
raisins, figs, 
olives, olive 
oil
James 
Campbell
19/9
Amity of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow Wine, 
raisins, 
cochineal, 
figs
James 
Wilson
19/9
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz butter, 
shoes, linen, 
stockings
James 
Campbell
19/11
Charles of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz linen cloth, 
stockings, 
butter
William 
Campbell
19/11
Leopard of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz butter, linen, 
candles, 
beef, 
stockings
James Rae 19/11
Charles of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, 
lemons
William 
Campbell
19/12
Leopard of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, 
raisins, figs, 
cochineal, 
oil, currants
James Rae 19/12
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From To Cargo Master E72
23 Feb 1686
2 Mar 1686
10 Jul 1686
16 Aug 1686
13 Sep 1686
9 Oct 1686
4 Dec 1688
17 Jun 1689
10 Sep 1689
12 Oct 1689
31 Oct 1689
26 Nov 1689
Richard and 
John of 
London
Glasgow Cadiz linen, shoes, 
tobacco 
pipes, 
thread, 
playing 
cards, 
stockings, 
nails, 
feathers, 
candles, 
knives, 
horse shoes, 
night caps, 
gloves
James 
Moodie
19/13
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow oil, olives, 
wine, 
lemons, 
oranges, 
figs, raisins, 
James 
Campbell
19/12
Charles of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz linen, 
stockings
James 
Biskett
19/13
Swan of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Spain linen, shoes, 
stockings
Quentin 
Crawford
10/13
Dolphin of 
Boston
Glasgow Madeira gloves, 
thread, 
stocking, 
hats, sack 
cloth, coal, 
grind stones
Alexander 
Coll
19/13
Providence of 
Belfast
Glasgow Madeira unknown John Loriner 19/13
Pelican of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, 
cochineal, 
oil, salad oil, 
raisins, 
lemons, 
oranges, 
figs
Ninian 
Gibson
19/14
Walter of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Lisbon salt, sugar. Hew 
Campbell
19/14
Salisbury of 
Boston
Glasgow Madeira linen, 
woolen 
cloth, 
gloves, coal
Andrew 
Doberry
19/14
Endeavour of 
New England
Glasgow Madeira coal, linen, 
flemish 
sacking
John 
Brackanbury
19/15
Friendship of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz butter, linen, 
tallow, 
candles, 
stockings
James 
Sinclair
19/15
Pelican of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine. Ninian 
Gibson
19/15
230
Date Name of 
Vessel
From To Cargo Master E72
3 Apr 1690
31 Jul 1690
2 Dec 1690
8 Dec 1690
9 Dec 1690
10 Dec 1690
10 Dec 1690
29 Dec 1690
10 Jan 1691
17 Jan 1691
20 Jan 1691
9 Feb 1691
6 Mar 1691
23 Mar 1691
22 Apr 1691
7 Jun 1691
25 May 1691
Agreement of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, olives, 
salt, oil, figs, 
almond
Alexander 
Spirks
19/18
Friendship of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, oil, 
salt, raisins, 
cochineal
James 
Sinclair
19/18
Agreement of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Cadiz stockings, 
candles, 
herring, 
butter, linen
Alexander 
Spinker
19/22
Providence of 
Lisbon
Glasgow Lisbon coal James Bogel 19/22
Alexander of 
Dublin
Glasgow Lisbon coal. Alexander 
Younger
19/22
Robert Glasgow Lisbon linen, 
thread, 
gloves
Robert 
Dunlop
19/22
Fortune of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Canary Islands candles, 
linen cloth, 
beef, thread
James 
Campbell
19/22
Marigold of 
Belfast
Glasgow Madeira candle cord, 
cloth, 
stockings, 
herring, 
linen cloth
Robert Goss 19/22
Joan of 
Belfast
Glasgow Madeira cloth, shoes, 
stockings, 
thread, hats, 
beef
John 
Harrison
19/22
Plaindealing 
of Colraine
Glasgow Madeira linen, 
woolen 
cloth, 
stockings, 
shoes, 
thread, silk 
buttons
Samuel 
Wilson
19/22
Prosperity of 
Belfast
Glasgow Madeira coal Mathew 
Scott
19/22
John of 
Londonderry
Glasgow Madeira linen cloth, 
shoes, hats, 
stockings
Andrew 
Cruickshank
19/22
Friendship of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow brandy, wine James 
Sinclair
19/21
Isobel of 
Glasgow
Glasgow San Sebastian coal John 
Finlayson
19/22
Friendship of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Lisbon coal, cloth, 
tallow
Archibald 
Yool
19/22
Charles of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Lisbon coal. James 
Johnson
19/22
Fortune of 
Glasgow
Canary Islands Glasgow Wine James 
Campbell
19/21
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2 Jun 1691
12 Sep 1691
14 Sep 1691
21 Sep 1691
23 Sep 1691
31 Oct 1691
26 Dec 1695
2 Jan 1696
28 Jan 1696
3 Feb 1696
29 Feb 1696
2 Mar 1696
3 Mar 1696
4 Mar 1696
6 Apr 1696
John of 
Greenock
Bilbao Glasgow brandy, 
wine, salt
Francis 
Duncan
19/21
Adventure of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Madeira linen, 
stockings, 
plaiding 
hose, gloves
Thomas 
Fisher
19/22
vessel of 
Boston
Glasgow Madeira linen, shoes, 
thread, 
gloves
Thomas Eyre 19/22
Fortune of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Bilbao tallow, 
butter
John Watson 19/22
Friendship of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow salt, white 
wine, brandy
Archibald 
Yool
19/21
Katherine of 
Glasgow
Glasgow Madeira linen, 
stockings, 
thread, 
shoes, nails, 
coats
Andrew 
Cruickshank
19/22
James of 
Glasgow
Bilbao Glasgow salt, sugar. Thomas 
Angus
19/23
Thomas of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow wine, 
prunes, 
brandy
John Ker 19/23
John and 
James of 
Leith
Bilbao Glasgow brandy, 
wine, 
prunes, 
writing 
papers, 
raisins, 
almonds, 
olives, 
walnuts
Edward Burd 19/23
George of 
Aberdeen
Bilbao Glasgow wine, 
brandy, 
chestnuts
William 
Trevier
19/23
Adventure of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow Wine, 
brandy, 
paper, 
chestnuts, 
glasses
Alexander 
Stewart
19/23
Margaret of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow Wine, 
brandy, 
chestnuts
James Rae 19/23
Margaret San Sebastian Glasgow wine, brandy Thomas 
Gourlie
19/23
Angel of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow wine, 
vinegar, 
paper, 
brandy, 
chestnuts
Charles 
Ramsay
19/23
Marion of 
Glasgow
Canary Islands Glasgow canary wine, 
brandy
John Watson 19/23
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8 Apr 1696
9 May 1696
11 May 1696
13 May 1696
26 May 1696
5 Jun 1696
25 Jun 1696
Total
Elizabeth of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow salt, brandy, 
white wine, 
paper
Robert 
Sinclair
19/23
Lamb of 
Glasgow
Cadiz Glasgow wine, 
lemons, 
oranges, oil, 
olives, figs, 
cochineal
Thomas 
Ballatine
19/23
St John of 
Glasgow
Bilbao Glasgow wine, 
malaga 
wine, sugar, 
molasses, 
lemons, 
oranges, salt
Unknown 19/23
Concord of 
Glasgow
San Sebastian Glasgow salt, brandy, 
white wine, 
canary wine, 
paper
Robert Arthur 19/23
Drothea of 
Glasgow
Bilbao Glasgow salt, raisins, 
prunes, 
brandy, 
paper
John Scarre 19/23
Chestour of 
Glasgow
Bilbao Glasgow brandy, 
wine, 
prunes, 
paper, 
canary wine
David Dunlop 19/23
James of 
Glasgow
Canary Islands Glasgow Canary wine John 
Morrison
19/23
49 From Iberia. 45 to Iberia.
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Appendix II
Trade to/from Iberian Peninsula and Islands from Glasgow
• This  appendix notes all the entries in the E72/15 Exchequer Records of the National 
Archives of Scotland. 
• Other notes for this appendix are the same as appendix one. 
Date Name of 
Vessel
From To Cargo Master Source
7 Feb 1667
2 Jul 1667
20 Dec 1671
22 Mar 1672
22 Mar 1672
22 Mar 1672
3 Jan 1681
26 Feb 1681
16 Dec 1682
21 May 1683
21 May 1683
29 May 1683
6 Jul 1683
St John of 
Gothenburg
Leith Bilbao salmon, herring, 
Irish butter.
Henry 
Wilkie
E72/15/6, 
Swedish 
Riksarkivet, 
Anglica VII, 
vol. 542 
(1660-1670), 
undated, 
unfoliated, c.
1666/7. 
Green 
Parrot of 
Statten
Leith Bilbao tallow, salmon. Unknown. E72/15/6. 
unknown Leith Lisbon salmon. William 
Bosworth
E72/15/11.
James of 
Pittenweem
Cadiz Leith raisins, lemons, 
oranges, olives.
John Cook E72/15/12. 
Anna of 
Pittenweem
Cadiz Leith wine, raisins John 
Aitchson
E72/15/12. 
Janet of 
Leith
Cadiz Leith figs, raisins, oil. Andrew 
Hall
E72/15/12. 
William and 
John of 
Leith
Cadiz Leith wine John Hay E72/15/22.
Beatrice of 
Burntisland
Cadiz Leith wine John 
Rutherford
E72/15/22.
George of 
Leith
Cadiz Leith wine. Edward 
Burd
E72/15/27. 
Albony of 
Leith
Leith Cadiz Victual Alexander 
Stevenson
E72/15/26.
Margaret of 
Leith
Leith Cadiz linen, felt hats. William 
Moncrieﬀ
E72/15/26.
Alexander 
of Leith
Leith Cadiz wheat, tallow, 
biscuit and 
candles
Robert 
Dunbar
E72/15/26.
Crown of 
Burntisland
Leith Cadiz Victual, biscuit, 
candles
Thomas 
Dewer
E72/15/26.
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From To Cargo Master Source
12 Jul 1683
11 Aug 1683
20 Nov 1683
26 Nov 1683
10 Dec 1683
4 Jan 1684
17 Jan 1684
25 Feb 1684
11 Aug 1684
29 Aug 1684
12 Jan 1685
9 Feb 1685
20 Feb 1685
17 Sep 1685
5 Oct 1685
1 Apr 1686
1 Apr 1686
21 Aug 1686
4 Sep 1686
James of 
Leith
Leith Cadiz Victual James 
Burnet
E72/15/26.
William and 
John of 
Leith
Leith Cadiz Victual, Butter, 
Biscuit, Linen .
John Hay E72/15/26.
William and 
John of 
Leith
Spain Leith Wine. John Hay E72/15/29.
Alexander 
of Leith
Cadiz Leith Wine. Robert 
Dunbar
E72/15/29. 
Red Lion of 
Leith
Spain Leith Wine. Unknown. E72/15/29. 
James of 
Leith
Cadiz Leith Wine. James 
Burnet
E72/15/29.
Henry of 
Leith
Cadiz Leith Wine. John Taitt E72/15/29.
Albony of 
Leith
Cadiz Leith Wine. Alexander 
Stevenson
E72/15/29.
unknown Leith Spain Linen, butter. John Hay E72/15/28.
unknown Leith Spain Wheat John Muir E72/15/28.
Henry of 
Leith
Cadiz Leith Wine John Swift E72/15/33
Sophia of 
Leith
Leith Spain Victual John 
Mackie. 
E72/15/31. 
Elizabeth of 
Leith
Spain Leith Wine John Muir E72/15/33. 
Unknown Leith Spain Wheat. Robert 
Dunbar
E72/15/32
unknown Leith Spain Wheat. James 
Dounie
E72/15/32. 
Alexander 
of Leith
Spain Leith olive oil, olives, 
oil, figs, raisins, 
wine
Robert 
Dunbar
E72/15/36, 
E72/15/39, 
E72/15/38.
Speedwell 
of Leith
Spain Leith raisins, olives, 
olive oil, 
James 
Dounie
E72/15/36, 
E72/15/38.  
unknown Leith Spain wheat. James 
Simpson
E72/15/37.
unknown Leith Spain wheat, linen. James 
Dounie
E72/15/37.
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1 Feb 1689
11 Feb 1689
31 Oct 1689
8 Jan 1690
10 Sept 
1690
1 Oct 1690
20 Dec 
1690
15 Apr 1691
19 May 
1691
26 May 1691
Speedwell 
of Leith
Cadiz Leith Figs, olives, 
raisins, olive oil. 
James 
Dounie
E72/15/40, 
E72/15/43
Lyon of 
Leith
Spain Leith figs, raisins, oil, 
wine
James 
Kendall
E72/15/40, 
E72/15/42,E
72/15/43
unknown Spain Leith wine James 
Kendall
E72/15/40
The George 
of Leith
Leith Bilbao Unknown Robert 
Gilmour
E72/15/44. 
Sophia of 
Pittenweem
Spain Leith raisins, olives, 
olive oil, wine, 
indigo. 
John 
Aitchson
E72/15/44, 
E72/15/47. 
RH15/59/2
Lion of Leith Cadiz Leith raisins, currants, 
white powder 
sugar, olive oil, 
canary wine
James 
Kendall
E72/15/47. 
Friendship Bilbao Leith Brandy Claus 
Fassie
E72/14/44, 
E72/15/49. 
Constancia 
of 
Copenhage
n
Bilbao Leith Brandy Michael 
Lawson
E72/15/44, 
E72/15/49, 
E72/15/51
Mary of 
Ostend
Cadiz Leith Wine, raisins, 
almonds, figgs, 
olive oil, small 
goods 
James 
Holbrand
E72/15/44, 
E72/15/49, 
E72/15/51
St Martine Bilbao Leith French Wine, 
brandy, wine, 
vinegar
Peter 
Barndler
E72/15/44. 
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Appendix III 
Consuls
• This  is a list of consuls who, due to the Treaty of Madrid (1667) should have 
represented all British merchants but who are normally listed as consul for the English 
nation appointed by the King of Great Britain.
Name Date Place Source
Charles Black 
Thomas Cunningham
Nicholas Holloway
Charles Burgoin
Robert Gode
Martin Westcomb
John Parker
Mr Doleman
Edward Smith
James Pendares
Thomas Moore
Alexander Stanhope
William Frankland
Felix Neito
Thomas Jeﬀries
William Paulin
Christopher Joiner
William Garret
late 17th century. Cadiz AGS, Estado 6870
1670 Canary Islands AGS, Estado 6870
1698 Malaga AGS, Estado 4192
1690 Galicia AGS, Estado 4192
1690 San Lucar de 
Barrameda, Sevilla
AGS, Estado 4192
1690 Cadiz AGS, Estado 4192
1690 Galicia AGS, Estado 4192
1690 Alicante AGS, Estado 4192
1690 Canary Islands AGS, Estado 4192
1681 Malaga AGS, Estado 4191, 
4192
1694 Cartagena AGS, Estado 4192
1695 Sevilla/Malaga AGS, Estado 4191
1685 San Sebastian, 
Bilbao
AGS, Estado 4191
1685 Canary Islands AGS, Estado 4191
1687 Valencia, Murcia & 
Balearics 
AGS, Estado 4191, 
4192
1683 Alicante AGS, Estado 4191
1686 Cartagena AGS, Estado 4191
1690 Alicante AGS, Estado 4192
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Appendix IV 
Notes for online database. 
http://live-scots-in-iberia.gotpantheon.com/node
This  database started as a tool with which to store notes during my research. Running 
from 1580-1730 the database covers individuals and vessels which I have discovered 
while researching my thesis. However, there are some important points to note: 
• Due to the fact that trade during the Anglo-Dutch Wars’ artificially inflates Scottish 
trade with the Spanish Netherlands this has not been included.
• The database does not include entries or departures from Glasgow or Leith. 
• It also does not include voyages that were chartered for Iberia but did not arrive or it is 
not clear that they arrived. 
• The database does occasionally make note of events post 1730, but this is normally in 
relation to an individual or ship which appeared pre-1730. For example, in the case of 
Mark Pringle. 
• Admiralty Court Records  (prefix ACX/XXX) where these records are preceded by the 
acronym HCA the record has  been created from Sue Mowat and Eric Grahams edited 
collection, The Records of the High Court of Admiralty of Scotland, 1627-1750. 
However, when preceded by NAS the original document has been consulted. 
• Occasionally individuals are included whose purpose is  unclear - this is in the hope 
that their purpose will be discovered at a future date. 
• Non-Scots have been included where they interacted with or influenced the trade of, 
Scottish merchants. 
• Names have been noted in modern English spelling unless none is available. 
• In order to keep the database as succinct as  possible only prominent Scottish based 
merchants involved in trading Iberian goods have been included. 
• Abbreviations are the same as those within the main project. 
Finally, the database is not exhaustive by any means. These are only the individuals 
that have been discovered following three years of research. I have no doubt that many 
more individuals or vessels are waiting to discovered and I welcome any additions. 
Any errors within the database are entirely my own. 
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